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Abstract 
This thesis considers the various ways in which J.L. Austin's discussion of the performative 
utterance—of what is done with words and, indeed, of what words "do"—has been taken by 
philosophers. It shows how different understandings of the performative dimension of 
language can illuminate thinking about language and education. Austin notes that some 
(performative) utterances "do things" (such as "I christen this ship the..."). Certain kinds of 
utterance "perform" an action. What is particularly interesting about Austin's discovery is his 
conclusion that truth statements (what he calls "constative utterances") are, in different ways, 
also doing things. Despite the fact that the "ordinary language philosophy" with which Austin 
is particularly associated is normally understood as a development within analytic philosophy, 
his impact goes well beyond this, and his ideas have sometimes found themselves in some 
strange places. This brings us to the first appearance of "performativity", the term ""coined by 
French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard. First appearing in Lyotard's The Postmodern 
Condition, the term purports to describe the state of knowledge within postmodern society. For 
Lyotard, Enlightenment narratives have been replaced by an obsessive concern with 
"effectiveness". Here Austin's performative is used as a metaphor. The second treatment of the 
word "performativity" considered originates with Judith Butler. Butler argues that "truths" 
pertaining to gender are not "rooted" in anything other than linguistic performances. When 
reiterated, such truths come to be perceived as constitutive. The ideas pertaining to 
performatives mentioned above will be interspersed with other work on the performative 
utterance drawn from philosophy and social theory. Here I draw on the work of Habermas, 
Derrida and Cavell amongst others. The philosophical analysis provides the backdrop for a 
discussion of language, ethics and education. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: What's it all about? 
Let us begin with some blunt remarks. This thesis examines the various ways in which 
J.L. Austin's discussion of the performative utterance is taken up by a number of 
philosophers (and in some cases sociologists) to develop interesting ways of thinking 
about what is done with words and, indeed, what words "do". In the process I hope to 
show how various understandings of the performative dimension of language can 
illuminate ways of thinking about language and education. 
John Langshaw Austin was born in Lancaster and educated at Balliol College, Oxford. 
He became White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford. Austin was a staunch 
advocate for examining the way words are used in order to elucidate meaning. He is 
generally regarded as a British-American analytic philosopher. The school of twentieth 
century analytic philosophy (which to some extent is also Austrian-German) has two 
main sub-branches. The first is the logical positivist branch of philosophy that includes 
the work of Frege, Russell, Mach and indeed, early Wittgenstein. The most famous 
philosophical works deriving from this movement include Ludwig Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein, 1922) and A.J. Ayer's Language, 
Truth, and Logic (1946). Logical positivist ideas were developed in the work of Rudolf 
Carnap and Carl Hempel (amongst others) in what became known as the Vienna 
Circle. 
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As legend has it, the second branch of analytic philosophy emerged out of weekly 
discussions held sometime between 1936 and 37 in Oxford. Austin is credited with 
initiating these discussions and is thought to be their leading spirit up until the war. 
What emerged from these discussions is generally known as "ordinary language 
philosophy." It was taken up especially after the end of World War II, centering most 
fully in Oxford and is sometimes called "Oxford philosophy". Austin tends to be 
treated as the leading exponent of that form of analytic philosophy, though some argue 
that the movement begins with G.E. Moore. The former's work appealed to those 
philosophers (including Searle, Strawson and Grice) who were attracted to analytic 
philosophy but shared a distaste for logical empiricism. Austin's most famous writings 
include Sense and Sensibilia (1964), 'A Plea for Excuses' (1961), 'How to Talk: Some 
simple Ways' (1953) and How to do Things with Words (1962). 
As regards the performative utterance, the main tenet of Austin's discovery is fairly 
straightforward: there are kinds of utterance that do not simply state or describe things, 
but "do things" in being said. So, when a priest utters the words "I now declare you 
man and wife" he has not just said something to the bride and groom, he has "married 
them". We can therefore say that certain kinds of utterance "perform" an action in 
being said. This all seems fairly straightforward and in the case of explicit 
performatives it is. However, Austin comes to the conclusion that truth statements 
(what he calls constative utterances) are, in different ways, also doing things. 
The "impact" (consider what has happened to this word—what it now "does") of 
Austin's performative (and theory of speech acts) on the world of philosophy is 
particularly unusual given the philosopher's background. What I mean by this last 
remark is that Austin's performative shows up at the kind of party that would not 
normally be frequented by his peers from the tradition he is usually placed in. One does 
not tend to find much reference to Moore, Russell, Ayer, Strawson, Grice, Searle, etc. 
in poststructuralist philosophy, gender studies, queer theory, sociology or debates on 
the historical/cultural status of knowledge within the university. Indeed, it is amusing 
to imagine Austin looking down from the kind of metaphysical dimension he had no 
time for at the kinds of work he had inspired. I do not use the word "inspired" lightly—
there is nothing sneering, hostile or wholly critical about Austin's reception in these 
various domains. 
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That is not to say that the responses to Austin (which will feature throughout this 
thesis) are wholly sympathetic or uncritical. By the same token, the performative 
utterance can be adopted rather hastily and used in ways that may seem a little forced. 
This brings us to the first appearance of the word "performativity". The term 
"performativity" was coined by French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard. It first 
appears in The Postmodern Condition (first published in French in 1979 though not 
translated into English until 1984). Performativity denotes the systematic functioning 
of knowledge within postmodern society (Austin would certainly be appalled by a 
sentence such as this one!). Lyotard describes a situation in which the narratives of the 
Enlightenment have been replaced by a concern for "efficiency" or "effectiveness"—
for what works. Here the performative acts as much as a metaphor as anything else. 
Truth (the constative) becomes coterminous with whether or not it is efficient. This has 
little to do with what Austin meant when he noted the constative and performative 
dimensions of the utterance. Indeed, Lyotard's philosophy of language is rather 
Austinian in certain respects. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. 
The second treatment (chronologically, and in terms of the structure of this thesis) of 
the word "performativity" that we will be considering here originates with philosopher, 
feminist critic and queer theorist, Judith Butler. One "commonsense" view of gender 
differences dictates that such differences are innate or biologically determined and 
relate to an inner truth belonging to the world. Butler argues that such "truths" are not 
"rooted" in anything other than linguistic performances, which, through their 
reiteration, come to be perceived as constitutive. 
Having outlined the meanings ascribed to performatives and performativities, I should 
mention that, during the thesis, these ideas will be interspersed with other work on the 
performative utterance drawn from philosophy and social theory. Lyotard's 
"performativity" is a more or less direct response to Habermas's treatment of 
consensus, which, in no small part, relies on a reading of Austin. Butler's 
performativity is both an affirmation of Derrida's reading of How to do Things with 
Words, which appears in his famous essay "Signature, Event Context" (Derrida, 1988), 
and a response to Bourdieu's account of language's "performative magic". Stanley 
Cavell's discussion of performance and passion both exposes the limitations of 
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Austin's work on the performative and directs its insights further into the expressive 
complexities of language. 
A bit of autobiography 
It is difficult, without being incredibly glib, to give a brief introductory explanation of 
what all the "difficult philosophy" described above might have to do with education or, 
more narrowly, schooling. Therefore, I want to let this emerge more slowly. It is 
customary when writing a thesis to give an autobiographical account of how one came 
to undertake such a project in the first place. This necessarily involves some story-
telling (with, I daresay, a few unintentionally tall tales thrown in for good measure). 
Let us begin with a recent story, one that will hopefully serve to open things up. 
In the last few years I have taught in a university education department. During a 
meeting concerning a Masters course in which students "research their own practice", 
one of the discussion topics concerned the extent to which the students should give 
autobiographical explanations for why they were taking on a particular project. It was 
felt by most participants that this should be a statutory component of a Masters thesis. 
Consequently the whole discussion had the scent of artificiality, box ticking, possibly 
an element of the confession. Then again, perhaps this was partly to do with the nature 
of the course. The notion of researching practice sometimes conjured images of Piglet 
retracing his footsteps round a tree in search of a woozle. This feeling was only 
intensified when I discovered that some of my colleagues intended to research their 
own practice on a course where others were researching theirs (Pooh joins Piglet). The 
circle could be drawn ever wider without anybody necessarily letting out a giggle. 
Now this is not to say that some of the students on this "teacher research" course had 
no stake in what they were doing, though quite a few had to strive quite hard to come 
up with a topic to look into. Neither would it be fair to say that their projects were 
necessarily lacking either richness or insight. However, it was notable how excited 
some of them were during the week in which the lecture focused on philosophy of 
education. During this session, the students were asked to consider the relative merits 
of liberal and progressive approaches to education and what had happened to these 
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ideas in the current climate of "performativity". To what extent did the focus on 
minimum target grades, SATS, learning styles, learning to learn, self-esteem etc. jar 
with liberal or progressive ideals? Had education "evolved"? When I say that the 
students were excited this is to some degree relative. They were less excited by (though 
not uninterested in) sessions on coding, data analysis and the difference between 
qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods research. 
As part of the research into the practice of those teaching others to research their own 
practice, the person who wrote the lecture materials was later interviewed and asked 
why this session had gone so well. There was an expectation that he would talk about 
the quality of the materials, the accessibility of the readings, the engaging language in 
which the lecture was couched, in other words the formal effectiveness, perhaps 
appropriateness of the session and the quality of the content. The answer that was given 
touches on none of these themes (though this is not to say that the lecture was entirely 
lacking in these respects). Rather the reply was that "this is the stuff they 'care' about". 
I would not want to suggest that the students did not care about their projects or "mixed 
methods" etc. One can care about solving a problem in the classroom. That said, the 
very notion of "solving a problem" implies a scientific detachment and a series of 
methods to sort it out. Scientists of all sorts may care about the problems they seek to 
solve but this is a very limited kind of caring. Failure to find a solution to a problem 
may result in frustration but somehow does not capture the generality that pertains to 
caring about one's profession. It is this kind of caring that informs my thesis. I shall 
indicate what this amounts to with a short biographical account of my experience of 
school teaching. 
Following a break from education I studied for a PGCE in Secondary English at a 
university in the North of England. I still recall being somewhat shocked by some of 
the pronouncements issued in sessions given to the entire cohort. Most shocking of all 
was the "discovery" that modern pedagogy was no longer about teaching your subject. 
At that moment I did not have a philosophical objection to this kind of statement. 
Rather I recall a shudder deriving from a mild terror. What could I teach if not my 
subject? The lecture's following diatribe concerning "key" and "transferable" skills did 
nothing to soften the blow. I remember that it was not at all clear that the speaker knew 
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what these things were and, worse still, I didn't like the sound of them. Moreover, even 
then (and this would be something that would follow me into school meetings) I found 
it hard to listen to this stuff—it became a blur. I found my mind wandering—I was "off 
task". 
Throughout my PGCE and during my five years as an English teacher I remember 
some feelings of incredulity at the sorts of things teachers were expected to swallow or 
put into practice. It is tempting to make a list of these because that is how they were 
generally presented to me—via bullet points, on a PowerPoint presentation. Presenters 
would be "experts". As I do not want my thesis to be about "supplying information" or 
setting myself up as an "expert", let us continue with sentences and paragraphs for the 
moment. Anyway, what I discovered about teaching during this time was that it tended 
to put a lot of emphasis on planning (schemes of work, seating plans, strategies for 
monitoring pupils, planning how to best go about planning). If I was not planning, I 
was assessing—if the child breathes, assess the quality of her breath. Is this 
hyperbolic? Well, only a little. 
During my years as a teacher, I was often struck by the kind of language used. There 
was a "strategy" for pretty much everything and a lot of "terms" cropped up that 
seemed to be drawn from psychology. Stimulate the reptilian brain. Accommodate 
kinaesthetic learners. There would also be plenty of slogans. Are the children "learning 
to learn"? How can we get them to "maximise their potential"? "Our school is about 
"inclusion". We are an "including school". In short, the language of teaching is rich (is 
this really the right word?) in acronyms, slogans and technical terminology. It takes a 
while to adjust to this language. At first it induces fear and insecurity—and the feeling 
that everybody seems to understand what is going on except me. With "experience" the 
language becomes second nature and provides the linguistic competence and horizon 
for professional life. It binds you to the fellow members of the professional 
community. Induction into the profession works only too well. 
Though the linguistic universe described above makes schooling sound like a terribly 
cold business, this is not exactly the case. The culture of schooling was, as I saw it, 
"warm" in a "limited" sense. Warmth was evident in the kind of libidinal drive that 
was diffused through the language, with us all on a journey, a journey of 
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"improvement", and with the managerial smile, a shit-eating grin, perfected on the 
battlefield of "difficult meetings" (whether such "grinning" is genuinely warm is 
perhaps open to question). Anyway, let me give the flavour of one such meeting as it 
was described to me by a colleague. Albert had been called in to a meeting with a 
senior manager, Sharon, due to "behaviour management" issues in his classroom (he 
was not managing). Albert, who at that time was very new to the profession, expected a 
telling off, along with perhaps a few pointers about how to improve. What he got was 
the sort of smile described above, some comforting words about how difficult the job 
was, and a long list of courses he might attend on behavioural techniques. 
Albert had already attended such courses, which usually involved pictures of icebergs 
(you never know what is going on below the surface of a child's behaviour!), and did 
not feel that they would benefit him. At some point he asked Sharon to stop and to tell 
him what she really thought about his ability to teach. He recalled that she had no 
response to this but simply continued to smile and persisted with what had gone before. 
Perhaps being asked to say what she thought in the way that was being asked for 
here—call this, if you will, the responsibility for her words—was simply inaccessible 
to Sharon. Maybe it was buried beneath the "skills set" she had acquired on courses for 
dealing with "failing teachers". I do not want to pour scorn on Sharon here. She was, 
after all, just "doing her job". She was being "professional". But I am reminded of the 
well-known Monty Python sketch in which the Spanish Inquisition reveal their 
weapons of torture—the "soft cushions" and the "comfy chair". But they were only 
joking. Albert is no longer in the teaching profession. 
Against sneering 
The above description may sound like sneering. This is not my intention. I have to hold 
my hand up and admit the extent to which I was waist-deep in the linguistic mulch of 
schooling. I wanted to get "positive value" on my statistics. The idea that my lessons 
might only be judged "satisfactory" filled me with fear. Yet there was always a 
nagging suspicion that something was rotten about it all. That said, it is easy to let such 
feelings retreat into the background. There are so many things to record, observe or 
assess. So much busyness, so little time for thought. Moreover, if you want to be 
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promoted, you had better attend "managing from the middle" courses with enthusiastic 
facilitators who want to upgrade you with new skills that can go on the CV. Do an 
MEd where you research your own practice and add that as well. If you have any 
"commonsense", you play by the rules and learn to speak the language fluently. After a 
while you will be in jargon stepp'd so far that should you wade no more, returning 
were as tedious as go'er. 
But those who cross the river do tend to care a great deal about children and education. 
Then again, as the scene between Sharon and Albert demonstrates, "caring" in 
professional culture is perhaps not what we ordinarily take it to be. The real danger is 
that ultimately, Sharon's way of caring might be the future of care. Does this sound 
nostalgic? It is not meant to be. When I was at school, there was a good chance that 
your teacher would be drunk in the afternoon, certain teachers had not fully adapted to 
laws regarding corporal punishment and weaker students were often left to their own 
devices. If schooling has been "professionalised", this is not a wholly bad thing. 
What I have outlined in this set of musings provided a "calling" (of sorts) to write this 
PhD. Indeed, the difficulty of responding to the kind of "calling" that I think teaching 
ought to represent, and that I have felt it to represent, is also at work here. I am trying 
not to be too negative or to succumb to the temptation to sneer. To sneer is to partake 
in nihilistic laughter, laughing but certainly not interfering with—in fact, remaining 
complacently disengaged from—the object of disdain. To sneer is to be the worst kind 
of aesthete (in the Kierkegaardian sense). It is not my intention to take a lofty stance on 
what is presented from the world of schooling. This is not to say that satire is out of the 
question. 
Difficult philosophy 
Having given an account of my experiences of schooling, it might also be appropriate 
to give some indication of my background in philosophy. I studied for a degree in 
Philosophy and English during the mid nineties. The philosophy department was 
something of a Mecca for Wittgensteinians due to the influence of figures such as D.Z. 
Phillips. As a consequence of a more than passing commitment to Wittgenstein, a great 
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deal of emphasis was placed on the philosophy of language—an entire year was 
devoted to a module on the history of linguistic philosophy. There was little in the way 
of Continental philosophy on offer, though one could take an optional module on 
existentialism. Consequently, my introduction to "Continental" ideas came through the 
study of literary theory in the English Department. To sum up, my undergraduate and 
postgraduate experience (I did a Masters degree in the diversity of contemporary 
literature at Swansea) provided a rich and varied experience from both sides of the 
Continental/analytic divide (a rather artificial distinction, surely). This education 
provided what you might call a backdrop for much of the work carried out in this 
thesis. It is hard to imagine how the chapters presented here could have been written 
without it. 
That said, the reader might wonder quite why the philosophy alluded to so far in this 
introduction is necessary. Indeed, when I have delivered conference papers drawn from 
this thesis (which introduced the ideas of Derrida, Butler, Cavell and Deleuze) I have 
sometimes been asked to justify all this difficult philosophy. The implication seemed to 
be that the "philosophy" in question was simply a pretentious adjunct to the meat of the 
discussion. The subsequent paragraphs give a flavour of my attempts to respond to 
such questions (or, should I say, accusations?). 
By now it should be quite apparent that there is a certain dissonance between the 
various registers that are handled during this thesis, between the language of complex 
philosophy and the language of schooling with its strange mixture of technical 
terminology and "ordinary" language. The reader will experience a jarring of 
discursive registers that will probably seem strange and perhaps "inappropriate". 
Though I am tempted simply to let this happen, I want, for the sake of scholarly 
seriousness, to thematise this "inappropriateness" and see it as a critical dimension of 
the thesis—critical, that is, as critique. 
The dissonance in question points to the ways in which language can open up, house or 
foreclose different ways of seeing the world. The philosophy introduced here is home 
to various ways of seeing that educational discourse is necessarily blind to (I make this 
point despite the fact that terms like "deconstruction" and "performativity" are 
regularly employed and hollowed out in schools and education departments). This is 
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not to say that the philosophy introduced here is meant simply to negate educational 
discourse or show up its narrow mechanistic character. Rather I want the dissonance 
described above to be "affirmative". Indeed, the kinds of philosophy championed here 
are not on the whole (or at least not wholly) adversarial. On the whole they are 
affirmative and productive. They speak of a way of doing philosophy that traverses the 
kind of dialectic where there are winners and losers. Moreover, they reveal possibilities 
for language that gesture beyond or sidestep around nihilism however close to it they 
may be prepared to tread. The philosophy in question tends to embrace the messiness 
of language and the hurly-burly of the form of life. Those philosophers of education 
who question the need for difficult philosophy tend to follow in the wake of an 
approach to language that demands precision and conceptual clarity. Though these can 
be worthy aims, they speak of decided limitations. More than this, much educational 
discourse flourishes on cleaning up the mess. It is hard to be an "effective" walker, 
they say, when wallowing in mud or tramping through sand, and sometimes they seem 
rather to aspire to raise their enquiries to the circuits of a frictionless medium of 
thought. To challenge that discourse's narrowness and shallowness, we should perhaps 
resort to messing up the clean—at least, to making it better earthed. 
Though undoubtedly this thesis draws on "difficult Continental philosophy", as an 
educationalist I do my best to make such philosophy accessible to as wide an audience 
as possible. There are a number of figures whose work, I believe, has similar 
ambitions. Here I am thinking of philosophers of education such as Paul Standish, 
Richard Smith, Gordon Beam, Nigel Tubbs, Lovisa Bergdahl, Jan Masschelein, Stefan 
Ramaekers and Naomi Hodgson, to name but a few. In many respects their work has 
provided me with an education in "difficult philosophy" that has complemented my 
undergraduate experience. That said, I also want to note that championing the relative 
accessibility of this work within the philosophy of education does not imply the 
chastisement of the likes of Derrida and Cavell for their difficulty (such chastisement is 
a favourite pastime of some members of the philosophy of education community). I 
feel that the linguistic complexity and experimentation that marks the work of Derrida, 
Lyotard, Butler, Cavell and Deleuze leads to a philosophy that is rich in ambiguity and 
possibility. These philosophers open up new and exciting ways of seeing the world. 
Their experiments in and on language are fundamental to reframing the possibilities of 
philosophical writing. 
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With this in mind, it is worth noting, that the same cannot necessarily be said of their 
followers, or in some cases, disciples. Secondary literature on postructuralism can 
sometimes read like a celebration of obscurantism and "cleverness". "Schools" of 
deconstructionists, queer theorisers, gender "specialists" emerge modishly to champion 
the kind of philosophy that is, in fact, anything but modish. Moreover, one only has to 
look at what has happened to "deconstruction" in the hands of "Denidians" to get a 
flavour of the problem. Derrida does not treat "deconstruct" as an illocutionary verb to 
be used in the present indicative active tense (at least, not in any straightforward 
sense). There is also failure within a considerable body of poststructuralist secondary 
literature to "engage" with the work of Derrida et al. Literary theorists regularly refer 
to "linguistic slippages", but tend to be very shy about explaining what these are. This 
is perhaps due to a shared sense that everybody within that academic community 
knows what a linguistic slippage is. However, this can seem "lazy". Such laziness is 
not, I think, characteristic of the philosophers of education mentioned above who, in 
providing examples drawn from education, engage in ways that are not modish. This 
thesis tries to follow in their footsteps. 
I shall now provide a breakdown of what appears in the subsequent chapters. This will 
be suitably (or perhaps, "appropriately") vague. I do not want to ruin the story. 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 provides a fairly detailed account of Austin's understanding of 
performatives. Austin shows how the philosophy of language had traditionally 
concerned itself with truth statements or "constative" utterances and had therefore 
ignored other types of utterance in which issues of truth are not fundamental. He calls 
such utterances "performatives". Explicit performatives include utterances such as I 
now declare you man and wife" in which something is done through speaking (in this 
case marrying). Though Austin originally makes a distinction between constatives that 
state things and performatives that do things, he comes to discover that this distinction 
is not absolute. Austin resorts to semantics and grammar to try and clear this up 
(though there is always a sense that he knows it cannot be cleared up) and eventually 
leaves it alone. In the last part of the book he discusses different aspects of the 
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utterance —the locutionary aspect (the forms of the words themselves, the 
illocutionary aspect (what is done with words) and the perlocutionary aspect (what is 
done by utterances). 
In the second part of this chapter I consider Austin's legacy within the analytic 
tradition. This involves a discussion of themes such as assertion, fit, convention and 
logic. Here I argue that those ordinary language philosophers following Austin miss or 
ignore important aspects of his work. Austin is not a "theorist" nor is he fundamentally 
concerned with the "truth" of utterances. Moreover, Austin's writing is extremely 
funny and the "tone" of his prose is not an adjunct that just happens to make his work 
an entertaining read. Ultimately, the neglect of these dimensions means that the likes of 
Searle and Vanderveken have nothing particularly interesting to say to the arguments 
surrounding education that feature in this thesis. 
Chapter 2 
The second chapter marks an abrupt departure from the realm of analytic philosophy 
that characterised chapter 1. Here I present a discussion of Lyotard's performativity, a 
concept that has come to denote the systemic relations within the social order of 
postmodernity. In what looks like an almost negligible endnote to The Postmodern 
Condition, Lyotard draws an analogy between performativity and J.L. Austin's concept 
of the performative. For Lyotard the postmodern condition is characterised by a drive 
towards effectiveness that either bypasses or colonises Enlightenment concerns with 
truth and justice. Lyotard employs Austin's merger of constative and performative 
concerns as a metaphor for the postmodern concern with truth as effectiveness. 
Lyotard's allusion to Austin, however serves another purpose. The Postmodern 
Condition is in part an attack on the consensual political philosophy of Habermas. For 
Habermas, Austin's account of felicity conditions that apply to the performative 
utterance provides a language that helps to reconstruct the differentiated realms of 
rationality in order to forge a kind of post-linguistic turn to Kantianism. Habermas 
argues that the Enlightenment project can be set back on the right path if concerns with 
truth are merged with those of normative rightness and appropriateness. But Lyotard 
finds Habermas's project terribly naive. Performativity depends on consensus and the 
purity of Habermas's conditions cannot be met. Instead what is required is an agonistic 
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approach to linguistic pragmatics, whereby one continually reinvents the rules of the 
game. However, Lyotard finally gives up on agonistics—the performative genre of 
discourse will always win out in the end. All that is left for Lyotard is an ascetic 
pilgrimage to nothingness. That said, his account of the sublime offers a gleam of light. 
In the last part of this chapter I bring these ideas to a discussion of schooling. Clearly, 
the Enlightenment philosophies of education, the liberalism espoused by philosophers 
such a Peters and Hirst or the progressive tradition (passed down from Rousseau 
through to Dewey and the British policy makers of the 1960s) can only inspire 
"incredulity" (to use a word borrowed from Lyotard). In this section of the chapter I 
draw on scenes from schooling to demonstrate how performativity has taken hold of 
education. Through approaching these scenes I try to indicate the relationship between 
the philosophies discussed in prior sections and the "ordinary", "everyday" experiences 
of schooling. 
Chapter 3 
In chapter 2 we saw that Lyotard, who coined the term "performativity", believed that 
the only resistance to "effectiveness" was to turn to absence and silence. His vision 
seems hopelessly pessimistic. Derrida, on the other hand, offers a more optimistic 
metaphysics. I begin this chapter by giving an account of some of the general features 
of Derrida's philosophy of language. This aims to be helpful on two counts. Firstly, it 
helps to set up and situate the main philosophical text that guides the discussion—
'Signature Event Context'. Also, there are certain loose parallels that can be drawn 
between Austin and Derrida's philosophical approaches. This chapter contains a 
reading of J.L. Austin's theory of the performative utterance. Derrida finds much to 
admire in Austin's philosophising. However, he argues that Austin's treatment of 
context misses something important about how things are done with words. Derrida 
maintains that, having shown how truth claims are bound up with performative 
concerns, Austin takes a step backwards by fixating on external contextual factors that 
must be in place for the performative utterance to be happy—for it to "succeed" in 
doing what the speaker intends it to do. This ignores the iterability of language and the 
ways in which words are ultimately bound neither by the intentions of the speaker, nor 
by any other aspect of the environment in which the utterance takes place. 
13 
The current thinking in regards to successful teaching and learning invites a 
comparison with Austin's treatment of context: for a lesson to be successful, a set of 
contextual factors must be put in place. One of the aims of this chapter is to bring 
critical attention to the ways in which notions of "success" and "failure" are applied to 
teaching and learning in English and Welsh schools) I argue that treating teaching and 
learning in these terms sees language as something to be tamed by context. Once we 
recognise that words cannot always or necessarily be brought under control then this 
will open the door to creative ways of thinking about teaching and language. 
Blockages to the kinds of creative approaches described above reflect Lyotard's 
performativity. In the last part of the chapter I discuss how statistics and the particular 
kind of discourse that emerges around them serve to suture the wounds in the body of 
discourse that is effectiveness culture. The earlier arguments pertaining to difference 
and iterability frame the discussion of statistics that follows. I begin with a discussion 
of numbers as particular kinds of words. Though numbers are, in a sense "iterable" 
they are not iterable in a way that is comparable to other words. Indeed, in certain 
instances when numbers become iterable, when meaning is artificially or excessively 
conferred upon them, they seem to exemplify the false metaphysics of presence that 
Derrida's philosophy undermines: they become idealised forms of Saussure's linguistic 
sign that have no equivalents in ordinary language. I develop this train of thought in 
relation to statistics. Statistics appear as surface signifiers of underlying truth. 
However, there is another dimension to statistics whereby they also present the promise 
(or threat) of absolute scepticism. This paradox serves to suture over linguistic 
slippages—as it were, churching the language in denial of its natural fertility. It 
"legitimates" the farcical "fixing" of statistics that goes on in British schools. That said, 
statistics offer a limited form of power. Statistics like all numbers can never operate 
alone. In British and American education, the drive to boost statistics finds its voice in 
policy initiatives that become slogans (No Child Left Behind, Every Child Matters) 
However tightly slogans that become mantras may stitch up the instabilities that inhere 
1 You do not have to grow up in Wales, although it may help, in order to remember that the jurisdiction 
in question covers England and Wales, but not other parts of the UK. 
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in language and stem its creativity, this can never be wholly successful. It is within the 
ordinary and extraordinary operations of language that hope lies. 
Chapter 4 
This paper considers the role that Judith Butler's conception of the term 
"performativity" might play in the provision of a multicultural education in pluralist 
Western societies. The first section of the paper will outline what Butler means by 
performativity. Her thinking on this matter derives from Derrida's reading of Kafka's 
"Before The Law". This involves recognition of the connection between 
foundationalist approaches to knowledge and legality: "the one who waits for the law, 
sits before the door of the law, attributes a certain force to the law for which one 
waits". Butler argues that the anticipation of the law (knowledge) as "an authoritative 
disclosure of meaning" conjures its object. She reads this approach in relation to 
gender which is treated as an interior essence to be disclosed, a treatment which 
produces that essence. Butler also recognises that this should not be thought of as a 
singular act but considered as a form of linguistic repetition and ritual. She sees the 
"invocation" of performativity as very much an ethical matter. For Butler, language 
performs us; various discourses designate who and what we are. This understanding of 
performativity has an ethical dimension because it works against essentialistic or 
biologistic performative discourses. It clearly applies to issues of race and ethnicity as 
well as gender. 
This chapter also features another thinker who discusses the magical power of a 
language, namely the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Like Butler, Bourdieu argues that 
language exerts a force that naturalises power relations. Bourdieu is very interested in 
Austin's philosophy of the performative but believes that the latter, having recognised 
issues of power in language misses an opportunity to discuss the sociological 
significance of this. What particularly interests Bourdieu about Austin is his set of 
felicity conditions. It would seem that only particular speakers are authorised to issue 
certain utterances. The magical force of language is partly bound up with the 
concealment of such authorisation and its implications. If you like, language conceals 
the extralinguistic factors that authorise or silence speech. 
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Butler and Bourdieu have much in common. However, Butler believes that Bourdieu 
puts too much emphasis on extralinguistic factors in his account of power (this is 
somewhat ironic—for Butler, following Derrida, this is also the problem with Austin's 
philosophy of language). Butler, drawing on Derrida, refers to the iterability of 
language in which words, though they carry their old meanings and resonance with 
them, find themselves in new contexts in which they may do damage or act creatively; 
consider the reappropriation of the word "queer" within the gay community. 
Understanding language in terms of fixity can act as an obstacle to justice. 
The final section of the paper considers how schooling might, in some fairly general 
sense, respond to Butler's approach to performativity. What this requires is more than a 
simple recognition of difference, but an understanding of how difference is 
linguistically performed. This segues into a discussion of the performative discourse 
that postcolonial theorist Edward Said (Said does not use the term "performativity") 
describes as Orientalism. Said shows how the Western distinction between Orient and 
Occident constructs differences from afar—there is no attempt to understand other 
cultures, but rather a tendency to read them in terms of characteristics considered 
undesirable by the colonial power. For example, Enlightenment humanism constructs a 
notion of the inhuman unenlightened culture. In the final part of this section, we will 
consider how documents such as the National Curriculum for English, though 
motivated by liberal aspirations, reinforce this performative discourse in the 
infantilising distinctions between a national literary heritage and writing from other 
cultures. 
Chapter 5 
Derrida and Butler focus on the locutions (words themselves) and their performative 
force. In Chapter 5 I draw on Stanley Cavell's notion of "passionate utterance". 
Passionate utterance acts as an extension of/departure from J.L.Austin's theory of the 
performative—we may read it as both. Austin's discovery of the performative ("a type 
of utterance which is neither true nor false") leads him on a journey toward what 
Cavell describes as a crisis. This crisis occurs when Austin is unable to disentangle the 
constative (the kind of statement that is either true or false) and the performative 
utterance (which acts a model of speech as action). 
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The "catastrophe" in Austin's theory springs from the ternary distinction, in which the 
performative utterance is viewed in terms of its locutionary aspect, illocutionary force 
and perlocutionary effect; this distinction follows on from the failure clearly to 
distinguish the constative from the performative utterance. Cavell notes that Austin, by 
reiterating Stevenson's claim that "Any statement about any matter of fact which any 
speaker considers likely to alter attitudes may be adduced as a reason for or against an 
ethical judgment", lapses back into a philosophical realm, from which he had worked 
so hard to depart. Cavell's discussion of perlocutions (which include passionate 
utterances) is an attempt to save Austin's theory from catastrophe. In the process 
Cavell touches on the possibilities for a moral education which is not moralistic. 
In the final section of the paper, I bring Cavell's approach to moral education to bear 
on Michael Hand's argument in his paper "Should we teach homosexuality as a 
controversial issue?". Applying Dearden's "epistemic" criterion, Hand discovers that 
there are no rational arguments for treating homosexuality as a controversial issue. 
Following Cavell's approach to "passionate utterance", I try to show that treating 
utterances pertaining to homosexuality in terms of passion/expression avoids the 
"moralism" that can accompany a narrow, epistemic approach. I also suggest that there 
is a parallel between the narrow limits of a particular kind of narrowly conceived 
analytic philosophy and the limits on expression imposed by the apparatus of 
performativity. 
Chapter 6 
The last chapter aims to build on the notion of an expressive approach to language put 
forward by Cavell. I suggest that Cavell either introduces or uncovers a Nietzschean 
dimension to language as performance. Gilles Deleuze is perhaps a more unabashed 
follower of Nietzsche. I look at three images of thought that appear in the introductory 
chapter of Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze and Guattari begin by 
discussing tree-like thought, which they describe as both the dominant form of Western 
thought and the oldest and weariest kind of thinking. Tree-like thought projects an 
insular depiction of the world in which knowledge emanates from a root to which it can 
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always return—it follows the logic of the One that becomes two. I suggest' that the 
apparatus of Lyotard's performativity is also tree-like. 
Deleuze and Guattari's second image of thought is the fascicular root. Here the 
principle root is aborted leading to a multiplicity, which flows from it. Modernist 
authors like T.S. Eliot who portray the world as multiple and fragmented might seem to 
exemplify fascicular thinking. With fascicular thought, the unity, which is aborted in 
the object, is returned to in the subject who, in a sense, gains control of multiplicities, 
by occupying a higher spiritual realm. In this section, I provide a reading of a Classics 
lesson portrayed in The Secret History by Donna Tartt, which provides something of a 
cautionary tale against fascicular modes of thought. I also focus on Ronald Barnett's 
contribution to a debate with Paul Standish, which features in The Blackwell Guide to 
the Philosophy of Education. 
In the third section of the chapter, I consider Deleuze and Guattari's third image of 
thought—the rhizome. Plants of the rhizome type grow by a process of cloning or 
lateral spreading; they do not have the central trunk of the tree, with roots and branches 
extending outwards from this. Rhizomes are in a sense always on the outside, moving 
between the roots of trees. Rhizomatic thinking is therefore also always on the outside 
and is characterised by the line as opposed to the point, by intensity rather than 
structure. At the end of this section, I look at two Classics lessons. In some senses, both 
lessons deal with the same issue. However, the first lesson is structured in accordance 
with the performative norms of contemporary pedagogy. In contrast, the second 
example corresponds to a rhizomatic pedagogy, in which intensity and lines of flight 
predominate. It is not my aim to dismiss tree-like structures, but rather, to demonstrate 
the importance of rhizomes. 
The final section of the chapter takes seriously the notion that although a "rhizomatic" 
education might seem an attractive way of reframing approaches to education, it can 
easily run up against accusations of elitism. One might argue that it is all very well to 
imagine an education that involves an intense experience unencumbered by a 
structuring apparatus, when the students are already reasonably well balanced, able to 
control their behaviour and sufficiently intelligent to deal with the disorientating 
aspects of learning that does not proceed in accordance with measured stages. Indeed it 
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might be argued that for less able/disaffected students, carefully structured/fast paced 
lessons provide the only means for ensuring that learning takes place. In this section I 
shall consider (1) whether the contemporary (nihilistic?) preoccupation with 
"excellence" and the various identities imposed on different kinds of students is not 
itself bound up with the suppression of intensity, and (2) the persuasiveness of certain 
scenes from schooling that depict an intense education (for students who do not find 
learning easy) that is neither characterised by speed nor controlled by objectives. 
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Chapter 1 
Austin and Speech Act Theory 
Introduction 
The aim of this short chapter is to provide as descriptive account as possible of 
Austin's theory of the performative. I am aware of the obvious problems that 
accompany such a venture! But it is necessary to include such a chapter, as Austin's 
philosophy provides a focal point for the arguments put forward by all the major 
protagonists who appear in this thesis. The importance of Austin's philosophy to the 
work of Lyotard, Butler, Cavell and Derrida varies greatly: Austin is a major figure in 
Cavell and Butler's philosophical projects, whereas his influence on Den-ida and 
Lyotard' writing, while resonating powerfully in their thinking, is not as explicitly 
significant. To put this another way, the major works of Butler and Cavell will 
invariably refer to Austin and the performative utterance, whereas Austin makes fewer 
appearances in Derrida's writing and only, it seems, merits a single footnote in 
Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition. However, I will attempt to demonstrate the link 
between Austin's performative and Lyotard's famous and much cited understanding of 
performativity. 
The reasons for the inclusion of a short chapter on the performative derive, in part, 
from a desire to avoid extensive repetition. If the main strands of Austin's thinking 
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around the performative are outlined at the beginning, then a necessary background to 
the more complex sections of my discussion will already have been provided. By the 
same token, if any confusion should accompany the appearance of Austinian 
terminology, then the reader need only refer back to this section of the thesis. 
Unlike the chapters that make up the bulk of the thesis, this chapter will not conclude 
with an Austinian reading of (or approach to) current educational issues. This is not 
because Austin has nothing to say to the philosophy of education or to educational 
practice. The discovery/invention of the "performative" as it appears in Austin's 
famous series of lectures anthologised as How to Do Things With Words represents a 
tentative step into a philosophical realm, the topography of which is very cautiously 
handled. It marks a dramatic opening up of possibilities within the philosophy of 
language, an opening which Austin occasionally revels in but, more often than not, 
recoils from, especially at moments when the potential to capitalise on the sheer 
ingeniousness of his approach present themselves. The main protagonists in this thesis 
seize on the opportunities afforded by the theory of the performative and their various 
approaches have more direct import for the philosophy of education. 
The last part of the chapter will include an account of philosophy in the analytic 
tradition that takes Austin as something of a starting point. I will try to show that, in 
that reception of his work, important features of Austin's approach (including his 
"style") tend to be ignored, to the detriment of work within Speech Act theory. 
Constatives and Performatives 
In the opening sections of How to Do Things with Words, Austin makes a distinction 
between what he calls the "constative" utterance and the "performative" utterance. This 
distinction is arrived at when Austin recognises a problem with "traditional" 
approaches to statements. In the philosophy of language, prior to Austin, utterances 
were grouped within the category of the statement. Statements are said to describe 
things or state facts. Austin immediately sets out to problematise such an approach: "It 
was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a 'statement' can 
only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or to 'state some fact', which it must do 
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either truly or falsely." (Austin, 1976, p. 1) Austin notes that a certain suspicion had 
developed within the philosophical community, that many so-called "statements" failed 
to present themselves in terms of verifiability as regards truth or falsity. One way of 
dealing with such "pseudo—statements" was to regard them as various forms of 
nonsense. Austin is, with characteristic humour, not prepared to let the matter rest with 
a distinction between verifiable statements and nonsense ("Yet we, that is, even 
philosophers, set some limit to the amount of nonsense that we are prepared to admit 
we talk"), thus signalling at an early stage, that certain utterances may not conform to 
verifiable "statements" but may be worthy of serious consideration. Before looking at 
the kinds of utterance which are interesting (not nonsense) but do not meet the 
philosophical requirements of a statement, Austin wishes to bring some clarity to the 
definition of the kind of utterance which does concern itself with truth. He calls this 
kind of utterance/statement the constative' 
The ronstative' 
Austin at arrives at the term `constative' to avoid the messiness that accompanies the 
unquestioning use of the term 'statement' to cover both descriptive utterances and truth 
claims. He notes: "Not all true or false statements are descriptions, and for this reason I 
prefer to use the word Constative'." (p. 3) 
The 'Performative' 
Austin's build-up to the performative utterance combines the sense of an important 
breakthrough with a certain reticence regarding that importance. With regard to the 
problematisation of the "statement" as an all-encompassing entity that merits 
philosophical study, Austin writes: 
Whatever we may think of any particular one of these views and suggestions, and 
however much we may deplore the initial confusion into which philosophical doctrine 
and method have been plunged, it cannot be doubted that they are producing a 
revolution in philosophy. If anyone wishes to call it the greatest and most salutary in its 
history, this is not, if you come to think of it, a large claim. It is not surprising that the 
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beginnings have been piecemeal, with parti pris, and for extraneous aims; this is 
common with revolutions. (pp. 3-4) 
Austin, elusively, decides not to elaborate on what he means by a "revolution" but 
perhaps takes this to be obvious. If the "statement" as a coherent unit of knowledge to 
be analysed and studied begins to fall apart, then so does the philosophical edifice on 
which it has been constructed. The way in which we use language begins to 
demonstrate its vital importance to a philosophical programme that had taken so much 
for granted. By the same token, if language begins to loom so large, and there are 
sensible examples of it that are impervious to truth claims, then the parameters that 
formerly surrounded philosophical discourse have been widened. It is now necessary to 
consider what Austin means by a performative utterance, and to look at how the 
"performative" widens those boundaries. 
Austin identifies utterances that conform to the grammatical norms that apply to 
constative utterances but are not constative utterances. He is also clear to point out that 
these utterances do not relate to philosophical distinctions between facts and values; 
that his examples present "none of those danger signals which philosophers have by 
now detected or think they have detected (curious words like 'good' or 'all', suspect 
auxiliaries like 'ought' or 'can', and dubious constructions like the hypothetical)". He 
is clear to point out that: 
"Utterances can be found, satisfying these conditions, yet such that 
A. they do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at all, are not 
`true or false"; and 
B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of, the doing 
of an action, which again would not normally be described as, or as 
`just', saying something. (ibid.) 
The "disappointing" (Austin's word) examples of such utterance include saying "'I do 
(sc. Take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)'—as uttered in the course of the 
marriage ceremony" and "'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth' as uttered when 
smashing the bottle against the stern". (p. 5) What is notable about these examples is 
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that they do not describe anything or state anything which could be verified as true or 
false. Rather, the utterances are examples of linguistic usage in which something is 
"done" during the speaking of the words. Austin neatly demonstrates the strength of his 
point using the example of wedding vows: "When I say, before the registrar or altar, 
&c., 'I do', I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it." Austin chooses to 
call such utterances performatives: 
What are we to call a sentence or an utterance of this type? I propose to 
call it a performative sentence or a performative utterance, or, for short, 
`a performative' ...The name is derived, of course from 'perform', the 
usual verb with the noun 'action': it indicates that the issuing of the 
utterance is the performing of an action—it is not normally thought of 
as just saying something. (p. 6) 
Austin notes that performatives do not only make their appearance in institutional 
settings. Many "performatives are contractual (I bet') or declaratory CI declare war') 
utterances" (p. 7), and instances of performative utterances would also include 
bequeathing and (perhaps most importantly for Austin) promising. 
Austin anticipates some of the possible objections to this idea that speaking is doing. 
He recognises that in certain cases some physical action may accompany or act as a 
substitute for an utterance. For instance: "I may bet with a totaliser machine by putting 
coins in a slot". (p. 8) By the same token, if the priest who performs the wedding 
ceremony is not sufficiently qualified, the ceremony will not be successful. Austin does 
not seek to deny that extra-linguistic features need to be in place for a performative to 
function successfully, but he still insists that: "The uttering of the words is, indeed, 
usually a, or even the, leading incident in the performance of the act". Nevertheless, the 
necessity for certain contextual factors to be present is extremely important for the act 
to be successful or "happy", as Austin puts it. 
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Felicity Conditions 
Thinking of performatives in terms of success and happiness leads to another important 
distinction (at least in the early stages of the lectures it is a distinction) between the 
constative and performative utterance. Whereas the constative utterance is determined 
by its truthfulness, the performative utterance is determined by its conditions of 
happiness. Austin calls such conditions "felicity conditions" and gives examples of the 
necessary conditions which make an utterance felicitous: 
(A.I) There must exist an accepted conventional, procedure having a 
certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of 
certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further, 
(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be 
appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. 
(B.I) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly 
and 
(B.2) completely. 
(no Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons 
having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain 
consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person 
participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those 
thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct 
themselves, and further 
(r.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. (pp. 14-15) 
Here, Austin is confronting a number of different problems. With (AI) he recognises 
the institutional aspects of language use and notes the correct procedures which must 
be followed. As with the earlier example of the priest, the people who utter 
performatives must have the authority to do so and must perform the utterance 
correctly and completely. Austin clearly recognises that there is a difference between 
the first four and the last two criteria. This is marked by the need for a certain sincerity 
of intention on the part of the speakers, in the sense that they believe in and mean what 
they are saying. This gives the impression of depth to Austin's project. However, this 
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apparent depth, which accompanies the happiness and success of the performative, is 
about as deep as Austin is prepared to go. It is important to recognise that a certain 
depth of feeling is only necessary for the happiness or success of the performative. It 
does not prevent us from saying that a performative utterance has taken place. This is 
made abundantly clear when Austin writes about promising. 
When discussing promising, Austin pours scorn on philosophical positions that would 
maintain that if there is no intention to keep a promise, then a promise has not been 
made. He finds a classic example of this in Euripides' Hippolytus, when Hippolytus 
says: 'my tongue swore to, but my heart (or mind or other backstage artiste) did not' 
(p. 10). Here is Austin: 
It is gratifying to observe in this very example how excess of 
profundity, or rather solemnity, at once paves the way for immorality. 
For one who says 'promising is not merely a matter of uttering words! 
It is an inward and spiritual act!' is apt to appear as a solid moralist 
standing out against a generation of superficial theorisers: we see him 
as he sees himself, surveying the invisible depths of ethical space, with 
all the distinction of a specialist in the sui generis. Yet he provides 
Hippolytus with a let-out, the bigamist with an excuse for his 'I do' and 
the welsher with a defence for 'I bet'. Accuracy and morality alike are 
on the side of the plain saying that our word is our bond. (ibid.) 
Austin clearly demonstrates a deep suspicion toward philosophy that champions "the 
invisible depths of ethical space". One might say that Austin anticipates Derrida's 
critique of logocentrism, which, the latter believes, has plagued Western philosophy 
since its inception. Austin is obviously suspicious of the invocation of a realm of 
thought that, in its representation of philosophical purity, can be separated from our 
usage of language. His point is that this unworldliness comes to provide an excuse for 
the things we do with language. He is also aware that by favouring philosophical 
flatness, he becomes open to the charge of superficial theorising. However, Austin has 
no desire to casually dismiss the notion of "intentionality" from the debate. However, it 
is given a secondary importance by becoming a felicity condition for the performance 
of a promise. This is most clearly expressed when Austin tackles the notion of a "false" 
26 
promise. Austin is clearly unhappy with this notion, invoking, as it does, a depth 
hermeneutic which he is trying to steer away from. He points out that when we speak 
of a false promise we are not saying that the person has not made a promise, or that 
they have made a mistake. The promise has been made, the performative utterance is 
not "void" but has been given in "bad faith". It is also interesting to note that the notion 
of a false promise tries to draw sensible utterances that are not related to truth claims 
back into the realm of verifiability. Avoiding such reclamation is an important feature 
of Austin's project. 
The example of promising highlights the aforementioned distinction between the 
infelicities which Austin marks using the English alphabet and the conditions he marks 
using Greek letters. Austin describes utterances that fail due to being botched (the 
correct words are not uttered, or the participants lack the necessary status) as 
"MISFIRES" (p. 16), where the botching makes the utterance void. In the case of a 
marriage ceremony in which the incorrect words are used, a marriage will not have 
successfully taken place and can therefore be declared void. However, Austin describes 
cases in which we make promises when we have no intention of keeping those 
promises, as "ABUSES": —they lack sincerity but do not nullify the promise; they 
make it unhappy. 
Austin goes into considerable detail when describing the different kinds of infelicity, 
and, for the purposes of this thesis, it is not necessary to follow him through all the 
twists and turns, although it should be noted that different acts can become party to 
differing forms/combinations of infelicity. 
Constatives and Infelicity 
Following his account of the different kinds of infelicity Austin makes a hesitant 
entrance into an area of direct interest to this thesis: he makes a dramatic about-turn in 
his thinking on the distinction between the constative and the performative. Here is 
Austin: 
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Lastly we may ask—and here I must let some of my cats on the table-
-does the notion of infelicity apply to utterances which are 
statements? So far we have produced the infelicity as characteristic of 
the performative utterance, which was "defined" (if we can call it so 
much), mainly by contrast with the supposedly familiar "statement". 
Yet I will content myself here with pointing out that one of the things 
that has been happening lately in philosophy is that close attention has 
been given to "statements" which, though not false exactly nor yet 
`contradictory', are outrageous. (p. 20) 
The admission that Austin is letting some of his cats on the table registers a certain 
excitement regarding a significant problem that begins to emerge. That problem 
concerns the distinction between constative and performative utterances. The "cat" 
metaphor neatly conveys a certain hesitancy concerning Austin's intentions regarding 
this distinction. This hesitancy is backed up by suspicion regarding the definition of the 
performative utterance, a suspicion marked by what appears to be nothing more than a 
cursory aside—"(if we can call it so much)". Why would Austin pour scorn on his 
"definition" of the performative, unless, as appears to be the case, it does not manage 
to differentiate the performative from the "statement" in any clear or concise fashion? 
It is interesting to note that when Austin is making his most radical moves he often 
seems at his most blasé. 
The example of "outrageous" statements marks the beginning of a nagging problem 
that haunts How to do things with Words, and this is a problem in which Austin, to his 
credit, seems almost to revel. The example of an outrageous statement which Austin 
refers to is "The present king of France is bald)" (ibid.). Austin's point is that because 
the present king of France does not exist, the statement, rather than remaining subject 
to verifiability, might be described as "void". His justification for making this claim 
derives from " a presupposition of existence" which pertains to the statement. (ibid.) 
Having apparently moved beyond the possibility of simply saying the statement is 
false, we might note that the unhappiness surrounding the statement in its entirety 
seems to take over. The outrageousness of the statement points to the fact that it is 
"doing" "something", and this leads Austin to maintain that: "the more we consider a 
statement not as a sentence (or proposition) but as an act of speech (out of which the 
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others are logical constructions) the more we are studying the whole thing as an act." 
(ibid.) What the example of "the recent king of France" shows is that language seems 
to be doing something regarding the possibilities that follow on from individual 
instances of speech. The outrageous example allows us to focus on the way in which 
words "perform", regardless of whether they are explicit performatives or not. 
It is quite characteristic of Austin to let the fox into the chicken coup and leave it there 
for a while whilst he ponders over more mundane matters. Having suggested that the 
isolation and purity of the hallowed ground—that ground where utterances had 
previously been fenced in and described as statements—might actually be under attack, 
Austin returns to the rigours of delineating different kinds of felicity conditions and 
performatives that go wrong. Some of the examples are extremely funny, including that 
of the insincere promise to give a donkey a carrot and that of the saboteur who 
christens a ship the "Mr Stalin". 
It takes Austin a while to return to the problematic distinction between the 
performative utterance and the constative statement. Austin returns to this theme near 
the end of Chapter 4. In this section he develops his earlier claims about "outrageous 
speech", looking at constative statements such as "John's children are bald" and "The 
cat sat on the mat". 
The Cat Sat on The Mat 
Austin begins his analysis by considering the different ways in which a constative 
statement entails, implies and presupposes other statements. I will use Austin's sub-
headings for the purposes of clarity. 
Entails 
Initially, he looks at what we cannot say—namely, "the cat is under the mat and the cat 
is on top of the mat" since "the first clause entails the contradictory of the second". (p. 
48) To avoid this problem we must recognise that "If p entails q then –q entails –p: if 
`the cat is on the mat' entails 'the mat is under the cat'" and therefore, equally, 'the 
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mat is not under the cat' entails 'the cat is not on the mat'." (ibid.) Here, Austin is 
simply building upon his earlier analysis of outrageous speech, pointing toward the 
potential infelicity which accompanies an outrageous utterance. 
Implies 
Austin notes G.E. Moore's recognition that saying "The cat sat on the mat" implies that 
I believe it to be so. Unlike the "entails" example, it may be the case that the cat is not 
on the mat, despite my belief that it is. However, like the other example, I cannot say 
the "the cat is on the mat" alongside "I do not believe that it is". In a different way the 
"implies" example also introduces felicity conditions into the equation, for if I say that 
the cat is on the mat but do not believe that it is, then I am being insincere. This causes 
Austin to point out that: "the unhappiness here is, though affecting a statement, exactly 
the same as the unhappiness infecting 'I promise. . .' when I do not intend, do not 
believe, &c." (p. 51) We can therefore observe that the elements of intentionality that 
accompany a promise and make it felicitous or infelicitous also apply to statements. 
Indeed, G.E.Moore's observation is already pointing towards the idea that a statement 
is something delivered by "somebody"! 
Presupposition 
When considering "presupposition", Austin refers to the statement "All Jack's children 
are bald". This presupposes that, for example, Jack has children. This is unlike 
"entailment" in the sense that "it is not true that John's having no children presupposes 
that John's children are not bald." Moreover, Austin shows that both the statements 
"John's children are bald" and "John's children are not bald" still "presuppose that 
John has children: but it is not the case that both 'the cat is on the mat' and 'the cat is 
not on the mat' alike entail that the cat is below the mat'''. (p. 51) Just as with his 
section "Implies", Austin wishes to show how infelicity conditions apply to statements. 
However, in the case of the "Jack" example the A and B conditions come to the fore: 
"Compare this with our infelicity when we say 'I name...', but some of the conditions 
(A. I) and (A.2) are not satisfied (specially A.2 perhaps, but really equally—a parallel 
presupposition to AI exists with statements also!)" What Austin means by this is that 
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particular constative statements require a specific set of contextual conditions to make 
them felicitous. 
In the final part of the chapter, Austin wishes to draw a parallel between the ways in 
which "I promise but I ought not" works in a similar contradictory way as "it is and it 
is not". Both reflect a "self-stultifying procedure". (ibid.) Finally he argues that: 
In conclusion, we see that in order to explain what can go wrong with 
statements we cannot just concentrate on the proposition involved 
(whatever that is) as has been done traditionally. We must consider the 
total speech situation in which the utterance is issued—the total speech 
act—if we are to see the parallel between statements and performative 
utterances, and how each can go wrong. So the total speech-act in the 
total speech-situation is emerging from logic piecemeal as important in 
special circumstances: and thus we are assimilating the supposed 
constative utterance to the performative. (p. 52) 
Here, Austin is clearly criticising the tendency to isolate propositions from their status 
as an utterance. Although he doesn't state this explicitly, the inference would seem to 
be that all instances of speech must be treated in terms of the contextual environment in 
which they take place (who is speaking, who is being spoken to, etc.) rather than 
abstracting those instances of speech from the conditions of their utterance. More than 
that, specific utterances pave the way for other utterances, and this applies to both 
constative and performative instances of speech. Of course, the word "supposed" 
suggests that speaking of the constative utterance at all is problematic if we wish to 
understand it as entirely distinct from the performative as both statements and 
utterances can go wrong in ways which are remarkably similar. 
Austin's point that "we are assimilating the supposed constative utterance to the 
performative" is interesting. It would appear that he is creating a certain hierarchy in 
which the previously unrecognised performative utterance has swallowed up or 
colonised the constative utterance. In fact, is he not suggesting that truth statements, 
the staple diet of much philosophy, can no longer be approached as discrete units of 
knowledge and must be thought of in terms of utterances, which "do" rather than 
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simply "state" something? If "How to do Things with Words had ended at this juncture, 
then the answer to this question would have to be in the affirmative. However, the 
assimilation of the constative is not so straightforward. Austin's example of the 
warning in response to a charging bull provides pause for thought: 
"I warn you that the bull is about to charge" is the fact, if it is one, that 
the bull is about to charge: if the bull is not, then indeed the utterance "I 
warn you that the bull is about to charge" is open to criticism—but not 
in any of the ways we have hitherto characterised as varieties of 
unhappiness. We should not in this case say that the warning was 
void—i.e. that he did not warn but only went through a form of 
warning—nor that it was insincere: we should feel much more inclined 
to say the warning was false or (better) mistaken, as with a statement. 
So that considerations of the happiness and unhappiness type may 
infect statements (or some statements) and considerations of the type of 
truth and falsity may infect performatives (or some performatives). (p. 
55) 
Here, Austin is questioning the assimilation of the constative to the performative 
utterance. He shows that just as considerations of happiness "infect" constative 
utterances, considerations of truth and falsity "infect" performative utterances. We will 
discuss the use of the word "infect" shortly. However, for the moment, the assimilation 
process is working in both directions: in certain instances the performative utterance 
will be assimilated by conditions applicable to the constative. Nevertheless the 
bracketed "(or some performatives)" suggests that the colonisation of the performative 
is limited to specific utterances and is not, therefore, always at work. The performative 
is still in the ascendancy. 
The use of the verb "infect" suggests that, having let his cats out, Austin rather wishes 
that he could put them back. Infection, with its connotations of disease, suggests that 
Austin is, in some way, appalled by his discoveries. Indeed, much of How to do Things 
With Words might be read as an attempt to restore order to the philosophical cosmos. 
By the same token, Austin's desperate attempts to "find a precise way in which the 
performative utterance can be distinguished from the constative utterance" (ibid.) can 
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also be read as a gleeful wild goose chase. But if it is a wild chase, it is an artful one. 
Austin protects his findings by exposing the to challenge, exposing them to the kind of 
rigour that will protect him from dissenters. 
Grammar and Explicit Performatives 
Austin's first attempt to clearly define the distinction between the performative and 
constative utterance involves recourse to grammar. Austin wants to find out if both 
utterances can be distinguished by differing grammatical constructions. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly he finds this impossible. Indeed, he discovers that commonly "the same 
sentence is used on different occasions of utterance in both ways, performative and 
constative." (p. 67). Indeed, in (mock-?)disconsolate fashion he bemoans the fact that 
"The thing seems hopeless from the start, if we are to leave utterances as they stand." 
(ibid.) 
Choosing to not "leave utterances as they stand", Austin becomes creative and attempts 
to distinguish between "explicit performatives and "primary performatives". A primary 
performative is "I shall be there" whereas its explicit version would be "I promise that I 
shall be there" in which the action of promising is, of course, made explicit. Austin 
detects an initial problem with this strategy noting that utterances which begin "I x 
that" include constative statements: 
(1) "I class" or perhaps "I hold" seems in a way one, in a way the other. 
Which is it, or is it both? 
(2) "I state that" seems to conform to our grammatical or quasi-
grammatical requirements: but do we want it in? Our criterion, such as 
it is, seems in danger of letting in non-performatives. 
(3) Sometimes saying something seems to be characteristically doing 
something—for example insulting somebody, like reprimanding 
somebody: yet there is no performative "I insult you". Our criterion 
will not get in all cases of the issuing of an utterance being the doing of 
something, because the "reduction" to an explicit performative does not 
always seem possible. (p. 68) 
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It is plain that any attempt to consign to the performative a concise structure will be 
doomed to failure if the task is to clearly demarcate the constative from the 
performative. This is partly due to the fact that explicit performatives with their "quasi-
grammatical requirements" will "let in" the most "explicit" of constative statements—
"I state that". Going down the route opened up by the designation of the explicit 
performative also creates problems when that performative doesn't actually feature in 
the English language, as is the case with "I insult you". It starts to become increasingly 
apparent that, as more effort is injected into the quest to mark a distinction between 
constative and performative utterances, the problematic aspects of this distinction 
intensify. 
This intensification is in evidence when Austin finds examples of utterances which 
reflect ambiguity regarding whether or not they are performative or descriptive. Austin 
looks at the utterances 'I approve' and 'I agree' and notes that "'I approve' may have 
the performative force of giving approval or it may have the descriptive meaning: 'I 
favour this'." (p. 78) For Austin, this ambivalence cannot be resolved. Indeed, he 
points out that the statements trade off this very ambivalence. 
Locutions, Illocutions and Perlocutions 
Having discovered that recourse to grammar/the explicit performative has yielded no 
absolute distinctions between constative and performative statements, Austin decides 
to change the focus of his project. He decides to concentrate on what the claim that to 
say something is to do something actually amounts to. This leads to his famous and 
important distinction between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. 
Locutionary Acts 
The locutionary act is of limited interest to Austin, excepting the fact that it provides 
the bedrock for illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Quite simply the locutionary act: 
"includes the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain words in a certain 
construction, and the utterance of them with a certain 'meaning' in the favourite 
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philosophical sense and with a certain reference." (p. 94) Austin divides the 
locutionary act up into three subsections—the phonetic act, the phatic act and the rhetic 
act: 
The phonetic act is merely the act of uttering certain noises. The phatic 
act is the uttering of certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain 
types, belonging to and as belonging to, a certain vocabulary, 
conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar. The rhetic act 
is the performance of an act using those vocables with a certain more-
or-less definite sense and reference. (p. 95) 
Obviously, all speech acts involve phonetic acts. The distinction between the phatic 
and the rhetic act involve the sense and reference (or lack thereof) of what has been 
said. 
Illocutionary acts 
Austin points out that analysing the locutionary act throws no light on the 
constative/performative distinction. This is due to the fact that (in Austin's view) 
looking at different locutions will not help us decide upon what an utterance is doing. 
Obviously, all utterances are locutions of some kind, but analysing them as simply 
locutions is philosophically unhelpful. Before considering the implications of Austin's 
position on this matter, we need to look at what is meant by his second (and perhaps) 
most innovative category, the illocutionary act. 
Austin paves the way for the illocutionary act by pointing out that when we perform a 
locutionary act we use speech, but he asks "in what way precisely are we using it on 
this occasion?" (p. 99) He goes on to point out that the "sense" in which we are "using" 
words is an extremely important consideration: "It makes a great difference whether 
we were advising, or merely suggesting, or actually ordering, whether we were strictly 
promising or only announcing a vague intention, and so forth." (ibid.) Looking at 
utterances as locutionary acts cannot deal with this dimension of the utterance. Austin 
writes: 
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I explained the performance of an act in this new way and second sense 
as the performance of an "illocutionary" act i.e. performance of an act 
in saying something as opposed to performance of an act of saying 
something; I call the act performed an "illocution" and shall refer to the 
doctrine of different types of function of language here in question as 
the doctrine of "illocutionary forces". (p. 100) 
The distinction between acts "of' saying something and acts "in" saying something 
reflects different levels on which our words might be described as acts. Although we 
evidently "do" something simply by speaking, that which is done by our speaking is a 
different matter. For Austin, looking at illocutions marks a new direction for 
philosophy. The privileging of the "statement" as the only significant linguistic unit is 
blind to what our words are "doing" because it abstracts them from the context of the 
utterance. This leads us back to the "whole speech situation", which we discussed 
earlier. For Austin, philosophers have for too long have "neglected this study" (ibid.) 
by focusing on locutions. For Austin, this fails to take into account the "force" of 
words—"the doctrine of illocutionary forces". The problem as such relates to the 
elevated place in philosophy occupied by attention to what words mean regardless of 
the illocutionary force that accompanies them. 
Perlocutions 
The perlocutionary aspect of the utterance refers to what is done "by" words. Though 
perlocutionary utterances (such as "I frighten you") do not exist in the language, we 
can still talk about the perlocutionary effects of the utterance. Austin is not terribly 
interested in perlocutions for reasons that will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
Speech Act Theory 
As we have seen, Austin draws a contrast between statements that previous philosophy 
in the analytic tradition had regarded as the only units worthy of study and 
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performative utterances that "do things". He then moves on to note that all utterances 
are in a sense performative. However, having made this discovery and having 
"attempted" to separate clearly the constative from the performative, Austin apparently 
gives up on the performative in order to look at locutions, illocutions and perlocutions. 
How to Do Things With Words became something of a landmark in philosophy. 
Though in some senses, Austin (for those within the analytic tradition) was supplanted 
by those thinkers following in his wake, he had let something out of the bag that could 
not be put back. The tradition of logical analysis had treated utterances as propositions 
in which a (necessarily) sincere speaker produces an utterance expressing a belief to 
which truth conditions are formally attached. His words are chosen to ensure that those 
truth conditions are present, and the interpreter simply has to receive the utterance and 
recognise which phones, morphemes, phrases and words are involved. Using his 
knowledge of meanings, the speaker is then in a position to deduce the truth conditions 
of the utterance. Austin's accounts of felicity, force, sincerity and, that is, the 
performative aspects of the utterance mess this picture up. His followers tend to avoid 
discussion of the performative utterance. Like Austin, they leave the troublesome 
constative/performative chimera alone. It is not the perfon-native that becomes the 
focus of philosophy in this tradition but the "speech act". 
Speech Act theory considers the philosophical complexities of language that 
descriptive theories simply ignored. Language, it turns out, is doing other things than 
simply describing reality. One cannot "simply" look at issues to do with truth and 
falsity in a cold analytic light—at least, not with analytic business as usual. Questions 
of "force" have entered the picture. And because of the aforementioned complexities, 
the question of whether or not one can establish a "theory" of speech acts is still a 
contentious issue. Here is Green, for example, who, having just explained to the reader 
that he has "shuddered with quotation marks around the expression 'speech act 
theory', writes: 
It is one thing to say that speech acts are a phenomenon of importance 
for students of language and communication; another to say that we 
have a theory of them. While, as we shall see below, we are able to 
situate speech acts within their niche, having a theory of them would 
enable us to explain (rather than merely describe) some of their most 
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significant features. Consider a different case. Semantic theory 
deserves its name: For instance, with the aid of set-theoretic tools it 
helps us tell the difference between good arguments and bad arguments 
couched in ordinary language. By contrast, it is not clear that "speech 
act theory" has comparable credentials. One such credential would be a 
delineation of logical relations among speech acts, if such there be. 
(Green, 2007b) 
The tone here is interesting. At first it seems as though Green shudders at the thought 
of a "theory" of speech acts, as though theory were something to be avoided. However, 
it becomes apparent that there is a certain admiration for semantic theory and the 
possibilities it seems to present for theorising and getting to the bottom of what 
constitutes a good or a bad argument. Though the possibility of a speech act logic is 
suggested, the tone is clearly tentative as though such a thing were somewhat far-
fetched. I will return to this, but it is worth briefly mentioning that Austin is certainly 
troubled by the notion of "theorising". There always seem to be examples that stray 
from the theory. Nevertheless, as we shall see, this suspicion was certainly not shared 
by some of his most ardent followers. 
Let us consider some of the preoccupations of Speech Act "theory". For reasons 
pertaining to relevance (to the thesis), parts of the following description may seem to 
be dealt with a little too quickly. I regret this, but we are talking about a vast field, most 
of which has little directly to do with what will be discussed in the forthcoming 
chapters. 
Issues of content of force and content are important to speech act theory. How might 
one characterise force? And what relationship does it have with meaning? So, for 
example, it might seem that when makes an utterance such as "You'll get your 
homework in on time next week, won't you?", this could be taken as a request, a threat, 
a command or perhaps a number of other things. Consequently we might wonder 
whether or not the force that would make it a request, etc., is external to the utterance 
or part of it. Certainly, whether or not it is a request, a command, etc., is part of its 
meaning. However, it would seem that there is nothing internal to its content that 
makes it one of these things or another. This is the sort of thing that speech act theorists 
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ponder over. We might say that whereas semantic theory looks at the content of 
utterances, "pragmatics" (which is ultimately the study of speech acts) is principally 
concerned with their force. 
Are all Acts of Speech Speech Acts? 
Another area of concern for philosophers interested in Speech Acts is whether or not 
saying it means doing it, or to put it another way, whether or not all acts of speech are 
necessarily speech acts. In an earlier part of this chapter we considered the role of 
explicit performatives in Austin's philosophy—christening, marrying, promising, etc., 
and the possibility of misfires and abuses. However, in various ways Austin's 
conditions for success might not seem sufficiently all encompassing. Examination of 
the kinds of conditions that Austin discusses for the happiness, abusiveness and 
potential to misfire is built on by Searle and Vanderveken, who identify seven 
components of illocutionary force. These are: 
I. Illocutionary point: This is the characteristic aim of each type of 
speech act. For instance, the characteristic aim of an assertion is to 
describe how things are; the characteristic point of a promise is to 
commit oneself to a future course of action. 
2. Degree of strength of the illocutionary point: Two illocutions can have 
the same point but differ along the dimension of strength. For instance, 
requesting and insisting that the addressee do something both have the 
point of attempting to get the addressee to do that thing; however, the 
latter is stronger than the former. 
3. Mode of achievement: This is the special way, if any, in which the 
illocutionary point of a speech act must be achieved. Testifying and 
asserting both have the point of describing how things are; however, the 
former also involves invoking one's authority as a witness while the 
latter does not. To testify is to assert in one's capacity as a witness. 
Commanding and requesting both aim to get the addressee to do 
something; yet only someone issuing a command does so in her capacity 
as a person in a position of authority. 
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4. Propositional content conditions: Some illocutions can only be 
achieved with an appropriate propositional content. For instance, I can 
only promise what is in the future and under my control. I can only 
apologise for what is in some sense under my control and already the 
case. For this reason, promising to make it the case that the sun did not 
rise yesterday is not possible; neither can I apologise for the truth of 
Snell's Law. 
5. Preparatory conditions: These are all other conditions that must be 
met for the speech act not to misfire. Such conditions often concern the 
social status of interlocutors. For instance, a person cannot bequeath an 
object unless she already owns it or has power of attorney; a person 
cannot marry a couple unless she is legally invested with the authority to 
do so. 
6. Sincerity conditions: Many speech acts involve the expression of a 
psychological state. Assertion expresses belief; apology expresses regret, 
a promise expresses an intention, and so on. A speech act is sincere only 
if the speaker is in the psychological state that her speech act expresses. 
7. Degree of strength of the sincerity conditions: Two speech acts might 
be the same along other dimensions, but express psychological states that 
differ from one another in the dimension of strength. Requesting and 
imploring both express desires, and are identical along the other six 
dimensions above; however, the latter expresses a stronger desire than 
the former. (Searle and Vanderveken in Green, 2007b) 
Searle and Vanderveken argue that: "each illocutionary force may be defined as a 
septuple of values, each of which is a 'setting' of a value within one of the seven 
characteristics" (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985, p. 13). What we see here is ultimately 
a more sophisticated development of Austin's felicity conditions. 
Another development of the issues discussed by Austin in How to do Things With 
Words can be seen through is evidenced in Speech Act theory through the discussion of 
indirect speech acts and conversational implicature. I would argue that this rises out of 
Austin's discussion of perlocutionary effect of the utterance. Perlocutions are, in a 
sense, the characteristic aims of speech acts (Austin, 1962, p. 101). Ultimately there is 
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no such thing as a perlocutionary utterance. Take two sentences such as "I urge you to 
give me my pen back" and "I persuade you to give me my pen back". The second is not 
a grammatical sentence in English. In urging, I am using an illocutionary utterance to 
try and get you to act. However I cannot issue a "perlocutionary utterance". 
As we shall discuss later in this thesis, Austin tends to concentrate on utterances that 
take the form of the present indicative active: "I ...". However, as Searle notes (Searle, 
1975, p. 62), there are certain kinds of utterance whereby attempts to get somebody to 
do things do not necessarily take this form. So, for example, if I say "you are standing 
on my foot", I am not simply informing you of something, I am trying to get you to 
move your foot. However, the formula "I..." does not apply here. Searle calls these 
utterances indirect speech acts. 
Perlocutions are characteristic aims of one or more illocution, but are not themselves 
illocutions. For instance, my remark that you are standing on my foot is normally taken 
as, in addition, a demand that you move; my question whether you can pass the salt is 
normally taken as a request that you do so. These are examples of so-called indirect 
speech acts (ibid.). Indirect speech acts are handled most extensively in the literature 
on conversational implicature, a term coined by Grice (see Grice, 1957, 1989). 
Conversational implicature refers to processes whereby we mean more than we say. So 
for example, if two people have just gone on a date and one says to the other "Would 
you like to come to my place for a cup of coffee?", coffee may be the last thing on her 
mind. 
Work on conversational implicature moves beyond a straight discussion of speech acts 
into the messier world of conversation. Analytic philosophy can be a rather slow 
moving elephant. Mill in A System of Logic (2002) tried to discern the meaning of a 
word in isolation. Frege (1976) maintained that to understand a word's meaning you 
had to look at the whole sentence. Speech act "theorists", having moved beyond the 
discussion of propositions, make claims for speech acts as the primarily significant 
units: "Illocutionary acts are important for the purpose of philosophical semantics 
because they are the primary units of meaning in the use and comprehension of natural 
language." (Vanderveken, 1990, p. 1.). So what about conversations? Well, there is 
clearly a danger here that heads might explode. Nonetheless, a certain order can 
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seemingly be discerned in conversations, whereby speech acts can be looked at in 
terms of discernible pairs (nobody is getting too carried away here). Questions and 
answers are obvious examples of this. Searle (1992, pp.7-30) was extremely unhappy 
about the notion that conversations might come to trump speech acts. He felt that study 
of the latter would lead to something of a dead end—conversations do not have a 
purpose. But rather than following that thought to the end, dead or otherwise, let us 
consider another favourite trope within speech act theory: the relationship between 
word and world. 
Word and World 
Work within speech acts on force often focuses on issues pertaining to direction of fit 
and whether or not certain conditions are satisfied. A famous example used by 
Anscombe (which is very revealing of its time) involves a woman who sends her 
husband to the shops to buy food (Anscombe, 1963). At the same time she sends a 
detective to check up on what he is buying. Ultimately both the husband and detective 
have the same list. However, there is a difference in the relationship between world and 
word in what they have done. For the husband, the items he buys must conform to his 
list, and therefore there is a world-word direction of fit. For the detective, his list must 
conform to the world. We have a word-world direction of fit. 
Bearing all this in mind we can see that different speech acts have different directions 
of fit. If you say "I predict that it will rain tomorrow", your utterance has a word-world 
direction of fit. If, on the other hand, I command you to do something, the reverse is 
the case. To complicate things, certain utterances have no obvious direction of fit. 
These are ugly ducklings that engender a lot of squawking, and they are, as far as I can 
see, unlikely to become swans. 
Another important issue for speech acts "theory" involves a discussion of "force 
conventionalism", and Austin is largely responsible for starting this off. "Strong" force 
conventionalism, which Austin's work exemplifies, implies that some convention must 
be in place in order for a speech act to occur. In discussing felicity conditions, Austin 
writes: "There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain 
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conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain 
persons in certain circumstances." (Austin, 1962, p. 14). This is echoed by Searle who 
maintains that" "utterance acts stand to propositional and illocutionary acts in the way 
in which, e.g., making an X on a ballot paper stands to voting." (Searle, 1969, p. 24) 
For Searle there are underlying constitutive rules to a language that frame its semantic 
structure. Speech acts are "characteristically performed by uttering sentences in 
accordance with these sets of constitutive rules". (ibid.) 
There are some strong opponents to force conventionalism, most notably Strawson: 
I do not want to deny that there may be conventional postures or 
procedures for entreating: one can, for example, kneel down, raise 
one's arms, and say, "I entreat you." But I do want to deny that an act 
of entreaty can be performed only as conforming to such conventions. . 
. [T]o suppose that there is always and necessarily a convention 
conformed to would be like supposing that there could be no love 
affairs which did not proceed on lines laid down in the Roman de la 
Rose or that every dispute between men must follow the pattern 
specified in Touchstone's speech about the countercheck quarrelsome 
and the lie direct. (Strawson, 1964, p. 444) 
For Strawson, an appeal to extra-semantic conventions when accounting for whether or 
not speech acts are possible is a wrong move. He maintains that instead we should 
focus on participants' intentions when communicating. He argues that the way to tell 
whether or not an utterance in the indicative mood is a prediction and not a command 
will be because it was intended to be a prediction. There is a lot of work in 
pragmatics/speech act theory on speaker-meaning and what it is to "mean" something 
(see, for example, Grice, 1957). However, there is no space for a discussion of this 
here. I will, however, come back to Searle and Strawson on force conventionalism at 
the end of the chapter. 
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Logic and Force 
In Frege's Begriffschrifi, he not only constructs a formal system that uses symbols to 
indicate the content of propositions, he also creates symbols that indicate the force with 
which words are put forth (such symbols are known as force indicators (Green, 2002)). 
Whether or not force is measurable in this way is a contested issue. For example, 
Davidson maintains that natural languages contain many devices for ascertaining force. 
If some kind of logical indicator could guarantee force then all well and good. 
However, for Davidson this is impossible and undesirable: 
It is easy to see that merely speaking the sentence in the strengthened mood cannot be 
counted on to result in an assertion; every joker, storyteller, and actor will immediately 
take advantage of the strengthened mood to simulate assertion. There is no point, then, 
in the strengthened mood; the available indicative does as well as language can do in 
the service of assertion (Davidson, 1979, p. 311). 
Davidson does not have the last word here. Dummett (1993), Hare (1989) and Green 
(1997) take the discussion into more complicated territory. Let us leave them to it, for 
further attempts to summarise are likely to appear glib. Speech Act theory's turn away 
from the "proposition" as the fundamental unit of communicative significance had little 
impact on the study of logic. The question that some Speech Act theorists wanted to 
answer was whether or not speech acts had their own logic. This involved looking at, 
for example, inferential relations between speech acts. This is what leads Searle and 
Vanderveken to this position: 
A theory of illocutionary logic of the sort we are describing is 
essentially a theory of illocutionary commitment as determined by 
illocutionary force. The single most important question it must answer 
is this: Given that a speaker in a certain context of utterance performs a 
successful illocutionary act of a certain form, what other illocutions 
does the performance of that act commit him to? (Searle and 
Vanderveken, 1985, p. 6) 
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In this discussion of "commitment" they relate their seven values cited above to 
entailment relations amongst speech acts, to "illocutionary point" etc. This involves a 
focus on "strong" and "weak" illocutionary commitment. Ultimately what they try to 
do is provide a "definition" of illocutions that will allow Speech Act "theory" to 
deserve its name by doing more than simply "describing" speech acts. 
Assertion and Truth 
As we have already noted, Speech Act theory replaces the proposition dominant in 
logical theory, with the speech act subject to all kinds of conditions. That of course is 
not to say that Speech Act theory gives up on truth. Quite the contrary. Rather, a 
certain kind of speech act comes to be privileged above all others, namely the 
assertion. An assertion is a speech act in which the speaker claims "that" something 
holds. The extent to which an assertion differs from a proposition or indeed a statement 
is something of a controversial issue in analytic philosophy. To what extent are issues 
pertaining to "force" relevant when discussing truth? This is, in some respects, the 
subject of the debate between Austin and Strawson on "truth". For Austin, 
(unsurprisingly) issues pertaining to truth are indissociable from linguistic conventions. 
It is not simply the case that the same proposition (which is either true or false) shows 
up in different contexts. Rather, those contexts are central to what is going on with 
each particular utterance. In contrast Strawson takes the opposite line, whereby force 
and context should generally be seen as add-ons rather than factors essential to the 
truth of utterances (Strawson, 1964). Within analytic philosophy, Strawson is generally 
thought to have won this debate. 
Conclusion 
In the introduction I maintained that debates within Speech Act theory are not germane 
to the discussion of performatives and performativities that feature throughout this 
thesis. The most basic reason for this is that the "performative" utterance is simply not 
a central concern for Speech Act theory. Austin's decision (in the last part of How to 
Do Things with Words) to leave alone the troubled relationship between constative and 
performative concerns is largely treated as the end of the matter for the philosophy that 
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follows on from that book. In contrast the afore-mentioned "troubled" relationship is 
clearly a concern for philosophers outside that tradition, and it is a concern for this 
thesis. 
On a number of levels the analytic philosophy that succeeds Austin simply ignores a 
number of crucial dimensions of Austin's work. Firstly, though categorising speech 
acts is clearly a concern for Austin (who loves to provide extensive lists of these 
things), he is clearly not a "theorist". What I mean by this is that Austin is not 
predisposed to look for a means of identifying force conventionalism or to seek a 
logical system against which speech acts can be properly categorised. To do the latter 
(which is certainly a concern of Searle's) represents a drive towards the kind of 
universalising metaphysics that Austin was clearly uncomfortable with. Conventions 
and "underlying structures" are different sorts of thing. 
Just as Austin is not interested in seeking a metaphysics for acts of speech, How to Do 
Things with Words is also an attempt, as Cavell notes, to bring philosophy's concern 
with truth down to size. However, much ordinary language philosophy following 
Austin (in the work of Searle and others) simply reinstates truth through work on 
"assertions" or returns for the most part to the "proposition" (as with Strawson). 
Though I am not suggesting that this work is not interesting or important, it is often 
blind to the many other aspects of ordinary experience that are important aspects of 
what an education might involve. Such aspects are bound up with performative force, 
and it is these that will be addressed in the chapters that follow. 
Austin's interest in the "conventional" aspects of utterances will be thematised in this 
thesis. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 take him to task on this point. As I have already shown, 
Austin's analytic followers, such as Searle, simply accept or tweak the former's 
account of force conventionalism. Derrida and Butler, through their discussion of 
locutions, show up Austin's overdetermined treatment of context. In contrast Cavell's 
work on perlocutions takes us to disorderly dimensions of language that Austin's 
"conventional" approach cannot embrace or even tolerate. Cavell's account is more 
sophisticated than Strawson's critique of Austin in regard to these concerns. 
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Lastly, some of the most interesting characteristics of Austin's philosophy are bound 
up with its "tone". Reading Austin can be a delightful experience because it can be so 
funny, and it is funny because of the way it "delights" in language. This humour is not 
an extraneous matter but is fundamental to what is being said. If one treats Austin's 
discussion as simply the presentation of a series of arguments one misses the "force" of 
his words and the important things he has to say about the force of those words. This 
aspect of force is about more than simply language's ability to get things done. To 
embrace and thematise such force takes us into areas that are central to this thesis. On 
the whole, "Speech Act" philosophy has no real interest in such force. I believe this is 
to its detriment. 
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Chapter 2 
Performativity, Agonistics and Silence 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I offered a reading of Austin's performative utterance and 
considered its legacy within Speech Act theory and philosophy drawing on pragmatics. 
At the end of the chapter I suggested that the take up of Austin's philosophy of 
language misses something of the richness and complexity of his concerns in How to 
Do Things with Words. The kind of project that analytic philosophers following Austin 
work within partakes in a language game (to borrow a Wittgensteinian expression) that 
Austin is not (exactly) playing. Analytic philosophy has no interest in "voice" which 
though not directly thematised in Austin's work is nonetheless a key ingredient in an 
endeavour that, rather than seeking analytic categories, provides a kind of satire of the 
process of seeking analytic categories. At the very least Austin exposes the messiness 
of language and the unhappiness that one will encounter in the search for 
analytic/logical formulas for the vast array of utterances that make up our ordinary 
linguistic universe. 
This chapter marks a rather abrupt departure from the philosophical world presented in 
the last chapter. If we were following one path through the terrain, we will come to a 
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bridge and take another one. As the chapter develops, I shall try to show that the bridge 
in question might be represented by the research on pragmatics conducted by the 
German philosopher Habermas. Although Habermas certainly makes a contribution to 
speech act theory (which is in certain respects a development of Austin) his interest in 
pragmatics is simultaneously narrower and more ambitious than research deriving from 
that field. For Habermas, speech acts/pragmatics play a prominent role in his attempt to 
resuscitate the Enlightenment project and overcome the instrumental rationality that 
infects the modern world. It is also within this narrower context that Lyotard, who 
draws on pragmatics, comes to develop his understanding of "performativity". As I 
shall attempt to show (whilst trying to keep a few cats in the bag) Lyotard's adoption 
of pragmatics/speech act theory is a more or less direct response to Habermas. Before 
looking into what this amounts to, let us consider what the term "performativity" 
means. 
What is Performativity? 
By way of Lyotard, "performativity" has come to denote the systemic relations within 
the social order of postmodernity. However, the aim of this chapter is to treat Lyotard's 
concept of performativity as the start rather than the end of a discussion on what 
performativity might come to mean for educational theory and practice. Let us begin 
with the outline of performativity presented by Lyotard. 
In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard examines the processes of delegitimation 
undergone by the grand narratives of modernity, arguing that the postmodern world 
largely behaves in accordance with a system that has exiled those grand narratives. The 
narratives in question relate to the place and role of knowledge in the university. 
Lyotard's narratives include the self-legitimating speculative narrative present in the 
work of Hegel (among others) and the narrative of emancipation: the notion that 
scientific progress will benefit mankind and will improve the lives of individual 
subjects. Lyotard argues that these narratives have been replaced by the logic of 
performativity, which has taken hold of knowledge: 
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The production of proof, which is in principle only part of an 
argumentation process designed to win agreement from the addressees of 
scientific messages, thus falls under the control of another language 
game, in which the goal is no longer truth but performativity—that is the 
best possible input/output equation. The State and/or company must 
abandon the idealist and humanist narratives of legitimation in order to 
justify the new goal: in the discourse of today's financial backers of 
research, the only credible goal is power. Scientists, technicians, and 
instruments are purchased not to find truth, but to augment power. 
(Lyotard, 1984, p. 46) 
So, for Lyotard truth and justice have been replaced by effectiveness and efficiency. 
The narratives of legitimation that provided frameworks for the former concerns are no 
longer credible and we have moved from a "modern" to a "postmodern" condition. 
This is what leads Lyotard to issue the pronouncement for which he is most famous: 
"Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward 
metanarratives." (p. xxiv) It should be noted that the first phrase in the sentence 
"Simplifying to the extreme" is usually left out of the citation in the form that has 
achieved such popularity. This perhaps partly explains why Lyotard is often taken to be 
the arch exponent or celebrant of the relativism and performativity that the 
Enlightenment makes room for (or alternatively gives birth to). 
This would be a misreading for as Gordon Beam notes Lyotard, despite giving his 
assent to the plurality that accompanies the demise of all-encompassing theories, does 
not celebrate what has appeared in their place. It is interesting that Bearn presents 
Lyotard's philosophy in "aesthetic" terms maintaining that "it is not painted in the 
slack polychromatic colours of eclecticism" and neither is it "painted the reassuring 
black of a glorious tragedy". Ultimately, we are told: "Lyotard's philosophy is painted 
a melancholic grey" (Bearn, 2000, p. 232). 
Bearn does not say as much, but Lyotard's philosophy cannot embrace "tragedy" for 
several reasons. Firstly, tragedy would imply a nostalgia for something substantial that 
has now been lost. When Lyotard notes the postmodern incredulity to grand narratives 
he is not suggesting that all-encompassing systems were ever fit for purpose—they 
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simply appeared credible. Consequently nostalgia gets us nowhere in either a 
philosophical or practical sense. Why then, can we not celebrate the current state of 
society and education? The problem can perhaps be stated in this way—performativity 
is a grand narrative of sorts, just a hollowed out one. Performativity "functions" like a 
grand narrative: "If a form of knowledge could not be translated into bits of 
information, it was bound to become more and more invisible to the system. . ." (p. 
231) Consequently, performativity provides just as overwhelming and brutal a 
systematic horizon as any grand narrative that preceded it. "Openness" and "diversity" 
are the order of the day but are only deemed acceptable when read against this horizon. 
Lyotard's performativity diagnosis is not wholly original. What he describes is, in 
certain respects, analogous to Nietzsche's account of nihilism, Heidegger's discussion 
of the "technological understanding of Being" and various distressed discussions of the 
state of modernity written by the founding members of the Frankfurt School. Let us 
briefly consider each of these. 
Let us begin with Nietzsche: "the highest values devalue themselves. The aim is 
lacking, and 'Why' finds no answer" (Nietzsche, 1967, p. 9). The collapse of relevance 
meaning and truth will bring about a destructive force that will sweep through Europe. 
The account of nihilism is in part predictive: "What I relate is the history of the next 
two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the 
advent of nihilism. . . . For some time now our whole European culture has been 
moving as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to 
decade: restlessly, violently, headlong, like a river that wants to reach the end. . . . 
(ibid.). The lack of real goals and purposes lets nihilism in. This is due to: "the 
formulation of value as the opposite of its opposite that Nietzsche—again—saw as the 
core of nihilism. What do we stand for? We are no longer sure: only that it is not what 
others represent. We are the reds, which means that we are definitely not the blues 
(Blake et al., xii). If there is no overriding aim intrinsic to what we do, success and 
failure, efficiency or inefficiency represent the only imaginable goals. To succeed is 
not to fail and vice versa. This is nihilism. 
Following Nietzsche (to some extent) Heidegger sees nihilism as intrinsic to what the 
calls the technological understanding of Being. In an interview with Brian Magee on 
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the subject of Heidegger's philosophy, Hubert Dreyfus nicely expresses what is at 
stake here: 
We don't seek truth any more but simply efficiency. For us everything 
is to be made as flexible as possible so as to be used as efficiently as 
possible. If I had a Styrofoam cup here, it would be a very good 
example. A styrofoam cup is a perfect sort of object, given our 
understanding of being, namely it keeps hot things hot and cold things 
cold, and you can dispose of it when you are done with it. It efficiently 
and flexibly satisfies our desires. It's utterly different from, say, a 
Japanese tea-cup, which is delicate, traditional, and socialises people. It 
doesn't keep the tea hot for long, and probably doesn't satisfy 
anybody's desires, but that's not important. (Dreyfus, 1987, p. 267) 
So knowledge has become efficient and disposable like a Styrofoam cup. What does 
not conform to these criteria and is "inefficient" (though it may indicate a richer mode 
of existence) is relegated to the past and becomes somehow quaint. Knowledge as 
such, and this is a view replicated in The Postmodern Condition, has become 
"information". Language as "an instrument of information increasingly gains the upper 
hand (Heidegger, 1991, p. 124). People become "thinking machines" that contribute to 
the "building of frameworks for large calculations". However, information is not 
innocent for whilst it "informs, that is apprises, it at the same time forms, that means 
arranges and sets straight". Information therefore takes on a colonising force that 
brings everything under control, shaping it in its own image: "As an appraisal, 
information is also the arrangement that places all objects and stuffs in a form for 
humans that suffices to securely establish human domination over the whole earth and 
even beyond this planet" (ibid.). 
Members of the Frankfurt School such as Adorno give as similar account to 
Heidegger's. Reason in Western civilisation has succumbed to a fusion of domination 
and technical rationality. External and internal nature have been brought under the 
power of the human subject. During this process no social subject (proletarian or not) 
can become the agent of emancipation. In Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged 
Life (the title says it all!), Adorno writes: 
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For since the overwhelming objectivity of historical movement in its 
present phase consists so far only in the dissolution of the subject, 
without yet giving rise to a new one, individual experience necessarily 
bases itself on the old subject, now historically condemned, which is 
still for-itself, but no longer in-itself. The subject still feels sure of its 
autonomy, but the nullity demonstrated to subjects by the concentration 
camp is already overtaking the form of subjectivity itself. (Adorno, 
2006, pp. 15-16) 
The image of the concentration camps as the horrific progeny of modernity is also 
present in Lyotard's writing on "Auschwitz" which captures a condition (rather than 
simply denoting the place). Auschwitz (the place) was, of course, extremely 
"efficient". Lyotard's work on "Auschwitz" is most impressively developed in 
Heidegger and the Jews (Lyotard, 1990). It expresses the theme of the immemorial, of 
what cannot be hauled back into memory. We must remember that we cannot 
remember. Attempts to remember "Auschwitz" (such as Spielberg's Schindler's List) 
do violence to its immemorial nature. 
So, as we can see, Lyotard's discussion of performativity does not exactly cover new 
ground. Its force and originality perhaps comes with its discussion of the state of the 
university and the predictions pertaining to what will eventually happen to that 
institution (many of which have come true). Moreover, Lyotard's response to 
performativity is also rather original. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger take a backward 
look to elements of (an imagined?) pre-Socratic culture, so as to reimagine the future. 
In the case of Heidegger this can seem nostalgic, whereas Nietzsche's turn to 
"Tragedy" is less so. Adorno seems rather cowed by instrumental rationality though 
later members of The Frankfurt School such as Habermas (who will be discussed 
shortly) are more optimistic. 
Why "performativity"? 
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In the notes to The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard acknowledges his debt to the 
philosopher J.L. Austin, who coined the term—"performative". Lyotard writes: 
The term performative has taken on a precise meaning in language 
theory since Austin. Later in this book, the concept will reappear in 
association with the term performativity (in particular, of a system) in 
the new current sense of efficiency measured according to an 
input/output ratio. The two meanings are not far apart. Austin's 
performative realises the optimal performance. (Lyotard, 1984, p. 88) 
Lyotard's reference to Austin can perhaps be partly explained by the structure and 
findings of the series of lectures that makes up How to do things with Words. If so, it 
should be noted that this represents a rather vulgar and generalised account of that 
book. I shall provide just such an account that leaves out the sophisticated nuances and 
richness of Austin's text, but may throw some light on why Lyotard should derive the 
term performativity from an encounter with Austin. What follows will then be a 
thinned out version of Austin's argument. 
As noted in the first chapter, Austin attempts to categorise performative utterances that 
"do" things, as distinct from constative utterances that state things. He then goes on to 
show the impossibility of achieving an absolute performative break between the two 
categories that he identifies. Performative utterances are not directly concerned with 
what is true or false but are subject to conditions of infelicity or unhappiness. Infelicity 
occurs when the performative utterance fails to achieve its intended effect. Failure 
results from some lack or inadequacy within the total speech situation. An example 
might be a wedding in which the figure presiding over the ceremony does not have the 
legal authority to marry the participants. The conditions do not allow for the words to 
have their intended effect. 
What makes Austin so excited during the course of his lectures is arguably the 
colonising behaviour of the performative utterance. This colonising behaviour results 
from the straightforward discovery that, although performative utterances such as "I 
now declare you man and wife" can be rendered distinct from the constative, the 
opposite is not true; the constative statement is always bound up with certain 
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conditions that apply to the performative. By this token, the claim that truth occupies 
some purified zone of stating cannot be considered tenable. "Statements" or 
"assertions" are positioned by contextual factors that take over the whole speech 
situation. Austin is not saying that we cannot speak of truth—that there is no point in 
making reference to the constative statement—but he does demonstrate that conditions 
applicable to the language of doing apply to the language of stating; that in a complex 
way, constative statements are necessarily performative. 
When Lyotard notes the similarity between Austin's performative and his own concept 
of performativity, the above analysis of Austin would appear to throw some light on his 
meaning. Neither Austin's performative, nor the systematic performativity described 
by Lyotard, are straightforwardly dealing with truth claims. Rather, what is at stake is 
success measured by internal cohesion; that what actors perform adheres to certain 
normative procedures that can be measured in terms of success. Lyotard may also be 
thinking of Austin's deferral of the question concerning the distinction between the 
performative and the constative utterance. Having failed to make a clear distinction 
between the constative and performative through reference to grammar and semantics, 
Austin decides to analyse the performative utterance in greater detail. He looks at the 
different aspects of the performative; the locutionary aspect, which concerns the form 
of the words, the illocutionary force of performatives (speech acts which perform an 
action through their very utterance) and the perlocutionary effects of performatives 
(what is done by the performative utterance). Austin says very little about the 
locutionary aspect of the performative. Instead, he looks more closely at the force 
enacted by words and their capacity to "do things". This process moves away even 
further from questions of truth and knowledge and focuses entirely on how things are 
achieved by words. In an entirely different context, the effectiveness of a speech act is 
the measure of Lyotard's performativity. 
The Postmodern Condition: A response to Habermas? 
So far, I have provided a rather sketchy explanation of why Lyotard draws on Austin's 
theory of the performative to develop his understanding of performativity. Though, this 
explanation seems logical (and I think there is something in it!), it misses something of 
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what is going on (what is being performed) in Lyotard's allusion to Austin. In his 
foreword to The Postmodern Condition, Jameson argues that Lyotard's discussion of 
scientific research is "a thinly veiled polemic against Habermas's concept of a 
"legitimation crisis" and vision of a "noisefree, transparent, fully communicational 
society" (Jameson, 1984, p. vii). The reason that Jameson uses the term "thinly veiled" 
is that Lyotard makes negative allusions to Habermas's terms of reference despite the 
fact that there is little in the way of direct reference to or quotation of Habermas's 
work. Anyway, the significance of Austin's performative to this scenario is that 
Austin's theory of speech acts and treatment of the performative utterance plays an 
integral role in the development of Habermas's theory of communicative action2. 
Habermas's theory of communication represents an attempt to revive the 
Enlightenment project of modernity, a project that for Lyotard can and should not be 
resuscitated. Before moving on to say something about the role Austin's performative 
plays in Habermas's work it will be helpful to give a sense of the context in which the 
latter is working. Habermas like Lyotard believes that society is in the grip of technical 
management and control. Instrumental reason and means-end rationality have 
infiltrated the realms of morality and politics. Questions concerning what is good and 
just seem to have disappeared and "reason" is employed as an instrument of 
domination. For Habermas, this does not mean that we should give up on the 
Enlightenment legacy but rather that the philosopher's task is to "recapture the 
differentiated realms of rationality" (Steuerman, 1992, p. 101) and revive the 
possibility for "critique" that the Enlightenment project engendered. This approach is 
clearly Kantian in nature echoing as it does Kant's three Critiques each of which 
focuses on a different domain of rationality, theoretical, practical and aesthetic. That 
said, Habermas is not simply trying to resuscitate Kant—the latter falls within the 
purview of subject-centred reason, which for Habermas ultimately becomes deformed 
due to its conversion into instrumental reason. 
It might, at this point be worth providing a brief (and due to the limitations of space, a 
rather glib) account of the development of subject-centred reason through the 
This is not fully developed until the publication of A Theory of Communicative Action in 1981. This postdates 
the initial publication in French of The Postmodern Condition. 
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Enlightenment. If we begin (and this is slightly arbitrary) with Descartes, then we think 
here of the cogito, in which, as the result of Descartes' famous scepticism, the thinking 
subject is placed at the centre of the philosophical universe—every other aspect of 
world is seen as though through the window of the scientists spaceship (through a glass 
darkly?). Moving swiftly on, Empiricism, as it emerges in the philosophy of Locke, 
pictures external reality as the subject of reason. Of course, things aren't quite as 
straightforward as this—for Locke we do not really get to things themselves—they 
imprint ideas onto our minds and therefore the thinking subject is still in a sense the 
centre of the philosophical universe. However, "his" role is largely subordinate. In 
Kant the subject of reason is split into phemonenological and noumenal domains. I can 
only apprehend what is out there through the phenomenological lens of space, time, 
etc. Of course there has to be "stuff' out there to be apprehended in this way—the 
subject of reason is thereby double—empirical/transcendental. Hegel (and yes, we have 
already got on to Hegel) unifies the empirical and transcendental, synthesising them 
into absolute reason/absolute mind. For Hegel the final synthesis is something that is 
worked toward—reason is invariably historical. 
So, Habermas wants to restore the differentiated realms of reason against the totalising 
"mega subject" imposed by the legacy of Hegel. Hegel's synthesis of the various 
domains of reason blocks critique that the differentiation of different realms of reason 
kept open, a possibility that was still available to Kant: "the question about the genuine 
self-understanding of modernity gets lost in reason's ironic laughter. For reason has 
now taken over the place of fate and knows that every event of essential significance 
has now been decided" (Habermas, reference) Of course, Habermas is not simply 
arguing against Hegel (or indeed Marx—I left out Marx earlier, but of course the 
subject of reason in Marx via Hegel is the proletariat). This is because the kind of 
synthesis that Hegel was after appears in a degraded foini 
	 instrumental reason which 
is coterminous with various forins of relativism. These are of course, the very reasons 
why Lyotard maintains that performativity fills the space vacated through incredulity 
towards grand narratives. 
Kant, despite his differentiated take on reason, still falls victim to the problems 
surrounding relativism that will apply to each of his domains. If theoretical reason is 
concerned with "truth" then whose "truth" are we talking about? To what extent can 
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"rightness" (practical reason) be universal? In which ways is aesthetic feeling 
culturally specific? Habermas cannot get round these problems and does not try to. 
However, he nevertheless wishes to reconstruct universals and comes to believe that 
this can only be done within the philosophy of language through "reconstructing" a 
universal pragmatics: 
Implied in this move is a recognition that the problems encountered in 
his initial project were due to a framework still too indebted to a 
philosophy of the subject, that is, to a reflection on the possibilities of 
reason in action which did not acknowledge that the very possibility of 
reflection is not a subjectivity turned onto itself but an intersubjectivity 
of discourse, of language, of communication. Habermas therefore now 
stresses the necessity of overcoming the framework of a philosophy of 
the subject in terms of a philosophy of intersubjectivity of language. To 
this end he proposes an analysis of the conditions of possibility of 
communication as the starting point for a critical theory. (Steuerman, 
1992, p. 103) 
This move toward a universal pragmatics (that marks a departure from "a subjectivity 
turned onto itself') already makes an appearance in an article from 1970 entitled 
`Towards a theory of communicative competence'. This article also includes an 
explicit handling of Austin's theory of the performative utterance. In contrast to what 
has just been done, the next section attempts to be reasonably thorough though it is 
likely to be dull. 
Communicative Competence 
In 'Towards a theory of communicative competence' Habermas provides a critique of 
Chomsky's account of linguistic competence. For Chomsky, becoming linguistically 
competent is to master an abstract system of rules, a system that emerges from an 
innate language apparatus. Habermas questions three assumptions that are intrinsic to 
Chomsky's account, namely "monologism", "a priorism" and "elementarism". Before 
delving into these areas it will be helpful to consider some general points about 
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Chomsky's position. Though language consists of a finite number of elements, 
"everyone who masters a language can, with the aid of these elements, understand and 
produce an infinite number of sentences, some of them unpredictably new" (Habermas, 
1970, p. 360). By the same token, competent speakers know when a sentence has been 
correctly formed because they can "choose intuitively between correct and deviating 
formulations (ibid, p. 361). That the speaker can do these things goes beyond what she 
can have picked up from her linguistic environment, a situation that is particularly 
conspicuous in infants. Consequently, Chomsky assumes that the system of linguistic 
rules must be an innate apparatus that consists of "universals which predetermine the 
form of all potential natural languages". This leads on to the assumption that linguistic 
sequences must be surface manifestations of deep innate structures. 
To be linguistically competent therefore involves the mastery of abstract rules 
irrespective of how they are used in actual speech. For Habermas this is indicative of 
the "monologism" mentioned above. Competence is founded in the human organism. 
Intersubjectivity of meaning, the fact that we can have a mutual understanding of the 
same thing is because you and I are programmed in the same way. Communication 
would otherwise be impossible. Therefore, the only way of explaining speech is to see 
it as the result of an "interaction between linguistic competence and certain 
psychological, as well as sociological, peripheral conditions which restrict the 
application of the competence" (p.361). As a consequence we get a merging of the 
notion that innate rules determine both whether expressions are correct/deviant and that 
a particular expression will be acceptable in a particular situation. If you like semantic 
and pragmatic aspects both derive from monological innate states of individual 
speakers, or to put it another way, the pragmatic dimension of language (as understood 
as a social non-innate process) is elided. To make this claim is dependent on other 
assumptions. It is important to identify (1) a series of rules allowing for the projection 
of lexical units into deep grammatical structures, (2) the number of lexical units must 
be reduced to a finite number of meaning components that the solitary speaker can 
construct semantic components from. This segues into the elementaristic research 
strategy through which, with the aid of general semantic markers, lexical units (indeed 
any lexical units) can be reduced to some few universals. At the same time language 
supposedly possesses an a priori meaning-structure: the condition that makes meaning 
possible precedes experience. 
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In contrast to this vision of language competence, Habermas argues that universal 
meanings do not precede "all" experience and are not "necessarily rooted in the 
cognitive equipment of the human" prior to experience or "all socialization" (ibid, p. 
363). Here Habermas is not making a complete departure from Chomskyan linguistics 
(note the qualifier "all" that precedes "experience" and "socialization" in the previous 
sentences). Habermas distinguishes between meanings that are a priori universal and a 
posteriori universal. Meanings that are a posteriori universal represent "invariant 
features of contingent scopes of experience which, however, are common to all 
cultures." Moreover some meanings are "intersubjectively universal" developing at the 
level of culture through communication. Examples include the system of kinship 
words. So how does Habermas hit on the idea that kinship words are examples of a 
posteriori cultural universals? Here Habermas turns to anthropology. Though kinship 
relations and the kinship vocabulary are in one sense common to all cultures, this 
semantic field "is differently classified depending on the age-, sex- and descent linked 
primary roles" (p. 364). Consequently, to think of kinship vocabulary as being rooted 
in the monological capacities of the individual person misses the complexity of what 
actually goes on in different cultures through the determination of social roles. 
Chomsky, Fodor and Katz amongst others reduce this complexity to a set of simple 
semantic markers that develop as binary oppositions such as male versus female, adults 
and children (p. 365). Conceptual hierarchies impose themselves on these binaries—
male over female etc. Habermas argues that for Chomsky et al. these hierarchies derive 
from independent irreducible meaning components, "elements if you like". 
If we follow Habermas's earlier point out cultural difference, this elementaristic 
approach to language breaks down: 
The conceptual hierarchies which the semantic analysis of a given 
common vocabulary discloses change in accordance with the world 
view, i.e. the global interpretation of nature and society, which is valid 
in a social system at a particular stage of development. It is apparent 
that the examples presented by Chomsky and his colleagues are 
likewise guided by a global pre-understanding, though admittedly one 
that possesses a certain plausibility for us as sharers of the ontology 
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governing the everyday understanding of enlightened members of our 
civilization after three hundred years of modern science and the 
criticism of religion, a hundred years since Darwin, and fifty years 
since Freud, i.e. after a subjectivization and privatisation of belief 
systems. (p. 366) 
There are several things we can glean from this, namely (1) that language cannot be 
abstracted from a world view, which must to "some degree" be local and historically 
contingent; (2) that Chomsky et al. are in the grip of a particular kind of Enlightenment 
thought that exerts a powerful (though plausible and not entirely bad) force that 
subjectivises and privatises thought. In other words what Habermas is describing is 
what he later calls the "wrong" turn in Enlightenment thought that gives itself over to 
subject-centred reason. Habermas does not want to give up on Enlightenment thought 
but show how it must be reconfigured along communicative lines—the development of 
reason is not coterminous with the unfolding of the subject as Chomsky would seen to 
have it. This is a project that Habermas refines throughout his career (the article 
discussed above represents an early manifestation of this thought). For some readers an 
alarm may sound at Habermas's reference to a social system at "a particular stage of 
development". This perhaps implies a colonialist (Enlightenment?) mentality, which 
we shall return to later. 
Anyway, so far we have only considered the relationship of kinship words and their 
ties to a world view, but what about the mechanics of language itself? In a sense 
Habermas's discussion of kinship already points in this direction. The hierarchical 
differences in kinship terms must recognise differing degrees of force that arise out of 
everyday communication. Language is about more than the transfer of information. 
The speaker must "have at his disposal, in addition to his linguistic competence, basic 
qualifications of speech and symbolic interaction (role-behaviour), which we may call 
communicative competence" (p. 367). This communicative competence means "the 
mastery of the ideal speech situation". (ibid.) It is at this point that Habermas 
introduces Austin: 
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We can elucidate this, in the first instance, by studying the example of 
a category of verbs to which J.L. Austin ascribed a performatory use. 
As is well known, verbs like 'promise', 'announce', 'warn', 'report', 
`desire', 'determine', etc. can be used to perform the acts they 
respectively designate rather than refer to or describe them. The 
meaning of a 'performative utterance' includes a reference to (a) an act 
of utterance in a particular and appropriate interaction relationship CI 
hereby promise...'), (b) the definition of a (suitable) situation which is 
explicitly determined by the performance of a speech act itself, and (c) 
the propositional content of the dependent clause. Austin differentiates 
between the levels of 'saying something' and of 'doing something' 
(locutionary level v. illocutionary level). Being composed of speech 
acts and dependent clauses of propositional content, utterances in 
general have, in addition to the meaning of their propositional content, 
a meaning which is linked to the speech situation as such. This 
following Austin, we can call their 'illocutionary force'. When they use 
performative expressions, the speech acts are representations of that 
illocutionary force, i.e. the universal pragmatic power of utterances. 
Expressions of this kind retain no given pragmatic feature of contingent 
speech situations; they explain the meaning of certain idealised features 
of speech situations in general, which the speaker must master if his 
competence is to be adequate for participating at all in situations of 
potential speech. A theory of communicative competence can thus be 
developed in terms of universal pragmatics. (p. 367) 
In certain respects, Habermas's reading of Austin here seems close to what I presented 
in Chapter 2. Habermas's invocation of performative utterances to challenge the 
monologistic theories put forward by Chomsky echoes Austin's attempt to undermine 
the descriptive theory of language. We cannot map sentence components onto the 
world and neither can we map linguistic competence onto some innate subjective 
"competence". This is because we are dealing with more than propositional content, 
but also "appropriateness" regarding a relationship between people and a "suitable" 
situation. Notably, suitability and appropriateness and suitability may be subject to 
conditions that differ between cultures. Nevertheless, to go into these differences is not 
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Habermas's concern. The fact that there are differences will be in accordance with a 
pragmatics that provides an underlying structure that manifests itself in specific speech 
situations that give them their particular force. We are dealing with "idealised features" 
here. 
There are one or two issues with Habermas's account (problems that will resurface 
later) concerning the reading of Austin presented here. Habermas's Kantianism is 
clearly on display. The utterance, so it seems can be located in accordance with 
differentiated concerns pertaining to appropriateness suitability and truth. This division 
is not so clearly established in Austin. It could conceivably be argued that the division 
of the utterance into its locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions bears 
some resemblance to Habermas's set of differences, though arguably suitability and 
appropriateness are both illocutionary concerns. However, in Austin, the divisions that 
Habermas seizes on are the result of an inability to separate constatives from 
performatives. Moreover, Habermas's interest in "promising" is also a little odd given 
that the promise is a particularly unusual type of speech act. If I say "I promise" or "I 
promise..." I have always done something regardless of concerns pertaining to 
suitability or appropriateness. The pragmatics of promising are far from universal. 
Anyway, we shall leave this concern alone for a while—for the moment it is enough to 
add it to the game (let it fester?)—and turn to a later essay that seeks to find universal 
features of speech in action. "What is Universal Pragmatics" would have been 
available to Lyotard prior to the publication of The Postmodern Condition and possibly 
provides the material for Lyotard's dismissive reading. Here Habermas develops the 
argument presented above. Note that in "What is Universal Pragmatics", Habermas is 
largely interested in developing a social theory of speech in action and "ethical 
concerns" emerge from the outset. Of course the references to "suitability" and 
"appropriateness" already make a move in this direction 
Universal Pragmatics (A section duller than the last but, I hope, 
equally thorough) 
"What is Universal Pragmatics" begins like this: 
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The task of universal pragmatics is to identify and reconstruct universal 
conditions of possible understanding [ Verstandigung]. In other contexts 
one also speaks of "general presuppositions of communication," but I 
prefer to speak of general presuppositions of communicative action 
because I take the kind of action aimed at reaching understanding to be 
fundamental. Thus I start from the assumption (without undertaking to 
demonstrate it here) that other forms of social action—for example, 
conflict, competition, strategic action in general—are derivatives of 
action oriented to reaching understanding [verstandigungsorientiert]. 
(Habermas, 2005, p. 118) 
The phrasing here is interesting as the implication would seem to be that there is a 
great likelihood that understanding does or will not occur. If we take it for granted that 
it does occur, then there would presumably be no need to identify or reconstruct the 
conditions for its occurrence. Is Habermas offering us a vision of scepticism here? 
Perhaps the answer is both a "yes" and a "no". It is not the case that Habermas is 
casting doubt on whether any old kind of understanding between people can take place, 
but whether that understanding emerges out of "communicative" action in contrast to 
the other kinds of action he mentions, namely "conflict, competition and strategic 
action". Not only might we assume (though Habermas does not "exactly" say this) that 
these other forms of action are in some ways ethically inferior, but that we might 
somehow mistake them for the "real thing" (communicative action) that, in a parasitic 
way, they rely on. 
To reconstruct the conditions for communicative action we must consider the 
normative conditions that we must already have accepted. Anybody who acts 
communicatively must "raise universal validity-claims and suppose that they can be 
vindicated" (p. 119). Therefore such a speaker will claim to be: 
1. uttering something understandably 
2. giving [the hearer] something to understand 
3. making himself thereby understandable; and 
4. coming to an understanding with another person. (ibid.) 
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So the speaker must (1) say something comprehensible, (2) aim to be saying something 
true, (3) be "truthful", so that the listener can trust him3 and (4) pick an utterance that is 
"right" in regards to a recognised normative background. Coming to an understanding 
is synonymous with "bringing about an agreement" that involves recognition of the 
"validity-claims of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and rightness" (ibid.). For 
Habermas full agreement that embraces all four components is not a normal state of 
linguistic communication. Rather we must think in terms of "bringing about an 
agreement" (p. 120). This is because typically communication occupies gray areas 
incorporating "intentional and involuntary untruthfulness and concealed and open 
discord". Habermas argues that ordinarily we start from a background consensus as 
regards what the participants in the conversation take for granted. Once this consensus 
is unsettled then participants try to find a new definition of the situation that all can 
share. To behave in this way is to act communicatively. However, if no new definition 
can be found then communication cannot be continued and the only alternatives are 
"strategic action" and "discourse". 
Habermas does not devote much space to explaining what strategic action involves. 
Indeed, he only discusses it in an endnote as the negation of communicative action: "in 
communicative action a basis of mutually recognised validity-claims is presupposed: 
this is not the case in strategic action. In the communicative attitude it is possible to 
reach a direct understanding oriented to validity-claims; in the strategic attitude, by 
contrast, only an indirect understanding via determinate indicators is possible" (p. 130). 
I take this to mean, though Habermas does not say as much, that one may reach an 
indirect understanding by reading through the speaker's strategy to see how their 
claims have been determined. The true nature of their claims will be in some ways 
concealed. If we resort to "discourse" this is because the normative rules are an object 
of concern. Engaging in "discourse" is to work at a meta-pragmatic level. 
Habermas distinguishes between formal analysis which he opposes to empirical 
analytic procedures. Formal analysis does not denote logical analysis but rather "the 
3 Habermas regularly distinguishes between speaking the truth in regards to prepositional content and 
being "truthful" in the sense of being sincere. Here we can detect the influence of Austin's felicity 
conditions. A successful utterance will not just be true or false, but "happy or unhappy". 
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methodological attitude we adopt in the rational reconstruction of concepts, criteria, 
rules and schemata". The distinction between analytic and reconstructive sciences can 
be partly explained by the differences between "observation" and "communicative 
experience/understanding. Whereas observation takes perceptible things as its object, 
understanding is directed to the meaning of utterances" (p. 122). Though she will in 
some sense be working within the systematic horizons which organise experience, the 
"observer" principally works alone. In contrast the "interpreter who "understands" 
meaning must, for Habermas be fundamentally a participant in communication due to 
the "symbolically established intersubjective relationship with other individuals (ibid.). 
This is the case even when she is alone with a book, a work of art etc. Consequently, 
whereas an observer participates in an immediate relationship to reality, 
communicative experience is mediated with regard to reality. 
Habermas considers the different types of sentence designating the different 
relationships between observer and reality and interpreter and symbolically 
prestructured reality. He then considers the different kinds of "interpretation" that 
observation and interpretation imply. We also have a distinction between observation 
and understanding, description and explication. I "report" an observation whereas I 
"describe an observed aspect of reality". Sentences that render interpretations interpret 
the meanings of a symbolic formation". I can only explicate the meaning of such an 
utterance. 
In regards to description, if we need an explanation of what we describe then this will 
be a causal explanation—we consider how the thing we are observing comes to pass. 
However, if the description is incomprehensible, we need an explication of what is 
meant by the utterance and how the symbolic expression which must be elaborated on 
or "rammed" came to pass. If the description is not incomprehensible then causal 
explanation will do the trick. If it does not do the trick then explication is required. 
Habermas argues that description and explication have different ranges, and both "push 
through" to underlying structures. Habermas maintains that what he is describing is 
familiar when considering individual phenomena within say the natural sciences (p. 
123). Explication, however, takes a more central role when it is directed at knowledge 
of "the deep structures of the reality accessible to understanding"—the reality of 
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symbolic formations produced according to rules". We cannot look at the meaning of 
expressions in the same way that we look at nature. 
Habennas identifies two levels of explication as regards the meaning of expressions. 
Firstly, if the meaning of a written sentence, gesture, theory etc. is unclear we look to 
the semantic content of the symbolic formation. Here, according to Habermas we try to 
put ourselves in the position of the author who wrote the sentence or performed the 
gesture (Habermas notes that we may also have to consider contextual factors that the 
author may be unaware of). Understanding of content for Habermas links surface 
structures of an incomprehensible formation with surface structures of other familiar 
formations. By this, he means that linguistic expressions can be paraphrased in one 
language or translated into another. We are told that competent speakers draw on 
intuitively known meaning relations obtaining within the lexicon of one language or 
between two languages. If we cannot reach an understanding at the level of content, we 
must move to the generative structures of the expression themselves—the rules that 
brought it forth. So, in the case of normal paraphrase, we make intuitive semantic links 
(the role of interpreter could potentially apply to the author herself). However, a new 
attitude makes itself known when the interpreter does not merely wish to apply 
intuitive knowledge but also wants to "reconstruct" it. 
Reconstructing intuitive knowledge involves the interpreter peering through the surface 
of the symbolic structure to discover the rules according to which it was produced. 
Therefore, the object of understanding ceases to be the content of the symbolic 
expression—what the author meant (or the kinds of meaning that the author could not 
be aware of) but rather the intuitive rule consciousness that a competent speaker has of 
his own language. This consciousness relates to an illocutionary bond (enter Austin). 
When we perform an illocutionary act (and the assumption is that this is what we do 
every time we speak) then we enter into a bond whereby there is a guarantee that 
certain conditions will be met. So if an assertion shows itself to be incorrect, we'll drop 
it when it proves false. By the same token, we can regard a question as settled when a 
satisfactory answer is given. 
Habermas then goes on to ask if illocutionary force has more than just a suggestive 
influence and considers what it is that motivates the hearer to act in accordance with 
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the belief that the speaker seriously means what she says. Here Habermas distinguishes 
between institutionally bound and unbound speech acts. In the case of institutionally 
bound speech acts, this matter is ultimately decided for us. I take it that Habermas is 
thinking here of the kinds of example offered by Austin (not that Austin uses the 
expression "institutionally bound speech acts". So for example, if I follow the correct 
procedures for christening a ship, if I say "I christen this ship the Mr Stalin" (one of 
Austin's lovely examples) then the conditions under which this is successful or 
unsuccessful are institutionally bound. If I've successfully christened the ship then of 
course the fact that I've christened it will be true. The normative rightness of the 
expression "I christen this ship the ..." is a convention. Also, the notion of sincerity, 
whether or not I have appropriate "feelings" does not even enter the picture—as long 
as I keep to the rules then my act will be successful. Unsurprisingly, Habermas is not 
really interested in institutionally bound speech acts (although the extent to which he is 
interested in ordinary utterances or speech acts is one we shall consider later). At this 
point suffice it to say that institutionally unbound speech acts are Habermas's concern. 
Here is Habermas: "The illocutionary force with which the speaker is carrying out his 
speech act, influences the hearer, can be understood only if we take into consideration 
sequences of speech actions that are connected with one another on the basis of a 
reciprocal understanding of validity claims" (p. 125). 
The recognition of validity claims is not irrational as cognitive claims can be checked. 
Therefore reciprocal bonds have a rational basis. It is only therefore possible to 
influence speakers in an illocutionary way on the basis of validity claims. At this point 
it is worth noting that Habermas's primary interest is not in the meaning of utterances 
(and the ways they might be true or false) but the rules underlying those utterances that 
allows one to question whether what is said is true or false, appropriate or 
inappropriate, sincere or in some ways deceptive. Therefore, assertions, descriptions, 
classifications, estimates, predictions and objections might have specific meanings, but 
truth, rightness and appropriateness depend on a wider sphere of possibility that follow 
on from individual utterances. By the same token "requests, orders, admonitions, 
promises, agreements, excuses and admonitions" all have different meanings, but the 
claim put forward in the interpersonal relationship refers to the "rightness" of norms 
and whether or not the speaker s able to assume responsibility for her utterance. In this 
sense, the content of the speaker's engagement is determined by the different ways of 
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appealing to the same thematically stressed universal validity claim. Taking all this into 
account, for Habermas, the social bond arises out of our "speech act typical 
commitments" (whether or not we can provide grounds for our claims, to what extent 
we adhere to norms or whether or not we prove trustworthy). 
Tensions in the theory of Universal Pragmatics 
Having provided what is largely a descriptive account of Habermas's theory of 
universal pragmatics let me set out schematically the fundamental tensions (what is not 
wholly "comprehensible"): 
1. A universal pragmatics as such is a very general sort of business in 
which ever utterance we make in communication contains a claim to 
truth, normative rightness, appropriate feeling or: 
2. All validity claims are raised in any utterance although only certain 
ones are emphasised or: 
3. Different kinds of utterance are respectively subject to 
happiness/appropriateness (in Austin's terms, rightness or 
appropriateness in Habermas's/Kant's terms) or truth, or various 
combinations, but not necessarily all combinations. 
It would seem then that 1 is clearly problematic because, for example, institutionally 
bound speech acts do not appear to correspond to all the pragmatic dimensions that 
Habermas mentions. Perhaps a (very Austinian?) point is being made here about the 
"strategic" politically compromised nature of institutionally bound speech acts. 
Nevertheless, such acts do not seem to fit the model of a universal pragmatics. More 
than this, during his essay, Habermas seems to present the difference between the 
objectifying attitude of the natural scientist and the communicative approach (of the 
social scientist?) as two equally legitimate paths to follow. The objectifying attitude 
only takes on board cognitive pragmatic concerns, so it is surely in some way 
communicatively limited. To confuse matters, on the penultimate page of the essay, 
Habermas writes: "We can replace this performative attitude (toward society) with an 
objectifying attitude toward society: conversely, we can switch to a performative 
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attitude in domains in which (today) we normally behave objectivatingly—for example 
in relations to animals and plants)". Are we in Husserlian territory here, whereby 
scientists or social scientists simply look at objects under different aspects? This is, in a 
sense what Habermas seems to be arguing for, although he clearly believes that it is 
possible to look at any utterance in accordance with all three pragmatic concerns. 
Ultimately, then point 2 listed above, which is really only a slight variation on 1 would 
seem to reflect Habermas's position. This does not get round the problems with 1 
regarding institutionally bound speech acts, although one might say that the criteria of 
truth and appropriateness also apply but are not emphasised. So, for example, I might 
have feelings about christening the ship (although it is unclear what appropriate 
feelings might be here) and of the course the ship will either be truly christened or it 
won't. To invoke these criteria is strange, but possible. We might, however, think back 
to the example of promising mentioned earlier and take this as cause for concern. 
Habermas is not arguing for point 3, though point 3 might, as we shall see, be more 
easily defendable. 
Strategy and Tone 
Earlier, I suggested that Lyotard's use of the term "performativity" represents more 
than just a rather vulgar transposition of Austin's treatment of performativity into a 
discussion about the state of knowledge. Rather, it is part of an "attack" on Habermas. I 
do not use the word "attack" here lightly—"critique" would be too soft. Indeed, to 
provide a critique of Habermas would imply some carefully worked out argument that 
looked for inconsistencies, aporias and the like (the kind of thing that I've attempted 
above). When we think of what a "critique" is, then we might imagine whosoever 
should undertake such a thing would apply scholarly close attention to the text under 
critique. Perhaps we might say, following Austin, that there are a number of 
"happiness" conditions pertaining to what a critique involves and that Lyotard's 
"treatment" of Habermas is decidedly unhappy. Here is Blake: 
Lyotard's sketchy comments on Habermas are not just inadequate but 
misleading and embarrassingly so. It is a scholarly question of some 
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interest in its own right as to why a thinker who has much the same 
political and moral motives should nonetheless treat a distinguished 
colleague so unsympathetically. (Blake, 2000, p. 59) 
There is no "reason" to disagree with Blake here in regards to the "sketchiness" of 
Lyotard's comments (we'll come to these shortly), though whether they are carefully 
worked out is another matter. As mentioned earlier, Habermas's project sets out to 
redeem the Enlightenment from the darkness of instrumental reason and would, 
superficially at least seem to have "much the same political and moral motives" as 
Lyotard. That this is only superficially the case is, I think, significant—there is a 
discord in this respect too. Without wanting to be too hasty I shall float the idea that 
there are good "pragmatic" reasons for Lyotard to mount an attack rather than proffer a 
critique. But we are getting ahead of ourselves, so I shall leave hat idea to bob up and 
down for a bit before returning to it. It is perhaps the moment to give an account of 
Lyotard's position regarding how one could respond to performativity. 
As mentioned earlier, The Postmodern Condition deals with the state and status of 
knowledge in the university. The grand narratives or "bond" that legitimated the 
university has been broken. Previously everybody could rely on one Grand Narrative or 
another to legitimate what universities were doing, but this is no longer the case: "Once 
the unifying thread of Grand Narrative is snapped, the narrative is dispersed in clouds 
of narrative language elements" (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv). Therefore where we once had 
an apparently coherent set of rules governing how universities legitimated themselves, 
this has been dissolved into "clouds" of smaller narratives. The "clouds" metaphor is 
interesting. Elsewhere, Lyotard talks of "islands of language" (Lyotard, 1993, p. 20). 
There is of course something rather solid about an island—clouds can merge into one 
another. Anyway, we are drifting from the point. Coterminous with the break up of 
narratives is the emergence of another rootless organising principle—performativity. 
Knowledge can be legitimated in terms of power and effectiveness. However, 
performativity, though it appears to have colonised the sky is as rootless as any of the 
small narratives. Consequently, to slip (however briefly) out of its grip, we must divert 
our attention to small micro-narratives: "Conveyed within each cloud are pragmatic 
valencies [potentials for creating social bonds] specific to its kind...There are many 
different language games—a heterogeneity of elements. They only give rise to 
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institutions in patches" (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv). Moreover, "The social bond is 
linguistic, but is not woven with a single thread" (p. 40). 
To avoid the mistake of thinking that it is woven with a single thread, we must consider 
the pragmatics of each cloud of particles. But how should we think the pragmatics of 
each cloud or cluster? Might they correspond to Habermas's universal claims? 
Therefore, could each utterance made within each cloud be validated in accordance 
with truth, rightness and truthfulness? Indeed, at one point during The Postmodern 
Condition, Lyotard makes explicit reference to differentiated pragmatic concerns 
following Kant (the same point of influence that Habermas draws on): 
Take for example, a closed door. Between "The door is closed" and 
"Open the door" there is no relation of consequence as defined in 
propositional logic. The two statements belong to two autonomous sets 
of rules defining different kinds of relevance, and therefore, of 
competence. Here, the effect of dividing reason into cognitive and 
theoretical reason on the one hand, and practical reason on the other, is 
to attack the legitimacy of the discourse of science. Not directly, but 
indirectly, by revealing that it is a language game with its own rules (of 
which the a priori conditions of knowledge in Kant provide a first 
glimpse) and that it has no special calling to supervise the game of 
praxis (nor the game of aesthetics for that matter). The game of science 
is thus put on a par with others. (p. 40) 
What, if anything, distinguishes Lyotard's account here from Habermas's? We have 
already seen how Habermas shows that science, when it adopts a purely cognitive 
approach can ignore other pragmatic concerns (though Habermas is not openly critical 
of this). Perhaps the main difference is that Lyotard's Kant thinks in terms of 
"islands"—where pragmatic concerns are autonomous and each concern does not 
necessarily always apply. Can the utterances of scientists be validated in terms of truth, 
rightness and truthfulness? Now, the idea of truthfulness seems somewhat strange here 
as it is hard to imagine how this would become an issue; I suppose scientists might 
falsify evidence in the pursuit of fame, this sort of thing, but such cases will be 
extremely rare (out of the ordinary). Anyway, regardless of whether or not any covert 
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tinkering is taking place in laboratories, one can always allude to it as a pragmatic 
condition, see it as part of the picture, but there is something very artificial about this. 
Habermas's criteria may "apply" but they do not all "come into play". Here we perhaps 
fall somewhere in between Lyotard's strict divisions and Habermas's universal 
pragmatics. I am not, at this point, denying that there might be a thread linking 
different pragmatic dimensions within the same utterance, but that thread is starting to 
wear a little thin. 
With all this in mind, it is worth re-emphasising that Lyotard's main bugbear with 
Habermas is what he takes to be the latter's fixation with "consensus". Lyotard treats 
consensus as a moral issue bound up with "choice". Seeking consensus is what Lyotard 
thinks communicative action is all about whereby "rules" for this consensus are static. 
He attributes this position to Habermas: That humanity as a collective (universal) 
subject seeks its common emancipation through the regularization of the 'moves' 
permitted in all language games". Blake finds Lyotard's treatment of Habermas here 
rather scandalous as it "puts Habermas in a paradoxically totalitarian light for a radical 
liberal, proposing an emancipation which looks like no emancipation at all." (Blake, 
2000, p. 61) 
Though it is true that, for Habermas, to act communicatively is to be understood to tell 
the truth etc., he recognises that this is not exactly the normal state of things. Often 
times we are not understood or our truth claims cannot be validated. Moreover, when 
consensus is not achieved we resort to discourse—the localised pragmatic level 
becomes a concern. The rules against which we judge truth etc. become a concern. 
Nonetheless, there is more than a strong suggestion in Habermas that consensus is the 
state of affairs we strive toward. "Discourse is something we resort to when things do 
not work out. For Lyotard, here lies the danger. If we are to resist performativity it is 
not enough to simply query the rules when a resolution is not forthcoming. The 
response must be a more "active" form of action than Habermas allows for: 
"Traditional" theory is always in danger of being incorporated into the programming of 
the social whole as a simple tool for the optimization of its performance; this is because 
its desire for a unitary and totalizing truth lends itself to the totalizing and unitary 
system of the system's managers" (Lyotard, p. 12). 
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Does Habermas propose a "unitary and totalising truth"? Not exactly. As we have seen 
when looking at Habermas's discussion of content (in "What is Universal 
Pragmatics"), Habermas is not really interested in semantics. It is perfectly reasonable 
to suppose that Habermas would be willing to accede that his Universal Pragmatics 
was "only that". He does not appear to be proposing some kind of universal 
metadiscourse. Nevertheless, a universal pragmatics however loosely applied, is a kind 
of metadiscourse—the same validity criteria always partake in the scene when people 
act communicatively. Though a totalising truth may not be of the metaphysical variety, 
it can still be arrived at communicatively and is thus open to colonisation by 
performativity. 
This is why Lyotard petitions for an "agonistics" to trump Habermas's consensus 
which will, if you like, work against the spirit of performativity that itself relies on 
consensus. Here: "to speak is to fight" (Lyotard, 1984, p. 10). Strategic pragmatic 
dissonance at a local level might fend of the overwhelming consensual force of 
performativity. 
Bearing all this in mind we can, perhaps, see that Lyotard's distrust of consensus goes 
too far. If there are different types of language game, then surely there can be different 
types of consensus. The sort of consensus on effectiveness offered up by performativity 
might be a completely different sort of consensus to the model put forward by 
Habermas. After all, Habermas is after (or at least recognises the pragmatic 
possibilities) of saying something "true" that can then be validated through interaction. 
He does not intend this process to be efficient or "effective". Therefore, what is at stake 
is whether or not Habermas's project (or at least the set of conditions he emphasises) is 
open to the colonising forces of performativity or is somehow resistant to them. After 
all, the theory of communicative action is meant to resist the dissociating forces that 
accompany political rhetoric, managerialism, advertising etc. To think like this, 
however, assumes a level of autonomy of the individual (or in Habermas's case 
"individuals") that Lyotard does not find credible: 
A self does not amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in 
a fabric of relations that is now more complex than ever before. Young 
or old, man or woman, rich or poor, a person is always located at 
74 
"nodal points" of specific communication circuits, however tiny these 
may be. (Lyotard, 1984, p. 15) 
The sort of autonomy that would allow for Habermas's "authentic" communication is 
illusory. For Lyotard the only hope (and this is a slim tainted hope) lies with the 
individual: "No one, not even the least powerful among us, is ever entirely powerless 
over the messages that traverse and position him as sender". The most we can do is 
make an "unexpected move, with its correlative displacement of a partner or group of 
partners". Nevertheless, this can still: "supply the system with that increased 
performativity it forever demands and consumes" (ibid.). 
One has to play or fight to keep things moving. This can perhaps explain Lyotard's 
hostility toward Habermas—it is a "performance" of some kind. If we take Lyotard's 
attack in this way, we might note that he is not going to be the professional philosopher 
and play by the rules. To some degree this is negative (the great despisers are the great 
reverers?)—Lyotard is "not" going to offer carefully formulated arguments with 
careful referencing. We might therefore see Lyotard's approach as "strategic" but not 
in the sense that Habermas uses that word—the connotation is not negative although on 
some level it implies negation. Though what Lyotard has to say about Habermas can be 
evaluated in Habermasian terms (as Blake does), doing this will miss the point. If you 
like, Lyotard and Habermas are not playing the same language game. Though 
Lyotard's treatment of Habermas represents an "attack" it is not the same sort of attack 
that analytic philosophers launch on one another. Within the world of analytic 
philosophy, people partake in debates that different sides can supposedly win or lose? 
Of course, here the precision of argument is everything. Lyotard is not adopting "that" 
sort of attitude. Rather, it seems that he wants to draw attention to the presuppositions 
of philosophy and consider what it means to "do" philosophy differently: "It remains to 
be said that the author of this report is a philosopher, not an expert. The latter knows 
what he knows and what he does not know: the former does not." (p. xxv) 
Though negation plays a part in Lyotard's "game", this is not the whole story for one 
does not simply play in order to win: 
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A move can be made for the sheer pleasure of its invention: what else is 
involved in that labor of language harassment undertaken by popular 
speech and by literature? Great joy is had in the endless invention of 
turns of phrase, of words and meanings, the process behind the 
evolution of language on the level of parole. But at least this pleasure 
depends on a feeling of success won at the expense of an adversary—at 
least one adversary, and a formidable one—the accepted language, or 
connotation. (p. 10) 
This delight in language is affirmative. It echoes the Nietzschean desire mentioned 
earlier to overcome nihilism (thought of as simple negation). Lyotard reminds us that: 
"Reactional countermoves are no more than programmed effects in the opponent's 
strategy". One has to be elusive and difficult, play a game that can be enjoyed if not 
won. This leads us to consider why, if Lyotard is playing such a "serious" game, he 
does not declare his hand more openly. Why not be more transparent and avoid the 
bluster? Is Lyotard simply laughing at his audience, "smirking" perhaps? Maybe the 
simple explanation is that he is trying not to get "caught". 
A softer approach 
Lyotard gives a number of examples of agonistic game playing within the scientific 
community. He dedicates a whole chapter to the various ways in which various 
individuals have rewritten the rules of science. Indeed this takes us to what might seem 
a less negative understanding of Lyotard's "tribute" to Austin when coining the term 
"performativity": 
Lyotard here ingeniously "saves" the coherence of scientific research 
and experiment by recasting its now seemingly non- or postreferential 
"epistemology" in telins of linguistics, and in particular of theories of 
the performative (J.L. Austin), for which the justification of scientific 
work is not to produce an adequate model or replication of some 
outside reality, but rather simply to produce more work, to generate 
new and fresh scientific enonces) or statements, to make you have 
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"new ideas" (P.B. Medawar), or best of all (and returning to the more 
familiar aesthetics of high modernism), again and again to "make it 
new": "Au fond de l'Inconnu pour trouver du nouveau!" (Jameson, 
1984, p. ix) 
Though Jameson has little in the way of textual evidence to back up this claim, one can 
perhaps link Lyotard's understanding of science to the early part of How to do things 
with Words and the failure to separate the constative from the performative. If the 
constative is always performative it can always be rewritten. This idea is ingenious, 
and would seem to be the only hope for science. However, at the same time, Lyotard 
has interesting things to say about speech acts of another sort. Let us consider a story 
that Lyotard tells of the Cashinahua tribe and indeed the stories that they tell do not 
arise out of "the choice called the occident". (p. 8): 
A Cashinahua story-teller always begins his narration with a fixed 
formula: "Here is the story of-, as I've always heard it told. I will tell it 
to you in my turn. Listen." And he brings it to a close with...: "Here 
ends the story of -. The man who has told it to you is- [Cashinahua 
name], or to the Whites- [Spanish or Portuguese name]." (p. 20) 
Now we might note that there are clear pragmatic rules here regarding "who" can tell 
the story (a male Cashinahua), those who are allowed to hear it (a male Cashinahua, a 
bearer of a Cashinahua name and a pre-puberty Cashinahua girl). There is also a rule 
about who is permitted to be the theme of the story (all the Cashinahuas). We might 
"innocently" note that in this story (and as Habermas tells us in 'What is Universal 
Pragmatics', stories contain speech acts) that "the form of narrative, the truth, the 
truthfulness and the rightness (in Habermas's terms) of the story are not a problem" 
(Steuerman, 1992, p. 109). Rather the story's "legitimacy" comes from being retold. 
There is "an immemorial beating", that generates a different sense of time from 
modern time—phenomenologically we are in another place. 
Let us stick with stories for a minute. What about stories that analytic philosophers 
tell? Such stories are generally employed to make a point—the story services a point. 
Normally it will be the case that Habermas's criteria do apply. Not only should the 
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story be understandable but one will see a truth in it (or not), recognise its rightness (or 
not), though one would probably question the way in which it was "felt". Clearly, 
philosophers who tend to tell these stories are not trying to deceive anybody though 
were we to see the story as expressive (in the way stories ordinarily are) then in 
pragmatic terms (given that somebody will either be reading or listening to their story), 
this might seem excessive. But of course there are (and there always are aren't there?) 
exceptions to this. Let us take Bernard Williams' famous story about two people 
drowning, one of whom is your wife. For Williams, to reason about who should be 
saved would be to have "one thought too many". This is of course a marvellously 
expressive sentence—it sticks with you, makes you laugh! —though perhaps this is a 
matter of opinion. However, there is something interesting about Williams' story that 
we might set against one of Habermas's more famous allusions to Austin, namely the 
"performative contradiction". 
Habermas accuses certain writers (those he considers to be counter Enlightenment 
philosophers) as engaging in a performative contradiction. This is because he believes 
that they "argue" for the non-existence of reason. If I say: "there is no such thing as 
reason" or, if we include the illocutionary verb "I argue that there is no such thing as 
reason" then I am doing the very thing, "reasoning", that I maintain cannot be done. 
For performative or illocutionary force to take effect, for you to be convinced, what I 
have to say must be "verifiable" or "falsifiable". If I say: "I argue that there is no such 
thing as reason", then this is neither verifiable nor falsifiable". The sentence 
undermines itself. Habermas uses this example as a means to demonstrate the ongoing 
pervasiveness of reason against its enemies. However, what is going on with the phrase 
"he has had one thought too many"? Here Williams uses reason (he is making an 
argument) that there is no place for reason on this occasion. Nevertheless, what he says 
makes sense and has force, although it is also not strictly falsifiable or verifiable. One 
could make the argument that there are perfectly good reasons for saving the other 
person, but to do this would be to miss the point (and someone might have drowned in 
the meantime). If we bring in Habermas's criteria we can see that Williams' utterance 
is normatively right, emotionally appropriate, and cognitively problematic—the 
constative or cognitive dimension is under duress. Perhaps Williams is engaged in a 
"constative contradiction", yet we might restate the claim that his words have 
illocutionary force nonetheless. 
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In the last few paragraphs, I have drawn attention to what I believe to be an area of 
Lyotard's thought that is "softer" than his interest in agonistics. The stories of the 
Cashinahua tribe represent "ordinary" uses of language that show up the limitations of 
Habermas's schema. As Williams' funny example demonstrates, there are occasions in 
which certain "considerations" are better left well alone. 
Phrases, Genres of Discourse and the Sublime 
Lyotard eventually gives up on agonistics and develops a philosophy of language in 
tune with an original reading of the Kantian sublime. In the subsequent section we shall 
consider what this amounts to. The reading of Lyotard presented here will be in 
keeping with Gordon Beam's and I will not (intentionally) depart from it. There are 
two reasons for this. Firstly, I find nothing to disagree with in Beam's reading of 
Lyotard (I will however attempt to consider one or two issues that Beam ignores that 
will seem peculiar to thought that is of a rationalist disposition). 
Beam argues that we must read Lyotard's interest in "the sublime" in accordance with 
the latter's philosophy of language and his discussion of "phrases", "genres of 
discourse" and "differends". Let us begin with phrases. Lyotard does not provide a 
definition of a "phrase" but rather gives examples such as "a fleeting blush; a tapping 
of the foot; give me a lighter" (p. 233)—it seems that virtually anything can count as a 
phrase. Phrases are to be thought of as "events"—they are "nothing cognitive or 
significant at all" (ibid.) and are the only thing that survives universal doubt. What 
does this mean? When Lyotard speaks of "the phrase" he is thinking of that 
entity/event prior (in a non-chronological sense) to its being linked and situated within 
discourse—the phrase/event is simply an "it happens" or an "is it happening" (Lyotard, 
1988) which once it is linked is realised as "what happens". Therefore, the phrase is "a 
presentation before the chronological present" an "event" prior to linking. When 
phrases are linked they bring the chronological realm into being. This is because 
linking is bound up with goal directedness—it binds the phrase to a past/present/future, 
which divides experience and unites it in accordance with the goal of linking. We can 
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only gain an understanding of the present because linking has constituted it (Beam, 
2000, p. 233). 
When a phrase is linked it is done so in accordance with a number of possible phrase 
regimens such as reasoning, knowing, describing, recounting, questioning, showing 
and ordering. Different regimens serve to "throw the chain over the abyss of not-being 
that opens between phrases", therefore suturing over the "eventness" of a phrase. 
However, to think solely in terms of regimen gets us nowhere. This is because the 
functioning of regimen is determined by the genre of discourse in which they are 
utilised. Genres of discourse guide particular moves. Because several linkages across 
genres of discourse are possible, once a genre takes hold of a phrase this produces a 
"differend"—only one kind of linkage can happen at a time. So what is a differend? 
Well, "as distinguished from a litigation, a differend would be a case of conflict 
between at least two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of 
judgement applicable to both arguments" (Lyotard, 1988, sect. 40). Because we link in 
one way, we cannot link in another and this produces a differend. 
Let us pause for a moment. It seems that there is every reason to query what has just 
been said. What an earth does Lyotard mean by a phrase that has yet to be linked. 
Surely such things do not exist. Moreover, if a litigation can be distinguished from a 
differend (in the sense that a litigation "can" be resolved by a rule of judgement) then 
how can a differend occur every time we link. We might imagine that in the case of 
schooling, a litigation might take place when somebody pointed to the injustice of 
expecting schools to achieve grades which the students are not even predicted to get, 
despite the fact that though those grades have been "predicted" by centrally approved 
methods. This would seem to be a litigation in the sense that it does not question 
statistical accountability per se, but the way in which it is being treated. In contrast a 
differend might occur when launching a critique of statistical accountability in a 
language that is not acceptable to the system. Though this is right on one level, the fact 
that a differend will occur every time we link shows how the fullness or presence that 
might be ascribed to either a litigation that is understandable to the system, or indeed 
one that is not, will always be compromised. Phrases could always have been linked in 
other ways. Dislocating the phrase from the chronological present is therefore an 
imaginative leap that flies in the face of rationalist concerns for an impossible 
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completeness and consistency "The differend is reborn from the resolutions of 
supposed litigations" (Lyotard, 1988, sect. 263). 
With this in mind genres of discourse (which may be represented by certain kinds of 
philosophy as well as performativity) cut off other avenues of thought, hold phrases in 
their grip and impose "the finality of a necessary causality". This is what leads Lyotard 
to write: 
No matter what its regimen, every phrase is in principle what is at stake 
between genres of discourse. This differend proceeds from the 
question, which accompanies any phrase, of how to link onto it. And 
the question proceeds from the nothingness that separates one phrase 
from the "following". There are differends because, or like, there is 
Ereignis [an event, an occurrence]. But that's forgotten as much as 
possible: genres of discourse are modes of forgetting the occurrence; 
they fill the void between phrases. (p. 235) 
Here, Lyotard draws our attention to the fundamental irony that the absent quality of 
the phrase (its non-chronological "is it happening") is what allows for genres of 
discourse to grip it and smooth over the absence. 
It seems that Lyotard has led us to an impasse. However, he does not simply give up. 
Rather he turns to Kantian aesthetics of the sublime. This turn is in keeping with what 
he sees as the philosophical necessity of bearing witness to differends through finding 
"idioms" for them. The idiom is a linguistic mode accessible only to those ways of 
thinking that are "not" bound by genres of discourse—the arts, philosophical thinking 
and philosophical politics (I think we can safely assume that Lyotard does not mean all 
art, all philosophical thinking or all philosophical politics). To bear witness to the 
differend is to bear witness to the "now" before chronology. It can only happen if we 
question/negate "everything including thought" and accept that something will "happen 
that reason has not yet known". That way, we accept the occurrence of what is "not 
yet" determined. Lyotard describes such philosophical work in terms of 
"Peregrinations in the desert" (Lyotard, 1991, p. 74). 
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For Lyotard, the activity of bearing witness to the differend resonates with Kant's 
treatment of the sublime. The sublime works in accordance with the movement from a 
no to a yes it is "a pleasure that arises only indirectly: it is produced by a feeling of 
momentary inhibition of the vital forces followed immediately by an outpouring of 
them that is all the stronger". For Kant, it seems that our imagination will fail to deal 
with something at first and then reason can think the infinite as a totality, though the 
totality could never be presented as such in an intuition. Bearn argues that bearing 
witness to the differend might be rather like this—first we feel pain at the differend 
then we try to find idioms to present what escapes presentation. This will involve the 
negation of desires goals and purposes. 
Up till this point the discussion has dealt with some pretty esoteric philosophy. At this 
point I will bring the discussion round to the relevance to schooling of what has been 
presented so far. This will necessarily involve a shift in register. What follows may 
seem tonally incongruous but that incongruity is something I want to thematise. The 
dissonance in register represents a strategy, or perhaps, more accurately, an attempt to 
bear witness to a differend. 
The Grand Narratives of Schooling 
Earlier in this chapter, we looked at how performativity has come to usurp the grand 
narratives of the Enlightenment. It might be worth considering whether education, or 
more specifically schooling, has its own grand narratives. The most obvious candidates 
are arguably the liberal and progressive traditions of educational thought. These are so 
familiar I will provide brief though hopefully not glib accounts of these traditions. 
The notion of what a liberal education entails is nicely captured by the work of what 
has been called the London School, whose work developed in the 1960s. The most 
famous advocates of a liberal education are perhaps R.S. Peters and Paul Hirst (see for 
example Peters (1963) and (1966)). The term liberal here is generally used to denote 
the liberty or freedom that education can provide if conducted properly. A liberal 
education is a plea for education, not training. Philosophers who argue for a liberal 
education believe that education should not be confined to specialism, nor constrained 
82 
by established beliefs. Moreover, a liberal education involves developing the ability to 
think originally and independently. It frees the mind to function according to its nature, 
frees reasoning from error and frees human conduct from wrong. In a sense, a liberal 
education is at least as old as Plato. We might think here of the figure in Plato's 
Republic (Plato, 2003) who escapes the confines of the cave to contemplate beauteous 
forms in the sunlight. Of course, the vision represented by the allegory of the cave is 
rather different to the modern version. To be set free is to overcome the illusions that 
are normal for human beings, and to come to see the truth. On the platonic view, 
coming to see the truth takes precedence over the value of coming to decide things for 
oneself. In contrast, the modern version of freedom (as understood by advocates of a 
liberal education) attaches to the formal nature of rationality. Someone who is not 
rational and well-informed is at the mercy of her passions, liable to be influenced by 
others and limited by ignorance. In contrast, autonomy involves making well-informed 
choices. Executive virtues are required so that the autonomous person has the will to 
see through whatever she decides to do. The focus on autonomy is clearly strongly 
Kantian in nature. The traditional "disciplines" are important to advocates of a liberal 
education. They cover what Hirst calls the "forms of knowledge", those distinct ways 
of reasoning that are part of the human inheritance. Such "forms of knowledge" 
provide different ways of disciplining the mind. Each of these requires an initiation, in 
the absence of which certainly possibilities of thought will be closed off to the 
individual. They allow the mind to function according to its nature, this being 
understood teleologically. They are a realisation of mind. Hence, they are at the heart 
of the freedom that education must bring about. 
Having considered what a liberal philosophy of education looks like, let us briefly turn 
to progressivism. A "progressive" (or "child/student-centred") approach to education 
can be traced at least as far back as the Romantic individualism of Rousseau's Emile 
(Rousseau, 1911), and it is most famously associated with the work of John Dewey 
(See for example Dewey (1925), (1963) and (1966)). Progressive educators argue that 
people learn best when interacting with other people. Consequently, a great emphasis is 
put on co-operation over competition. It is argued that this not only makes learning 
more effective but also increases creativity and has good social outcomes. Good social 
outcomes would include the development of the democratic spirit. Traditional 
education had tended to favour the more able whereas progressive education recognises 
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the need to develop all children in their own right. Also, progressive educators/thinkers 
have often argued for the need to consider aims of consciousness-raising for particular 
groups in the light of circumstances of oppression. They aim to avoid creating fodder 
for industry and obedient compliant citizens. Progressive educators emphasise the 
importance of teaching in accordance with developmental stages (a notion that receives 
much emphasis within the psychology of education), which should govern when 
particular subject matter is introduced. They also recognise the importance of 
accounting for personal or temperamental differences between children—education 
must be adjusted to the individual learner's needs. When teaching one should also start 
from the ""social" circumstances of the child. Progressive educators emphasise the 
importance of learning by doing. The experience of learning should focus not simply 
on reading and drill, but on the experiences and activities that make up real life. 
Consequently, they aim to break the hermetic seal that traditionally separates the 
classroom from the outside world. They wish to temper the "bookish" spirit of 
traditional education. Progressive thinkers not only sever the cord separating the 
classroom from the outside world. They also question the distinction between work and 
leisure. An understanding of childhood as a separate domain informs such questioning. 
For progressivists, it is important to build on the imaginative, creative aspects of 
childhood and provide environments and outlets to foster these aspects. This will not 
only lead to more effective learning, it will lead to flourishing and happiness. 
Let us now consider a scene from schooling to gain an impression of what has 
happened to education's grand narratives. 
Scene 1 
I shall begin at the beginning, certainly as far as the culture of the school is concerned, 
with the phenomenon of the first day back after the summer break; in many schools this 
is an INSET day.' The ,first INSET day has everything to do with performance and is a 
resonant reminder of how our professional subjectivity is generated by it. The first 
Notes 
1. INSET stands for In Service Training. Schools are required to offer a set number of training days 
each year. These are usually dedicated to developing skills and improving performance. 
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meeting of the year involves the entire teaching staff watching senior management run 
through the GCSE results et al.2 This involves a comparison with previous results and 
results that were predicted by various computer programmes based on comparative 
statistics. Generally speaking, this will either be followed by congratulation for success 
at meeting targets, or a telling off, thinly veiled in managerial language, for "failure". 
At the micro-level of this process, teachers compare their results with target grades to 
see if they have achieved value on their results. This will often be formalised in a 
performance management meeting with the teacher's line manager. 
During the course of the school year a teacher's performance will undergo checks 
involving lesson observations and evaluation of marking skills in exercise books. 
These evaluations tend to be conducted in relation to departmental requirements. 
Practice in the classroom is therefore to some degree standardised according to 
prescribed policies. Relative failure or success as regards results will involve 
rethinking the policies, although constant innovations will be applied in more energetic 
departments. 
The picture illustrated above clearly demonstrates that what teachers do is largely 
regulated by, or in relation to, technological systems that determine an expected 
outcome or result. The methodologies for achieving these results are homogenised as 
far as is humanly possible and the shape of the year leads to annual regulation of 
success. The language that shapes and surrounds these procedures is replete with 
acronyms, technical terminology and the language of business. 
There is clearly a metonymic relationship here between Lyotard's description of 
performativity and what is happening in schools. The input/output model conforms to 
Lyotard's model in the sense that statistics are electronically merged with exam results 
to produce predicted grades. Those grades become the most overriding system for 
measurement of performance. Satisfaction is achieved if results conform to the 
2. The acronym GCSE stands for General Certificate of Education. These are the first serious official 
exams that students take. They are usually taken by sixteen year old students. Schools are judged 
according to the success of their GCSE results. 
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information produced by a computer program, and this conformity is more important 
than the quality of the achievement 
Clearly, what is being described here relates to the nihilism diagnosed by Nietzsche 
mentioned earlier on in this chapter. Schools that succeed only do so because they do 
not fail and vice versa. The kinds of aim implicit to the liberal and progressive 
traditions are no longer on view. Thinking about a liberal understanding of education, 
might we compare the teachers/executives sitting round the computer to the figures that 
stare at the shadows in Plato's Cave? Have we seen an ancient allegory take a more 
solid form and become more than metaphor? Looked at in a certain way, the 
participants in the scene described are very like the cave-dwellers. This is assuming 
that they do not question the limitations of the form of illumination that has been laid 
on for them and sit there sleepily contemplating it. Moreover, in the darkness they may 
compete for "honours"—who can gain the most value on their statistics and be 
proclaimed the very best of teachers? But what of those who turn away, aided or 
unaided towards the source of light? There are no beauteous forms to contemplate but a 
machine-made contraption, a contrivance worthy of the Wizard of Oz. The last 
remnants of a liberal education are still retained through the teaching of subjects like 
English literature. Other "traditional" subjects like Geography, History and Modern 
Languages can be dropped at 14. 
Perhaps progressivism has fared a little better. After all, contemporary pedagogy 
certainly seems to focus on the "manner" rather than the "matter" of education through 
the focus on transferable skills and the like. However, the progressive focus on how 
one teaches has been stripped down. "Facilitation" is no longer about making learning 
pleasurable, about tapping into the experience of childhood or about a genuine concern 
for developing democracy. Pedagogical "methods" have become instruments of 
"effectiveness". It might be argued that the focus on the individual learner in today's 
classrooms reflects progressive ideals. However "learners" are not quite the same thing 
as "children". If you are synonymous with your target grade", the kind of authenticity 
that progressivism tried to "bring out" is no longer at issue. 
One can perhaps see the kernel of progressivism and the drive toward authenticity in 
the "Student Voice" movement. The notion of "student voice" has gained particular 
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popularity in recent years. Indeed, it might appear to offer the promise of 
progressivism. It is all about involving children in a democratic process of schooling, a 
process that takes their voices seriously and moves beyond the cursory nods to student 
involvement that had characterised school councils (where students would have little 
involvement in tackling anything very important). There is clearly some recognition of 
the force of performativity within the student voice debate (or should we say children's 
voice [s]?) which has clearly embraced a form of progressivism. That said, much of the 
material in the area of student voice is devoted to "raising standards". Those very 
voices that are so concerned (and we are dealing with a very serious bunch of people 
here!) do not necessarily recognise the dissonance (in my experience they sometimes 
favour the ugly "disconnect") between effectiveness culture and the development of the 
democratic process. Notably there is nothing deceitful about this. The proponents of 
student voice are in earnest (and oh are they earnest!) about what they are doing. They 
make arguments that are accepted or refuted within the "student voice" academic 
community and operate within a systematic normative horizon. Of course the 
normative horizon here is provided by performativity. Moreover, the students/children 
who would engage with student voice have been brought up within the culture of 
perfonnativity, reared to play that language game. They too may earnestly engage in 
debate, but . . . if one looks for "authenticity" one is likely to be disappointed. As 
Stephen Ball writes: 
[T]he potential for inauthenticity and meaninglessness is increasingly 
an everyday experience for us all. The activities of the new technical 
intelligentsia, of management, drive performativity into the day-to-day 
practices of teachers. They make management, ubiquitous, invisible, 
inescapable—part of and embedded in everything we do. Increasingly, 
we choose and judge our actions and they are judged by others on the 
basis of their contribution to organisational performance, rendered in 
terms of measurable outputs. Beliefs are no longer important—it is 
output that counts. (Ball, 2006, p. 151) 
This embeddedness that Ball refers to is not always recognised by the academic 
education community. In my experience the term "performativity" has often been 
bandied about in meetings. However, on such occasions, I often felt that it was taken to 
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simply refer to the government focus on results and summative assessment. The reader 
will probably be unsurprised to learn that I have sat through meetings in which talk of 
effectiveness, different "knowledges", "creative partnerships", "student experts", etc., 
have all been "on the table". Yet, at the same time, the participants who spoke this 
language so fluently would also be opposed to target culture and "performativity". I 
have also witnessed drives to resuscitate progressivism such as the recent Cambridge 
Primary Review. However, the Review also speaks the cold language of 
"effectiveness" despite its commitment to broader educational aims. Performativity is 
not something one can easily opt out of. 
It seems fairly clear that authenticity or, to put it another way, freedom from 
performativity is not an option. There is no unsullied educational island to paddle up 
to. Is this a reason to give up hope? I do not think so. However, what is required is a 
more probing and subtle philosophy than the liberal and progressive narratives of the 
past can provide. 
Agonistics and Sublime Education 
Having considered what has happened to liberal and progressive ideas, does Lyotard's 
philosophy provide anything that might guide our thinking in terms of how to counter 
performativity? The notion of playing agonistic language games might be a place to 
start. However, the kinds of activity (drawn from the university) that Lyotard 
describes—where scientists reinvent the rules that constitute science—sounds a little 
ambitious as a project for school teachers to undertake. Moreover, even if one could 
envisage what this would amount to, it would be difficult to disentangle it from the 
constant "innovations" that plague teachers' lives and have everything to do with 
performativity. 
One can, I suppose, imagine a micro-politics of the classroom in which teachers resist 
the pressures to bring their work into line with prescribed teaching models. In a sense 
this is what I used to try and do in my classroom. For example, I gave very short shrift 
to the idea of three part lessons, only used ICT when I thought it was appropriate and 
refused to put learning objectives up on the board. For quite a long time I was left 
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alone as my results were good (the notion that modern pedagogical "techniques" would 
invariably boost results is, in my experience, somewhat suspect). However, as 
managerial forces intensified and descended we were required to "make" students write 
objectives in their books (so this could be checked by line managers). Children also 
had to put assessment objectives inside the front covers. Senior managers would go on 
"curriculum walks" to ensure that ICT was being used and "lively" teaching styles 
were being adopted. What I am saying is that you can run and hide but eventually they 
will catch you. 
The Sublime School 
What "significance" might Lyotard's thoughts on the sublime have for schooling? It 
would seem that in and amongst the activities teachers may engage in to fill their 
"professional roles", when they are constrained by learning objectives or illuminating 
their rooms with PowerPoint presentations, there may be moments of silent 
contemplation in which something unexpected (possibly frightening) is allowed to 
emerge. Perhaps teachers might suddenly come to question everything "including 
thought" and feel that their work has been stifled by the numerous effects of statistical 
goals. Then the situation is suddenly transformed into a sublime state of absence 
waiting to find idioms. They will suddenly no longer know what teaching is—
previously they had thought it was all about structures, learning objectives and learning 
styles. That has now been cleared away. Unfortunately, the system (which is 
inescapable) will eventually bring them back to all this. 
It should perhaps be noted that this understanding of the sublime in relation to 
education derives from Bill Readings' book The University in Ruins (Readings, 1996), 
and there is something very universityish about it. University lecturers will still have a 
deep involvement with their subject through research, etc., but this will hardly be the 
case with schoolteachers. Moreover, the facilitator culture has encouraged the modern 
teacher to think less about their subject and to concentrate more on "transferable 
skills". In my experience newly qualified teachers are quite likely to refuse sixth form 
teaching (teaching of 16-18 year olds) on the grounds that it represents "academic" 
challenges that they feel ill-at-ease with. Is an experience of the sublime (however 
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limited) only (or largely) available to intellectuals? It would seem one has to be a pretty 
deep thinker to unthink oneself into the possibly impossible sublime space. Indeed, 
Lyotard's examples of this kind of behaviour are often drawn from the least accessible 
instances of modern art. 
These are serious reservations, and so it is not without reservations that I now turn to 
consider what must count as something of a sublime moment in Alan Bennett's The 
History Boys. The film's action takes place over a year in the lives of a group of 
particularly high-achieving students (from an ordinary comprehensive school near 
Sheffield) as they attempt to sit Oxbridge exams4. 
Due to the unusually good A-level results, the head teacher (an ambitious, 
unprincipled, reptilian figure) is particularly determined that the boys gain places at 
Oxford or Cambridge. However, he feels that they may lack the necessary "edge" to 
ensure success. Consequently, he employs Irwin, a young Oxbridge graduate, for the 
specific purpose of sharpening the boys up. Much of the drama focuses on the different 
approaches to teaching and learning displayed by Irwin, who teaches the students exam 
technique, Hector who teaches them "general studies"—Hector is unhappy with the 
term "general studies": "There is no such thing as general studies. General studies is a 
waste of time. Knowledge is not general, it is specific."—and Dorothy who teaches the 
students A Level History. 
In certain respects the film is a meditation on performativity, which in certain respects 
is embodied in the character of Irwin. For Irwin, making judgements about history is 
not the issue—there is no sense of making a good or bad judgement about history, or of 
taking a stand. Rather, there are multiple ways of reading events, which can only be 
distinguished on the grounds of how interesting a particular interpretation might be. 
Irwin's teaching manner is confrontational and frequently mocking in its attempt to 
wake the students up from the stupor that lulls them into thinking that there might be 
4 The play/film (the play was made into a film) is set in the early 1980s and there are good reasons for 
this. Up until the early 1980s A-level students who wanted to get into Oxbridge and Cambridge would 
spend an extra year at school to prepare for the tests and the interview. This practice was then 
abolished. 
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good and bad judgements. The roots of their judgements are aborted as he interrogates 
students, dismisses their naivety and provides a virtuoso display of all manner of 
"interesting" readings of history. Ultimately, we find out that Irwin has misrepresented 
himself at interview and that he is not an Oxford graduate but had attended a teaching 
college there. He is brimming over with resentment at his own failure, a resentment 
that permeates his approach to academic enquiry. 
One of the more memorable scenes featuring Hector, Irwin and the boys involves a 
discussion during which the characters consider whether or not it is possible to "teach" 
the holocaust (both Hector and Irwin are present during this lesson). Some of the 
students try to impress Irwin by coming up with clever explanations that might justify a 
discussion of the holocaust: "It has origins, it has consequences. It's a subject like any 
other." In response to this, Hector says: "They go on school trips there nowadays, don't 
they? Auschwitz, Dachau. What's always concerned me is: where do they have their 
sandwiches, drink their cokes?" Of course, one of the students misunderstands this 
question and responds: "The visitors' centre. It's like anywhere else." However, Hector 
continues: "Yeah, but do they take pictures of each other there? Are they smiling? Do 
they hold hands? Nothing is appropriate." 
Let us think again for a moment of Habermas's concern that our utterances should be 
true, normatively right and "felt". Clearly the criteria for communicative interaction, as 
Habermas understands it, is lacking in what the boys are up to—they are disconnected 
from their words. In a sense they may be trying to say something true, but the 
illocutionary force of their utterances would seem to depend on whether or not Irwin 
finds their comments sufficiently clever. However, Hector's response is also far 
removed from communicative action. What he says does not take the form of an 
argument. Rather, through images, through a mini-narrative if you like, he gestures 
towards an unspeakable silence, a blank. Here Hector is not involved in an agonistics 
(nothing so aggressive, or perhaps scientific is going on). Of course, a differend 
emerges between Hector's words and the boys' argument and indeed, on some views, 
rational argument per se. We might say that what he offers is something like an 
education in the sublime. 
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Even though schoolteachers might experience the sublime, is this all we can hope for? 
To some degree Beam is supportive of Lyotard's project in that there is no one way to 
make links "guaranteed by some special semantic object or other". However, as he 
shows us with reference to Lyotard's discussion of modern art, Lyotard's sublime is 
unlike Kant's, which involves a "no" followed by a "yes". Rather Lyotard's sublime 
involves a "no" followed by a "no" (Beam, 2000, p. 238). This is because the "event" 
(the yes) must always be "betrayed by putting it into words, colours, a link, a phrase" 
(ibid.). Bearing witness (if there is a yes element to it) must always fail by producing 
other differends. We are left with the depressing claim that "To link some emptiness is 
necessary" (Lyotard quoted in Beam, 2000, p. 241). At best we are left with a pseudo-
religious worship of absence. Beam's point here would seem to be backed by 
Lyotard's choice of the phrase "Peregrinations in the desert"—a pilgrimage to nothing. 
An alternative 
If agonistics and the sublime do not get us very far, then perhaps the softer examples 
drawn from The Postmodern Condition offer more in the way of hope. As we saw with 
the example of the Cashinahua tribe's stories (and Bernard Williams's drowning wife) 
there are clearly occasions (many occasions?) when particular pragmatic criteria do not 
apply, or at least if one tries to make them apply it can be shown that one is in danger 
of becoming ridiculous. There are simply occasions on which the apparatus of modern 
pedagogy is just simply inappropriate. Let us consider another scene drawn from 
schooling to illustrate what might be at stake here. 
Scene 2 
An English teacher decides that her class will study the film Dead Poets' Society. 
Students will eventually write an essay on the film for their GCSE media coursework 
assignment. Having made this decision, the teacher generates a scheme of work 
incorporating learning objectives, assessment criteria, opportunities for kinaesthetic 
learning and a lot of other things that teachers are expected to include in their planning. 
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The reason I employ this scene (which is not a fabrication!) here is that its 
inappropriateness derives from the substance of the film. Dead Poets' Society, 
whatever you think about it, is a celebration of free (though not untempered) 
expression in education. Indeed, the film includes a famous scene in which the class 
read from an introduction to a poetry anthology. This introduction includes a method 
for evaluating the relative merits of sonnets by Byron and Shakespeare using a graph. 
The class are asked to rip the introduction out of their books, as inappropriate and 
against the spirit of the poetry. In the same vein, teaching Dead Poets' Society whilst 
rigorously adhering to assessment criteria, learning objectives, etc., is against the spirit 
of the film. A dreadful chimera rears it head as constituent parts attack one another. 
That this could go unacknowledged says a great deal about the force of performativity. 
Nevertheless, here one can provide rational grounds against the rationalisation of 
education. Would this be another constative contradiction, or are we simply bearing 
witness to a differend? 
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Chapter 3 
Derrida, Iterability and the Arrivant 
In the last chapter I gave an account of Lyotard's understanding of "performativity". 
Though his agonistic response to performativity bears the mark of optimism, as we 
saw, this gradually faded away. For Lyotard, the only possible hope or "redemption" 
for postmodern society lies in a blank desert space where something might appear or 
happen. Equally nothing may appear or happen. Ultimately, Lyotard's philosophy 
succumbs to an elitist and ascetic refusal to engage. He no longer wanted to come out 
to play. Consequently, though Lyotard's work is fabulously prescient in regards to the 
future of knowledge and the university and terribly convincing in its diagnosis of the 
malaise that education has succumbed to, it ultimately has little to say about how 
thinking might take a more optimistic line. If Lyotard has anything to say on this 
matter at all, the scientist's agonistics and academic ascetism have no weight or place 
in the context of ordinary schooling. That said, the account of "The Sublime" and his 
recognition of pragmatic dissonance, offer some hope. 
In this chapter we turn to the work of Jacques Derrida whose philosophy provides a 
powerful though limited form of optimism. In a later part of this chapter we will 
consider Derrida's reading of Austin and the opportunities for thinking through the 
malaise described above. However, it will hopefully be helpful to provide a brief more 
general background to Derrida's philosophy of language before delving into this 
territory. 
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Derrida wishes to draw attention to the false metaphysics that has held philosophy in 
its grip. He does this by providing a critique of what he calls logocentrism and 
phonocentrism. Let us begin by considering what Derrida has to say about the 
phonocentrism which he believes characterises the history of the philosophy of 
language, indeed, the history of thinking generally. Here is Derrida: 
The system of "hearing (understanding)–oneself-speak" through the 
phonic substance-which presents itself as the nonexterior, nonmundane, 
therefore nonempirical or noncontingent signifier—has necessarily 
dominated the history of the world during an entire epoch, and has even 
produced the idea of the world, the idea of world origin, that arises 
from the difference between the worldly and the non-worldly, the 
outside and the inside, ideality and nonideality, universal and 
nonuniversal, transcendental and empirical, etc. (Derrida, 1997, p. 5) 
With an irregular and essentially precarious success, this movement would have 
apparently tended, as toward its telos, to confine writing to a secondary and 
instrumental function: translator of a full speech that was fully present (present to 
itself, to its signified, to the other, the very condition of the theme of presence in 
general), technics in the service of language, spokesman, interpreter of an originary 
speech itself shielded from interpretation. (pp. 7-8) 
When we speak we feel a closeness to our words, a command over them, a sense of 
control. Therefore, the spoken word does not seem isolated from its utterance, unlike 
the written word, which already seems to render a sense of dislocation. When we 
speak, our words "seem" to register something internal whereas writing "feels" 
external, distant and supplementary. Therefore speech appears to be present to thought 
whereas, in contrast, writing seems to embody absence. When we read a book, the 
author is not there, we cannot speak to them. Also, the things, which the words refer to, 
are not in front of us. We might therefore say that writing (conceived of in the 
traditional sense) connotes absence and therefore otherness in relation to our words. 
We will come back to this shortly. 
95 
Related to the phonocentrism described above is a certain logocentrism. To think 
logocentrically is to adhere to a belief in truth that is beyond or above history. This 
vision of truth sees various truths as having the quality of metaphysical presence. Such 
truth is "internal" and therefore superior to all forms of "exteriority" whether they are 
cultural, historical or textual. It seems obvious that language originates with speech—
we speak before we can write! It therefore appears equally obvious that speech is 
somehow closer to the logos: 
As has been more or less implicitly determined, the essence of the 
phone would be immediately proximate to that which within "thought" 
as logos relates to "meaning", produces it, receives it, speaks it, 
"composes" it. If, for Aristotle, for example, "spoken words (ta en to 
phone) are the symbols of mental experience (pathemata tes psyches) 
(De Interpretatione, 1, 16a 3) it is because the voice, producer of the 
first symbols, has a relationship of essential and immediate proximity 
with the mind. (Derrida, 1997, p. 11) 
As mentioned earlier, when we speak we get the impression that our speaking reflects 
an outpouring of our thoughts. Spoken words are therefore "symbols" of our thoughts. 
This way of thinking creates a hierarchy in which thought (logos) comes first, followed 
by speech and then writing: before history, knowledge and culture, there is presence. 
Plato's writing on "the forms" provides a clear example of logocentrism—the very 
goal of philosophy is the reappropriation of presence that can only take place (in 
however partial a fashion) if one seeks to commune with the eternal forms. The text as 
such, is only an aid/supplement to this process. 
To show how Derrida provides a critique of phonocentrism and logocentrism, it will be 
helpful at this point to introduce Saussure and his theory of the linguistic sign. The 
sign, according to Saussure, is made up of the signifier (an "acoustic image") and the 
signified (a concept). Language is a structure made up of signs. For Saussure, the 
signifier is in an arbitrary relationship with the signified—there is nothing "cowish" 
about the word "cow". Language is structured according to differences—"cat" is 
different from "bat" by one letter, and this difference in the signifier leads to two 
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completely different signifieds. It should be noted that Saussure's theory is clearly 
phonocentric: 
In every case, the voice is closest to the signified, whether it is 
determined strictly as sense (thought or lived) or more loosely as thing. 
All signifiers, and first and foremost the written signifier, are derivative 
with regard to what would wed the voice indissolubly to the mind or to 
the thought of the signified sense, indeed to the thing itself . . (Derrida, 
1997, p. 11) 
For Saussure, the signified belongs to/is located in the mind. Because the voice seems 
more immediately connected to our thoughts, it is closer to the signified. Consequently, 
the "notion of the sign always implies within itself the distinction between signifier and 
signified, even if, as Saussure argues, they are distinguished simply as the two faces of 
one and the same leaf. This notion remains therefore within the heritage of that 
logocentrism which is also a phonocentrism: absolute proximity of voice and being, of 
voice and the ideality of meaning". (p. 12) 
Derrida's reading of Saussure is not wholly critical. Let us set this out schematically: 
1. Derrida agrees with Saussure that the linguistic sign is arbitrary, but 
argues that Saussure fails to account for the implications of this. 
Having seen that there is nothing cowish about the word "cow", 
Saussure turns away from the more radical possibilities that accompany 
this recognition and turns toward the logocentric assumption that there 
is some fullness of meaning that exists behind the sign, which is then 
embodied in speech. 
2. Derrida argues that if we take Saussure's argument to its logical 
conclusion, then the arbitrariness demonstrated by the latter (the 
signifier?) demonstrates a dislocation, a fundamental otherness that 
characterises the relationship between the mark of the signifier and the 
content of the signified—in this sense the signified is, in an original 
sense, absent from the mark. 
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3. To go one stage further, if we can only think in words, and yet our 
words as referents bear no necessary relationship to their meaning, then 
the logocentric hierarchy (thoughts—speech spoken words—writing as 
supplement) is in a sense inverted. It would seem that the mark comes 
first. 
4. If we take this logical reordering seriously, then it would seem that 
"full presence" is in fact an illusory effect of language (or something 
produced by language). Meaning is not out there waiting to be worded. 
Rather, words as they come into being word the world. Consequently, 
the signifier does not represent the signified, but brings it into 
"presence"—brings it into being as an effect. 
5. Therefore, the figure of the linguistic sign (with its unity linking 
signifier and signified) is no longer adequate to the task of 
understanding how language works, and Derrida replaces the figure of 
the sign with that of the "mark". The "mark" is an indicator of absence 
rather than presence. It exists in the form of the trace, the graphic 
representation of the word prior to its signification. 
To summarise, Derrida's discussion of the mark demonstrates the unravelling of the 
binary distinction between speech (as indicative of presence) and writing (as 
supplement). This distinction depended on the passage from fully present non-
linguistic truth passing through into the words of the speaking subject present to that 
truth. This subject could then turn to the supplementary function of writing. However, 
if the "mark" comes first, then, in a sense, writing comes first. However, our 
understandings of presence, speech and writing have all suffered a sea change—writing 
can no longer be thought of as simply the secondary representation of speech. Speech 
is not bound to "presence", as "presence" is an effect of the mark. When Derrida talks 
about "writing" he is referring to a "general" writing, which need not be thought of as 
the word on the page. So, for example, a social group whose culture does not involve 
writing (in the traditional sense) is still subject to writing in the general sense. The fact 
that the mark may not take a materialised form is, in a sense, immaterial. So, when 
Levi-Strauss maintains that African tribes, because they do not write (in the traditional 
sense) are in some ways more innocent than Westerners, he fails to recognise the 
general writing, the "markness" that characterises their language. 
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So far we have considered a synchronic picture of language. The other dimension of 
difference can only be accounted for if we move beyond this to a diachronic picture of 
language in use. As Derrida notes, for words to mean anything at all they have to be 
repeatable and repeated, iterable and reiterated, they have to be "used" and used over 
time. It is this dimension of difference that is handled explicitly in 'Signature Event 
Context'. It is in this essay that Derrida presents his most famous treatment of Austin. 
Austin, Derrida and Context 
Derrida's interest in Austin's project derives in part from the latter's recognition that in 
identifying the ways in which words can do things the focus moves away from thinking 
of language in terms of signification where words stand as markers for ideas, for some 
truth external to language, to an emphasis on "communicating a force through the 
impetus [impulsion] of a mark" (Derrida, 1988, p. 13). We should note here that for 
Derrida, the notion of the mark acts as a replacement for the sign. The sign, with its 
binary distinction between signifier and signified, remains trapped within the 
metaphysics of presence. It assumes some origin of meaning and a fullness that 
precedes the signifier. Derrida's "mark" is the written word stripped of signification 
(emptied out of meaning) that indicates a presence in the form of a trace. The mark 
indicates presence, yet in Derrida's terms it exists as the absent origin—the mark 
stripped of meaning. Meaning/concept is an effect produced through the force (the 
impetus) of the mark. To understand things in this way is to understand all meaning as 
textual—there is no outside texts. When Austin shows how issuing a performative 
utterance is not to report on language, but to indulge in it, he appears to recognise the 
impossibility of adopting a stance that is not external to language. This is why Derrida 
notes that: 
5 This is a literal translation of Derrida's famous formulation "II n'y a pas de hors-texte". As Attridge 
notes, "this phrase does not mean "the things we normally consider to be outside the text do not exist" 
but "there is nothing that completely escapes the general properties of textuality, differance etc."—that 
is, as Denida goes on to explain, no "natural presence" that can be known "in itself'. But it is also true 
that here is no inside the text, since this would again imply an inside/outside boundary" (Attridge in 
Den-ida, 1992, p. 102). The more famous (though less exact) translation is "there is nothing beyond the 
text". 
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As opposed to the classical assertion, to the constative utterance, the 
performative does not have its referent (but here the word is certainly 
no longer appropriate, and this precisely is the interest of the discovery) 
outside of itself or, in any event, before and in front of itself It does not 
describe something that exists outside language and prior to it. (Derrida 
1988, p. 13) 
Derrida argues that Austin has shattered the concept of communication as a purely 
semiotic, linguistic, or symbolic concept. Communication is no longer considered in 
terms of 'transference of semantic content' or fixed in its orientation towards truth. 
Derrida praises Austin's patience and openness, the fact that the work is in constant 
transformation, that it acknowledges its impasses6. Nevertheless, despite the fact that 
for Austin meaning no longer has a 'referent in the form of a thing or of a prior or 
exterior state of things', Derrida argues that Austin undoes all his good work by 
missing something important about the structure of locution which effects the ternary 
distinction between locutions, illocutions and perlocutions. 
What does this amount to? It seems to have everything to do with the importance to 
Austin's project of an exhaustively determined context. One of the essential elements 
to this 'remains, classically, consciousness, the conscious presence of the speaking 
subject in the totality of his speech act'. Performative communication is bound up with 
intentional meaning: 
The conscious presence of speakers or receivers participating in the 
accomplishment of a performative, their conscious and intentional 
presence in the totality of the operation implies teleologically that no 
residue [reste] escapes the present totalisation. (Derrida, 1988, p. 14) 
I take this to mean that Austin, having shown how the outside to language invoked by 
the 'referent in the form of a thing or a prior exterior state of things' (ibid.) breaks 
down in the colonisation of the constative by performative concerns, then goes on to 
reinstate external presence in the figure of the speaking subject. The success of an 
6 In his essay "Truth", Austin writes: "in philosophy the foot of the letter is the foot of the ladder" 
(Austin, 1964b, p. 19). Here there is a clear affinity between Austin and Den-ida. 
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utterance depends on whether or not my words do what I intend them to do: 'therefore 
we find an exhaustibly definable context, of a free consciousness present to the totality 
of the operation, and of absolutely meaningful speech master of itself: the teleological 
jurisdiction of an entire field whose organising center remains intention' (ibid). If my 
intentions succeed they must do so with due 'correctness' and 'completeness'. This can 
only be accomplished if other factors (felicity conditions external to the utterance) are 
in place. If the priest is not qualified to marry me, then I will not be married. Derrida 
notes that Austin's procedure is 
rather remarkable and typical of that philosophical tradition with which 
he would like to have so few ties. It consists in recognizing that the 
possibility of the negative (in this case, of infelicities) is in fact a 
structural possibility, that failure is an essential risk of the operations 
under consideration; then in a move which is almost immediately 
simultaneous, in the name of a kind of ideal regulation, it excludes that 
risk as accidental, exterior, one which teaches us nothing about the 
linguistic phenomenon being considered...Thus, for example, 
concerning the conventionality without which there is no performative, 
Austin acknowledges that all conventional acts are exposed to failure: 
`it seems clear in the first place that, although it has excited us (or 
failed to excite us) in connexion with certain acts which are or are in 
part acts of uttering words, infelicity is an ill to which all acts are heir 
which have the general character of ritual or ceremonial, all 
conventional acts: not indeed that every ritual is liable to every form of 
infelicity (but then nor is every performative utterance)' (Austin's 
emphasis). (Derrida, 1988, p. 15) 
Derrida notes, and applauds, Austin's interest in the "negative", in communicative 
failure. In this respect, Austin's project seems in line with non-analytical strands of 
philosophy. However, Austin then seems to take a step backwards by focusing solely 
on the contextual surroundings "the conventionality constituting the circumstance of 
the utterance" (ibid.). Derrida's point is that Austin misses the conventionality intrinsic 
to what constitutes the speech act [locution itself]. He notes that: 'Ritual is not a 
possible occurrence, but rather, as iterability, a structural characteristic of every mark' 
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(ibid.). What does this amount to? It seems that words if they are to mean anything at 
all, must be repeatable and repeated as ritual. Derrida's point is that language is itself 
performative and exercises force in its own right. Austin's mistake is to move away 
from the "wordness" (the "graphematic" aspects) of language to concentrate on forces 
that enact themselves on language and are thought to be somehow exterior to it. For 
Derrida, words are subject to an internal force and movement. It is not the case (as 
Austin might have it) that the context determines the force of words. Rather, an 
unlimited number of possible contexts are internal to the words themselves. The word 
or concept is never at one with itself. Derrida insists that he is not referring to the 
polysemy7 of language but its iterability. If we perceive the forces in language to be 
external, then the context determines meaning. Of course, the organising centre of 
context in Austin is the individual speaking subject. To show how this particular 
contextual feature comes under duress, it will be helpful to consider what Derrida has 
to say about signatures. 
Signatures 
Derrida notes that it is the critique of linguisticism8 that most interests him about 
Austin—that 'no single, simple criterion of grammar and "vocabulary" can distinguish 
constatives from performatives' (ibid, p. 19). However, Derrida notes that Austin 
explains his preference for the present-indicative-active voice—'I promise' I christen 
this...' I...' -in non-linguistic terms. Despite not being in favour of linguisticism, a 
move away from language is not what (in Derrida's eyes) is called for. Derrida's 
suspicion relates to what Austin calls the 'source' (the translator notes that Austin's 
term is "utterance-origin") of the linguistic utterance, the "I" that does something with 
words. Derrida notes that Austin both has no doubt that 'the source of an oral utterance 
in the present indicative active is present to the utterance' and that this is equally true 
in written (in its conventional sense) examples: 
Polysemy comes into play when a word that has two or more similar meanings. Consider the phrases 
"the house stood at the foot of the hill" and "he liked to stand on one foot". 
8 
 Here "linguisticism" refers to the tendency to try and define what utterances are and what they do in 
accordance with semantic or grammatical rules. 
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When there is not, in the verbal formula of the utterance, a reference to 
the person doing the uttering, and so the acting, by means of the 
pronoun "I" (or by his personal name), then in fact he will be 'referred 
to' in one of two ways: 
(a) In verbal utterances, by his being the person who does the 
uttering—what we may call the utterance-origin which is used 
generally in any system of verbal reference-co-ordinates. 
(b) In written utterances (or 'inscriptions'), by his appending his 
signature (this has to be done because, of course, written 
utterances are not tethered to their origin in the way spoken 
ones are) (Austin cited in Derrida 1988, pp. 19-20) 
So, the source of the utterance is the speaking subject in cases of speech, and in written 
form appears as the signature. My presence as speaking subject is manifested in written 
form in the guise of my signature. Let us begin by looking at the written example and 
consider issues of "source" or "origin" as they pertain to it. Problems immediately arise 
when we consider the question: when do I write my signature for the first time? 
Commonsense might indicate that this occurs when I first scribble down that mark that 
is to become my signature. However, to suggest it will "become" my signature 
suggests that it is not my signature yet. If this is true, then the first occasion of my 
signature might be the first time I write it on a cheque or a form. Unfortunately, this is 
also inaccurate, because for it to be my signature it has to be repeated. Are we then 
bound to the strange conclusion that the second time I put the mark of my signature on 
a form or cheque is the first time I have used my signature? No, because the whole 
point of my signature being my signature is that it must be repeated endlessly as ritual. 
It will be helpful to consider how issues pertaining to context fit in here. Every time I 
write my signature, I do so in a different context—my signature is in some way 
different each time it makes an appearance. The "significance" attached to signing a 
marriage license or signing a cheque is quite different. By the same token, my 
signature carries with it, its old contexts and is in a sense full of the contexts in which it 
will enter. In a radical sense, it is not at one with itself, nor is it under my direct 
control, even though it functions as my representative in my absence. More than this its 
previous, present and future contexts are internal to it. 
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If we see the signature as in some way "out of joint", might this simply represent the 
lack of fullness/presence that is traditionally ascribed to writing in contrast to speech? 
After all Austin notes that written utterances are not tethered to their origin in the ways 
spoken ones are. For Derrida, to see things in this way is to miss the wordness of our 
understanding of things. What is applicable to signatures is applicable to all words. Just 
as the "mark" on the page represents the absent trace of my signature, the same thing is 
true of all words. Consequently, what applies to the signature applies to language in 
general regardless of whether it is "written" (in the traditional sense of the word) or 
not. Just as the signature appears to indicate full presence to my words, this illusory 
quality vis-à-vis presence also applies to the speaking subject. This control of context 
and therefore meaning is central to the tradition that has given speech a particular 
dominance in the linguistic hierarchy over writing. Derrida, in showing that words 
carry their contexts with them, means that the fullness and completeness, the presence 
ascribed to the speech situation, is never fully realised; never mind the force of the 
present context, the words will not allow it. 
Through his adherence to the law of iterability Derrida is, in a sense, putting forward a 
general theory—all words and utterances are subject to iterability—the ways in which 
this manifests itself will vary, but all words are essentially iterable. Derrida seems to 
sense that Austin anticipates problems concerning a general unhappiness that applies to 
language but turns away from it: at one point Austin wonders if there is not: 'some 
very general high-level doctrine' that might 'embrace both what we have called 
infelicities and these other "unhappy" features of the doing of actions—in our case 
actions containing a performative utterance—in a single doctrine' (Austin cited in 
Derrida, 1988, p. 16). However, he maintains that he is not concerned with this kind of 
unhappiness and notes that: 'Features of this sort would normally come under the 
heading of "extenuating circumstances" or of "factors reducing or abrogating the 
agent's responsibility" (ibid.). Derrida argues that Austin is referring here to 
quotation—every performative utterance—indeed every utterance can be quoted. But 
for Austin, this possibility is both 'abnormal' and 'parasitic' (ibid)—it should not be 
regarded as a feature of the "ordinary" or of ordinary language. Here we might note 
that Austin's identification of the "ordinary" is resistant to the notion of words being 
somehow taken out into the ether, untethered from their original source. Yet, as we 
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have already seen (Derrida has shown us), words are never under our direct control in 
the first place. More than this, the repetition of words, the fact that they can be and are 
subject to quotation is a factor that is internal to language and the very condition for 
anything to mean anything. In turning away from this 'general doctrine' Austin looks 
inward to the singularity of the individual utterance and the specificity of the total 
speech act situation. Derrida captures the problems pertaining to this inward turn when 
he discusses the linguistic event. 
Events 
It is necessary at this point to recognise what might seem like an obvious objection to 
Derrida's development of locutions. It would appear that people have got married and 
boats have been christened. Indeed, if people fail to get married despite the issuing of 
the utterance 'I now declare you man and wife' then this may be to do with the kinds of 
unhappiness that Austin identifies. Derrida maintains that this is 'perhaps' (Derrida, 
1988, p. 17) the case, but surely there is something grudging, absurd, or deliberately 
obtuse about saying 'perhaps'—one might imagine that Derrida's wife would not be 
too pleased. Of course, Derrida cannot, in a straightforward sense, be suggesting that 
such things do not occur. Rather, it is the 'pure singularity of the event' that is in doubt. 
To think that there can be a "pure singularity of the event", is to be caught in the grip 
of a false metaphysics and a false security vis-à-vis language. It is this false security 
that Derrida wishes to expose and move beyond. There is of course a genuine security 
that we ordinarily have in our lives—people do get married. Moreover, the fact that 'I 
now declare you man and wife' or 'I christen this ship the...' make any sense and 
represent instances of doing things with words is because they are iterable in structure: 
I take things up here from the perspective of positive possibility and not 
simply as instances of failure or infelicity: would a performative 
utterance be possible if a citational doubling [doublure] did not come to 
split and dissociate from itself the pure singularity of the event? (ibid.) 
The formulations 'I now pronounce...', etc., could only succeed if they repeated a 
coded or iterable utterance. They are citations. This is of course a different citationality 
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to a poem, a philosophical reference. This is why there is a "relative purity" (p. 18) of 
performatives. However, this is not in opposition to citationality or iterability, but to 
"other kinds of iteration within a general iterability", which represents a 'violation' of 
the "allegedly rigorous purity of every event of discourse". Therefore we must not 
oppose the event to iterability. Rather we must consider the different kinds of 
iterability and security that apply to our words (a very Austinian task!). The category of 
intention here does not go away but will not govern 'the entire scene and system of 
utterance' (ibid.). The intention animating the utterance will never be through and 
through present to itself and to its content. To recognise the iterability of language—to 
steer clear of the 'lure of consciousness'—prohibits any 'saturation of the context': 
By no means do I draw the conclusion that there is no relative 
specificity of effects of consciousness, or of effects of speech (as 
opposed to writing in the traditional sense), that there is no 
performative effect, no effect of ordinary language, no effect of 
presence or of discursive event (speech act). It is simply that those 
effects do not exclude what is generally opposed to them, term by term; 
on the contrary, they presuppose it, in an asymmetrical way, as the 
general space of their possibility. (p. 19) 
Therefore, of course, we can say that marrying takes place and can go wrong in the 
ways identified by Austin, but this does not imply that the fullness he associates with 
the ways in which words get things done is ever realised. The kinds of failure that 
Austin refers to come after the initial "failure" in which words are not subject to an 
absolute form of contextual control due to the essential iterability internal to them. To 
see things in this way is to bypass the "endless alternation of essence and accident"—
the idea that things would be "essentially so, if it were not for the fact that external 
contextual factors prohibit this from always being the case. For Austin infelicity is 
posed as a trap or abyss that language may fall into. This trap surrounds language like a 
"ditch" or "external place of perdition" which can be avoided by remaining "at home" 
in the shelter of the "essence" or "telos" (p. 17). Derrida notes that Austin does not 
consider the fact that infelicity should be seen as a law, that a possible risk is a 
necessary possibility. He does not consider what success might mean once the 
possibility of infelicity continues to constitute the structure of an utterance. 
106 
Of course to talk of infelicity here is to make a value judgement. It means seeing words 
as in some ways impervious to the control of the speaking subject as something bad. If 
we agree that any words we use are iterable, then what they do is not entirely under our 
control. To say "not entirely" is to account for the relative specificity of effects of 
consciousness. Nevertheless, there is a decided danger of uncritically adhering to the 
uniqueness and singularity of linguistic acts—their eventness. The fact that we see 
things in terms of singularity and uniqueness means that we are trapped in the 
metaphysical eventness of events and this involves shutting our eyes to the creative 
possibilities of language. It is therefore necessary to move beyond the stultifying terms 
of "success" and "failure" for these terms only serve to stifle the ordinary ways in 
which words can take us somewhere else and already are, in some sense, somewhere 
else—they are not "ours". To do this requires us to adopt a simultaneously active and 
passive approach to language. In the following discussion, we will see what this 
amounts to in regards to teaching and learning. 
Lessons and Events 
In the current British educational climate, teachers are expected to know what giving a 
good lesson involves. They should also know what one has to "do" (or not "do") if one 
is to give an "outstanding", "satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory" lesson. In short, if 
teachers are unfamiliar with the criteria for success and failure, then the latter is the 
most likely outcome. There is a strange artificiality that seems to accompany the 
categories "unsatisfactory", "satisfactory", "good" and "outstanding"—during my time 
as a teacher in a comprehensive school, I vividly recall a talk in which the speaker 
informed us that "satisfactory" no longer meant satisfactory9. What this story reveals is 
a certain kind of scepticism in the face of language—that "satisfactory" no longer 
means satisfactory reveals a deep suspicion of how words ordinarily do what they do10 . 
In this paper, I want to bring attention to linguistic issues pertaining to the role played 
9 
 The words "unsatisfactory", "satisfactory", "good" and "outstanding" have simply come to denote a 
set of characteristics that lessons may or may not conform to. For British inspectors, lessons that are 
found to be satisfactory now demonstrate an unacceptable set of characteristics. We might also note 
that from the perspective every teacher could in theory be labelled "outstanding". 
10 Though this article deals with universal issues pertaining to language and teaching it also presents a 
"localised" critique of pedagogical practice in British schools that will hopefully be of interest to an 
international audience. 
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by contextual factors when establishing whether or not teaching fails or succeeds. Such 
contextual factors are often alluded to or brought in to counter the perceived dangers of 
language. Teachers should not talk too much and what they say should be utterly 
transparent. In the meantime, they should make sure that they supply seating plans etc. 
to gain maximum control of the classroom so that learning takes place. The 
philosophical material that guides this discussion derives from Jacques Derrida's 
reading of Austin's theory of the performative utterance (found in Derrida's famous 
essay "Signature Event Context")11. As we shall see, Derrida's reading of Austin is by 
no means wholly critical. The former finds much that is interesting and important in 
Austin's philosophical project. Indeed, Derrida applauds Austin's ability to show how 
the language of truth is bound up with the language of performance. However, he 
argues that Austin's overdetermined treatment of context misses something important 
about the functioning of language12. In the last part of the chapter, I will attempt to 
show how Derrida's discussion of context and what is meant by a linguistic "event" 
creates a space for questioning deeply held assumptions about "successful" teaching 
and learning and the understanding of "failure" that accompanies such assumptions. 
Before, delving into the complexities of Derrida's argument it may be helpful to 
provide an outline of Austin's work on performatives. 
When considering what Derrida's discussion surrounding iterability, context and 
events have to do with teaching and learning, we might begin by drawing an analogy 
between what is currently regarded (in Britain) as "successful learning" and the notion 
of infelicity or unhappiness that plays such an important part in Austin's theory of the 
performative utterance. A successful or happy lesson as it conventionally understood13 
nowadays must take on board numerous contextual factors (felicity conditions?). So, 
for example, a good teacher will do the following things (this is not an exhaustive list): 
11 The introduction of Den-ida as a voice to challenge linguistic scepticism in education might seem 
strange to some readers. Den-ida is often presented as a sceptic through and through who champions the 
view that you can never be sure what anything means. What this paper hopes to show is that the kind of 
scepticism that has emerged in education is based on a false metaphysics that Derrida's philosophy 
helps to counter. 
12 
 To question the extent to which context determines meaning is perhaps particularly apposite in the 
current educational climate. Reference to context has become a safe philosophical move that appears to 
display sensitivity and an appropriate depth of understanding. Paying lip service to context has become 
a mantra, an obstacle to thought. It is important to note that though an analogy will be drawn in this 
article between Austin's treatment of context and the role context plays in modern pedagogy, the 
analogy is necessarily loose (see footnote 11). 
13 It should be noted that the "happiness" referred to here relates to "effectiveness" and is not meant to 
allude to positive psychology's treatment of the former. 
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1. She must place the learning objectives/outcomes on the board and 
make it clear from the beginning of the lesson exactly what it is that is 
going to be learnt that day. 
2. The teacher should ensure that the learning outcomes are 
differentiated at the outset so that different things are required of 
different learners with different abilities. 
3. Tasks should be differentiated in accordance with both 
ability/attainment levels and different learning styles, kinaesthetic, 
auditory and visual. 
4. The lesson should incorporate group tasks and individual tasks in 
which learners work independently. 
5. Students should be provided with the tools to assess their work 
6. Behavioural issues should be accounted for through the use of 
various techniques for example a seating plan that locates students in 
accordance with their behavioural needs. 
7. Activities should be timed in accordance with the anticipation that 
students may go off-task. 
8. Whether or not learning has taken place should be assessed at the 
end of the lesson through adherence to the learning 
objectives/outcomes. 
The above list represents examples drawn from the set of contextual factors that should 
be in place for successful (happy?) learning to take place. This notion of success is 
built into the idea that more old-fashioned pedagogies (if they even deserved the name) 
failed to account for all sorts of factors necessary to successful communication. Indeed, 
there are good reasons for thinking that adherence to these contextual factors represents 
progress in the realm of pedagogy. It seems likely that taking account of different 
abilities, attributes and behavioural characteristics will prevent the kind of confusion, 
boredom, or chaos that simply ignoring such factors might engender. Equally, there is 
surely much to recommend the inclusion of different kinds of task, which encourage 
group or independent learning. What should be noted (and we will return to this) is that 
most of things listed above are things we do with words—which is to say things we do 
with words. 
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This paper does not aim to debunk the predilections of contemporary pedagogy. 
However, through adherence to Derrida's reading of Austin, we might see that current 
approaches to teaching and learning miss something important about context, and how 
what is missed out is not wholly dissimilar to what is left out of Austin's philosophy 
when he talks about the total speech act situation. For both Austin and adherents of the 
contemporary pedagogical norms, context is thought of solely in terms of factors (that 
are not thought of as linguistic) that need to be in place for successful communication 
to take place.14 So for example, the didacticism attributed to traditional forms of 
teaching is criticised because it is felt that if teachers simply talk to the class or discuss 
issues with them, then only a certain kind of student (able, auditory, good at 
concentrating) will benefit. It appears that what is at issue here, is the teacher's role as 
a kind of master—the teacher knows what he is talking about and understands the truth 
of what he professes yet things go wrong (or become unhappy) because simply 
speaking to the class will not ensure that whatever is in the teacher's head will end up 
in the student's heads. It should, however, be noted that the contemporary teacher is 
also expected to be a master, but it is more important that this mastery involves control 
over contextual factors than knowledge (the teacher's knowledge is taken for granted). 
Consequently, we might note that constative/truth concerns are not at issue here, it is 
the successful transmission of the constative that is at stake. The assumption here is in 
keeping with a view of knowledge that sees it as something that floats above us waiting 
to be communicated in either a successful or unsuccessful way. It is this view of 
language that had been undermined by Austin in his discussion of the performative 
aspects of speech. 
We might argue that taking the constative for granted in this way represents a deep 
suspicion of language. Teachers are often told not to speak too much and when they do 
14 It is important to recognise that several things distinguish Austin from the pedagogues. To begin 
with, the latter take the constative for granted whereas Austin does not. Also, the "extra-linguistic" 
factors that Austin refers to are somewhat different to those that are a feature of modern pedagogy. As 
mentioned earlier, people do get married. When they fail to do so, this is due to a fairly exceptional set 
of circumstances. Moreover, the contextual factors Austin alludes to are not annexed to utterances in a 
forced manner. The manipulation of context that characterises fashionable teaching methods is of a 
rather different order to the treatment of context in Austin's work. We do not wilfully construct 
authenticity. That said, Austin's philosophy still presents an overly simplistic and overdetermined 
treatment of context. 
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speak they should be as clear as possible, otherwise meaning will go awry, their 
utterances will not be understood. This is surely to acquiesce in securities that are 
unwarranted. Is there "always" a danger that students will misunderstand what has 
been said? If teachers were to come across some examples of poststructuralist writing 
on education they might be forgiven for thinking that such fears are justified. I am 
thinking here of the discussion of strong emergence in Osberg and Biesta's 'Beyond 
Presence: Epistemological and Pedagogical Implications of 'Strong' Emergence' 
(Osberg and Biesta, 2007). Though this article shares some common ground with 
Osberg and Biesta's, scepticism is closer at hand there than it is here. 
The issue that is at stake here concerns whether when teachers speak (particularly when 
they, heaven forefend, speak "for a long time"), they are generally misunderstood. To 
recognise the iterability of language does not lead to scepticism (which would be based 
on a false metaphysics of the constative) but openness to the flexibility of language and 
meaning. To speak of flexibility is to take a positive stance on linguistic complexity. If 
we are constantly afraid that meaning will "go awry" we will be bound by the kind of 
value judgement about failure implicit to Austin's argument. It repeats the suspicion of 
writing and literariness that runs through the tradition of Western philosophy. Yet, As 
Derrida shows, the very possibility of communication is dependent on the iterability of 
language, and this iterability requires a necessary division that means words are not at 
one with themselves. Consequently, trying to pin words down through excessive 
adherence to clarity is destined to failure, but this is only "failure" because 
communication is thought of here as something that must be full and transparent. I am 
not suggesting that teachers should give up on clarity, but rather that they should be 
aware of its limitations. Moreover, clarity as such is not simply a contextual quality 
that can be brought in from outside, or ticked off on a list, it is a quality that pertains to 
the utterance itself—a facet of a certain way in which we indulge in language. 
It is perhaps an overdetermined understanding of success and failure that accompanies 
the more stifling aspects of modern pedagogy. Success is dependent on absolute 
control of what is being learnt and how it is being learnt. If lessons are to be fully-
fledged "events" then what will be learnt must always be known in advance and 
necessarily circular (objectives will be returned to at the end of the lesson). It might be 
argued that to see things otherwise, to embrace the iterability of language will simply 
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lead to chaos. How will we know if anything has been learnt at all? It should be noted 
here that "presence" (manifested in the truth of how things are) as an effect of 
iterability is not something that Derrida seeks to deny or escape from. Rather, seeing 
presence as an effect of language is to be open to what teaching or "professing" the 
truth amounts to. Here is Standish: 
Derrida explores ways in which the idea of profession requires 
something tantamount to a pledge, to the freely accepted responsibility 
to profess the truth. The professor enacts this performative continually 
in her work: what she says is testimony to the truth; as work it is 
necessarily an orientation to a to-come. The academic work of 
professing must then be something more than the (purely constative) 
statement of how things are. (Standish, 2001, p. 18) 
Here Derrida's argument is subtle; professing15 the truth is about orientating students 
towards something that neither professor nor student can necessarily predict in which 
the constative will always be performed as the to-come (an aspect of the future) rather 
than a statement of that which is secure, of the past, is somehow originary. To take the 
constative for granted is to ignore its performative/iterable aspect. Here we can see that 
the identification of, and return to, the aims of the lesson and prescribed outcomes, can 
lead to an impoverished treatment of the areas that are being covered. This partly 
derives from the constative value that will invariably be ascribed to the outcomes of the 
lesson; that what will be learnt is known in advance and is in some way foundational. 
Consequently, the structure of the lesson can drastically inhibit the development of a 
learning process that has the potential to dramatically veer away from the progression 
mapped out by that very structure. Here is Standish paraphrasing Derrida: 
The responsibility of the professor extends beyond the performatives of 
criticism to an openness to the event. It must extend beyond the 
`masterable' possible', which is the result of conventions and legitimate 
fictions, to the surprise of the impossible possible, which has the 
character of the arrivant. Openness to the impossible possible, 
15 
 As we shall see this account of professing is radically at odds with what tends to count as 
"professionalism" today. 
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something beyond the range of predetermined categories or a purely 
autonomous control (effective performance), is essential to the exercise 
and growth of the imagination that this professing requires. (ibid.) 
It should be noted that for Standish/Derrida the "event" here is a quite different thing to 
the kind of "event" referred to earlier. When Derrida talks about an "event" in Austin's 
philosophy" he is referring to the "legitimate fiction" of the masterable possible"—the 
idea that words are under our direct subjective control. Here, "eventness" can only 
characterise things in a full planned sense in which all possibility of failure has been 
eradicated. Of course such an event can never take place in any full sense. In contrast 
this other kind of event attains its "eventness" from the fact that it is completely 
unplanned—it arrives. Indeed, the very fact that such an event can take place is 
dependent on the iterability of language, whereby our words find themselves in 
unfamiliar territory and "do" unexpected things. 
As Biesta notes in his article 'Witnessing Deconstruction in Education' (Biesta, 2009) 
the idea of the "arrivant", is central to Derrida's understanding of deconstruction: 
"Deconstructions", which I prefer to say in the plural . . . is one of the possible names 
to designate . . . what occurs [ce qui n'arrive pas a arrived, namely a radical 
dislocation, which in effect reiterates regularly—and wherever there is something 
rather than nothing' (Derrida cited in Biesta, 2009, p. 394). Following Biesta, it is 
important to note that this treatment of deconstruction radically differs from its 
treatment in much literature where it has come to denote a ("destructive") form of 
critique. Deconstruction is not something that one "does" but something that "occurs". 
Moreover: 
all deconstruction is "auto-deconstruction" (see Derrida, 1997, p. 9)—
deconstruction "occurs", whether we want it or not. But that doesn't 
mean that there is nothing to do in relation to deconstruction. While it's 
not up to us to let deconstruction happen or prevent it from happening, 
what we can do is to show, to reveal, or, as Bennington (2000, p. 11) 
has suggested, to witness the occurrence of deconstruction or to be 
more precise, to witness metaphysics-in-deconstruction. (ibid.) 
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It is precisely this "witnessing" of "metaphysics-in-deconstruction" that Derrida's 
account of professing alludes to. The metaphysics that undergoes deconstruction is the 
metaphysics of the constative. Biesta raises the question of why it is important to 
witness metaphysics in deconstruction. To some degree we have already answered this, 
in the sense that the metaphysics of the constative presents a false picture of meaning. 
However, there is clearly more at stake here and this relates to the fact that a particular 
"presence" makes other ways of seeing invisible. To witness is therefore 'to do justice 
to the 'other' of presence'. This shows that 'the point of deconstruction is not negative 
or destructive but first and foremost affirmative. . . It is an affirmation of what is 
excluded and forgotten; an affirmation of what is other' (p. 395). The emergence of 
this otherness "the arrivant" is unforeseeable and "impossible": Tor Derrida 'the 
impossible' is not what is impossible but what cannot be foreseen as a possibility' 
(ibid.). 
Taking all this into account we can say that "professing" or teaching with 
deconstruction in mind is about bearing witness to what is excluded, to what is other. 
To see things this way is not to simply champion "openness" as an educational aim but 
is an attempt to do justice to what has been excluded and show "hospitality" towards 
the impossible other that waits at the door. If we ignore this, communication can only 
be viewed as a "strictly mechanical, a strictly calculable and predictable process" 
(Biesta, p. 399). Moreover, it is "precisely at the limit of intelligibility that the question 
of ethics emerges" (Bergdahl, 2009, p. 42) 
I should note at this point that the argument presented in this paper departs from 
Biesta's understanding of "witnessing" in some important respects. For Biesta, one of 
the reasons that deconstruction takes place and the arrivant arrives is because 
communication between sender and receiver must fail due to the fact that the receiver 
will always "interpret" what is sent (Biesta, pp. 396-397). One cannot make a direct 
comparison between linguistic communication and signals sent from the "TV studio to 
another location such as the home" (p. 396). Though, to a degree, I am in agreement 
with Biesta on these matters, I wonder if his argument moves toward an overly 
humanistic or "personal" vision of Derrida's philosophy and the possibilities that 
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philosophy offers to thinking about education16. As we saw in an earlier section of this 
article 'Signatures', the speaking subject is an effect of presence and undergoes 
deconstruction. It is therefore not the act of interpretation that issues in the arrivant, but 
the iterability of language that splits the subject, just as it splits the constative. This is 
not to say that interpretation is unimportant but rather that it is a secondary 
complication. Though communication is of course impossible without subjects 
engaging in discourse, subjectivity itself emerges through language, it is an effect of 
language. Words (and, if you like, their absent traces) come first. It is for this reason 
that the arrivant can make an appearance when one is performing "more" solitary tasks 
such as writing. 
The humanistic flavour of Biesta's account also makes itself known in the literal 
translation of the "arrivant" as the "newcomer"17 which does not just speak of "new 
beginnings" but "new beginners" (p. 400). In contrast, we might think of the arrivant as 
something darker, more akin to the spectres and ghosts that haunt Derrida's writing. 
The "arrivant is also a revenant" (Attridge, 2001). This darkness is not an inherent 
quality that pertains to the arrivant, but is generated by its challenge to the metaphysics 
of presence, to what "is". With this in mind, from the perspective of modern pedagogy, 
the appearance of the arrivant must generate consternation and unhappiness. Confusion 
will ensue. How can we assess the class on what has just happened? The mark scheme 
cannot account for the unexpected. Nevertheless, to wish the event had not occurred 
will not banish or exorcise it. One can quickly move on to the next fast paced task and 
pretend that nothing has happened, yet surely, the "happier" (more hospitable?) option 
is to embrace the arrivant, to face and perhaps affirm our fear of the unexpected. This 
will not produce anarchy. And I am not proposing some whimsical, unstructured 
approach to the planning of lessons. The professor should make a stand, but that stand 
is performative; it opens up and embraces new possibilities. Teachers regularly find 
that interesting things happen in lessons that affect the structure; that take the lesson 
into unforeseen territory. Though there can be complete break-ups of structure, for 
good or ill, this is not what I am advocating. Rather, I am thinking of the ways in which 
16 Siesta's reading of "Signature, Event Context" is similar to my own. However, one significant 
difference is that Biesta associates Derrida's account of communicative failure with complications 
surrounding the receiver's interpretation of the message (Biesta, 2009, p.399). 
17 Biesta does not explicitly mention the arrivant here, but I take it as read that this is what he is 
referring to. 
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a surprise question or unexpected occurrence can alter the structure of the lesson. 
Aspects that were otherwise hidden will come to the fore in ways that are fruitful. 
Unfortunately, the current orthodoxy encourages teachers against seeing this as 
something positive and creative. This orthodoxy is blind to the enhanced potential for 
learning that the readiness for deconstruction indicated above might provide. 
As mentioned earlier, this paper does not aim to pour scorn on modern teaching 
methods. Making the aims of the lesson as transparent as possible can certainly help 
some students to feel more comfortable with what is being learnt yet this is to indulge 
in language in a particular way (it is not to bring in a manipulative technique from an 
imaginary extra-linguistic zone). By the same token, helping students to come to grips 
with the assessment process has its benefits, but this too can only benefit from 
recognition of the subtleties and complexities of language18. If the teacher does not 
take account of the needs of particular students, then a certain amount of unhappiness 
will ensue. Indeed, if teachers do not try and account for certain factors then their 
lessons may become chaotic, or deeply confusing. However, the ways in which 
teachers take account of these factors is often bound up with how they use words. 
Working with detailed seating plans and consistent routines may have benefits. 
However, in my experience, good working relationships with students develop in 
accordance with a more flexible approach to behavioural issues that involves 
"indulging" in "banter". To exchange jokes and mild insults with children is, in a sense 
to be open to the "event" as Derrida uses the word—surprising things can emerge from 
this kind of linguistic scenario. Of course, one might argue that "banter" is simply a 
distraction from the purposes of the lesson but this surely reflects a very limited 
conception of what teaching and learning can involve. 
Ultimately, the fear of communicative failure clearly has a troubling impact on the 
ways in which teachers are encouraged to use language. To see the lesson as a singular 
event in which every possible measure must be taken to ensure transparent 
communication reflects a paranoia deriving from overdetermined considerations 
18 My experience of working as an examiner represented a particularly severe induction into the 
religion of the constative, for, as Biesta notes, assessment is "the mechanism that constantly tries to 
close the gap between teaching and learning. It does this by saying "this is right" and "this is wrong"—
and, more often, by saying "you are right" and "you are wrong". In a sense it is as simple as that. But 
because the slippage is there all the time, achieving closure in education requires an enormous amount 
of effort (Biesta, 2009, p. 398). 
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regarding success and failure. The fear of failure that haunts the teacher and school is 
the product of bad metaphysics. As this paper hopefully shows, getting out of this 
metaphysical trap (through finding a better metaphysics) would help us to live better 
with our necessary and inevitable "failures" and the possibilities of teaching and 
learning they afford. To move beyond paranoia is to reinstate the importance of what 
the teacher and student have to say. As regards the teacher's words, this is not an 
appeal to didacticism, but to acknowledge that words require breathing room. The 
appearance of the arrivant need not be such a painful business. 
Language, Numbers and Statistics 
So far, we have looked at the ways in which an overdetermined understanding of 
context in the classroom, combined with a certain fear of language, can serve to block 
richer possibilities of teaching and learning. This kind of blockage is of course an 
effect of Lyotard's performativity and is reinforced by other factors that exact an 
equally debilitating act on classroom practice. I am thinking here of the predilection for 
numbers/statistics in contemporary education along with the proliferation of slogans. 
The subsequent parts of the chapter will handle each of these in turn. I now want to 
explore the role of statistics in performativity more directly and the ways in which the 
utilisation of statistics involves doing something with words. Numbers (and this is 
something we possibly forget) are words and moreover they are iterable—we might 
talk of 20 bags of potatoes or 20 people shot for insurrection—the number 20 finds 
itself in different contexts in which it will resonate in different ways. Moreover, 
throughout the rich history of language various numbers have become "significant". 
There are plenty of examples of this, some of which involve numbers in combination, 
some of which require (or perhaps do not require) explanation. Let us list some: 13 
(unlucky for some) 666 (the number of the beast), 69 (I am not sure if this has 
resonance outside Britain, though the pervasiveness of English suggests that it might), 
99 (red balloons), 9/11, 6,000,000 (Jews killed in the Holocaust), 10 (the number 
usually worn by the best player in an international football team). Certain numbers take 
on a moral status. An ethical significance attaches itself to some of these numbers, 
notably 666, 69 and 6,000,000. Moreover, one of the numbers is a statistic (we'll come 
back to this shortly, though we might note that 6,000,000 is usually written as six 
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million as though there were something obscene about using polynomial/positional 
notation here). 
Now, clearly, the numbers used above are iterable, they will find themselves in all 
manner of contexts in which their previous contexts will necessarily play some sort of 
role. Moreover, they gained their performative force from being repeated. One cannot 
mention 6,000,000 anything without thinking about the Holocaust. If the number 69 
appears in the national lottery this will provoke a degree of smirking and general 
titillation around the country. 999 is the British number of the emergency services but 
turn it on its head and. . . Even the most confirmed atheist may look over her shoulder 
just to make sure that a little red man with a tail and horns isn't standing behind her. 
Though numbers are iterable, they are iterable in a very specific way. Moreover, they 
are not iterable in the same way that other kinds of word are. When we looked at what 
can happen with the number/word 20 we must note that the fact that 20 can take on a 
different resonance is due to the words that surround it. The iterability of 20 here has 
nothing to do with the word/numeral itself. Moreover, the "meaning" of 20 does not 
change at all. In the case of 666, assuming one is not (too?) superstitious, the meaning 
that is attributed to it has nothing to do with where it has been before. In contrast let us 
take a word like "queer" which has come to denote homosexuality. Of course there is 
nothing about the word itself that relates to homosexuality, its passage from an insult 
expressing moral disapproval (homosexuality here is supposedly, strange, unedifying 
and unnatural) to being reclaimed by the gay community whereby the transgressive 
image of homosexuality is celebrated, reflects the complexity and richness of the 
iterable life of the word. Even apparently "functional" words like "both" "and" either 
and "or" express an extraordinary richness if one considers the role they have played in 
explaining deconstruction. This sort of richness cannot apply to numbers. Standish 
captures what is at stake here when he notes that numbers are untranslatable: 
[T]here is the peculiar place of numbers in contemporary natural 
languages. Numbers, it seems, can appear in translations of texts in a 
way that is entirely without loss or distortion, and in this respect they 
are unlike the (more obviously) linguistic aspects of those texts. But in 
a sense this is to say that they cannot be translated at all—given that all 
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translations between natural languages do involve loss and distortion in 
some degree. To some, this will confirm the view that numbers achieve 
an ideal clarity of meaning, and indeed it is partly such a thought that 
lay behind the experiments with language in which Leibniz and others 
engaged. It is partly what computers achieve (and depend on). But to 
others, this will demonstrate the ways in which numbers fall short of 
the very qualities of meaning upon which our thought and being . . . 
depend. (Standish, forthcoming) 
It is perhaps unnecessary to note that sympathy here lies with Standish's "others" and 
almost certainly, with Standish himself. Let us return to 666. In a sense what has 
happened to it is emblematic of the false metaphysics vis-à-vis language that Derrida's 
philosophy tries to overturn. The "attribution" of significance to 666 interestingly 
demonstrates a common misunderstanding of the ways in which language ordinarily 
works-666 (the signifier) "signifies" the devil (signified). As Derrida shows us, this 
kind of logocentrism is precisely undermined by differance and language's 
translatability/untranslatability. The fact that the significance of 666 has to be 
artificially attributed to it reveals the barrenness of numbers. They do not give birth to 
any kind of "becoming". Numbers are marks, but somehow not the "trace" of anything. 
In this sense, they tell a half-truth about language, as they are not the progeny of the 
metaphysics of presence. For Deffida, the metaphysics of presence is not a wholly bad 
thing—it is what allows meaning to take place. Paying uncritical lip service to it causes 
all the problems. 
So far, we have looked at numbers and iterability. Statistics are of course numbers but 
not just any old numbers. Statistics supposedly represent something that is there, they 
offer the promise of a truth that is etched into the fabric of existence. Having looked at 
the some of the ways in which numbers can become iterable, and how this reflects a 
false metaphysics vis-à-vis language, we might say that something similar is going on 
with the symbolic practice of statistics. Just as 666 "signifies" the devil, statistics are 
supposed to "signify" some truth about the world. Consequently statistics as numbers 
look "clean". Now, the process of accumulating statistics is bound to be open to the 
linguistic slippages that apply to iterability as it generally works in language. However, 
when statistics are shown, and it is interesting that statistics are something we 
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ordinarily "show" (a point about aesthetics?) the processes behind the accumulation of 
statistics are not usually made explicit. This is true for debating politicians, or for 
school managers introducing statistics to teachers. The function that statistics perform 
in many of their common usages is to render invisible the complex processes that led to 
their status as data. This is what gives statistics the lure of purity—they suture over all 
the messy stuff that led to their generation and hide the "meaningful" process that takes 
place before and below. I want to draw explicit attention to the metaphor of the suture 
(a metaphor that Derrida regularly employs) here. Sutures are made up of non-toxic 
substances that can be absorbed by the body. Statistics, which, as numerals, "appear" 
pure, have been absorbed into educational practice. 
That said, teachers are often critical of the data supplied on their classes. They will 
commonly complain about the targets their students are supposed to meet: "student x 
has been predicted a level 5—she's never going to get that! It's all a load of rubbish". 
Here the teacher shows suspicion toward the statistics generated but it is unclear 
whether they think that a better treatment of the data would have yielded more accurate 
results; the implication seems to be that it would. The data that is given leads teachers 
to be suspicious, but this is always caught up in the dialectic with a truth that a better 
approach to statistics might yield. Please note that I am not suggesting that any student 
is capable of anything, but that judging "potential" should not be reduced to checking 
things off against data. 
Let us not be too quick here. Paradoxically, though statistics present the promise of 
truth, they also present the threat of absolute scepticism. Though we might become 
inured to the performative force of statistics in our everyday working lives, this is 
never absolute. We are always dimly aware that statistics can be produced to make any 
case whatsoever. What this demonstrates is the paradoxical double bind accompanying 
statistics that can work in disorienting ways on teachers through their discourses and 
practices. Such disorientation arguably serves a purpose. If teachers are preoccupied 
with whether or not their statistics are accurate, or if they are suspicious of statistics 
generally, they may be less inclined to consider whether or not their teaching should be 
thought of in terms of effectiveness. I recently marked a group of essays on "inclusion" 
in which the students (who were trainee teachers) often pointed to statistical 
imperatives (as regards target grades) as an obstacle to wider concerns about 
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"including pupils". These wider concerns related to the importance of effective 
teaching strategies to accommodate learning differences and the promotion of "self-
esteem techniques". They made it clear that we should not forget that the teaching 
assistant was the most important "learning resource". What is most interesting about 
the views expressed in these essays is that the students clearly see no connection 
between effectiveness when thought of in terms of meeting statistical targets and the 
discourse of "effectiveness" per se. Of course, the very "techniques" they champion 
are those that are employed to gain value on statistics. Consequently we might say that 
just as statistics can take on a suturing function through the promise of the constative, 
they also serve to divide experience. They are set up as the enemy of better teaching, 
yet the very notion of what better teaching involves is inextricably bound up with 
statistics. The ultimate effect of this simultaneous suturing and division of experience 
is suturing at a meta-level. Performativity is served by the paradoxical nature and use 
of statistics. 
Fixing the stats 
Furthering our discussion of statistics and language, "truth" and scepticism, let us note 
that whereas words cannot be fixed statistics famously can. This is not to say that 
words cannot be manipulated, they cannot be "fixed" in either a neutral or "ethical" 
sense—iterability and interpretation will not allow it. The fact that statistics can be 
fixed is due to their suturing effects resulting from the barrenness of numbers (the 
surface effect) and the ways in which statistics partake in the fluctuation between the 
promise of the constative and absolute scepticism. Let us see how farcical things have 
become within English schooling. 
In England the situation has intensified as regards statistical imperatives. Earlier this 
year, schools were told that that 30 per cent of students must achieve 5 C grades or 
more including English and Mathematics. This process goes by the name of the 
"National Challenge". In keeping with media friendly heroic sloganeering, this sounds 
like a jolly game show in which people from all round the country may participate via 
their television sets and mobile phones. "Failing" schools (many of whom do not 
possess cohorts that are even predicted to meet this target) must find a way to boost 
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their statistics and take on the "National Challenge". There are a number of ways of 
doing this that I am familiar with. 
Given the fact that English and Maths are primary requirements in reaching the magic 
number, schools can fill up the timetable with a greater number of English and Maths 
lessons. Then, if one lacks a sufficient number of teachers to deliver these lessons 
(there is such a great demand for English and Mathematics teachers that "failing" 
schools" can often not attract enough of them) take non-specialist teachers (skilled in 
"behaviour management") from "non-essential" areas such as Physical Education or 
History to teach English and Maths. Such teachers will at least be able to ensure that 
something gets taught. Consequently supply teachers can cover the non-essential 
subject areas. Of course such subject areas can potentially all but disappear. This takes 
us on to ways of fixing the stats. There are numerous vocational courses that schools 
now offer which are equivalent to GCSEs in terms of their statistical value. So for 
example rather doing a GCSE in French, one might do an NVQ in business French. 
Everybody knows such courses are easier for children to do well in. They are often 
dominated by coursework activities that can be repeated until decent grades are 
achieved. Consequently failing schools are dismantling the framework of a traditional 
liberal education to gain value on statistics. In some schools, lower achieving students 
are being "prevented" from taking GCSEs in virtually all subjects bar Maths and 
English. 
What goes on in "failing" schools also takes place in "successful" schools, but to a 
lesser extent and therefore a less explicit way. Schools that soar above the 30 % 5 A-C 
target will still have weaker students who will take courses equivalent to GCSEs. 
Though nobody says as much, "successful" schools will often be those whose leaders 
are smart and savvy enough to play the system well. Such schools appear to be offering 
value to their clients and they help the government to play its part in a closed economy 
of exchange. It is in nobody's interest (apart from the students and broader, wider aims 
of education) to bring close critical attention to the farcical nature of what is going on. 
The government need to show that standards are improving. Numbers, as long as one 
doesn't consider what they relate to, can give this impression. 
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Statistics and Slogans 
Having considered the performative force of statistics let us refer back to one of the 
numbers mentioned earlier-6,000,000 (referring to Jews killed in the Holocaust). I 
have never seen this number (given the context/s is normally appears in) written in 
numerals. This might be due to the fact that the number is somewhat inexact. However, 
there seems to something obscene about using numerals in this instance that goes 
beyond their relation to reality, something disgusting about the equation of numbers 
with such horror. One might even go further and say that writing 6,000,000 out in 
words sutures over the horror of the Holocaust and that there is something unethical 
about humanising it in this way. What I am trying to touch on here is that bleakness 
accompanies numbers/statistics, whether they appear as words or numerals. 
This perhaps explains why policies designed to boost the stats are given names like 
"Every Child Matters" (a British invention) and "No child left behind". Both these 
phrases have become slogans. "Every Child Matters" need not mean, (and from a 
humanist perspective should not mean) "every child must gain added value on their 
minimum target grade". There is a sense in which the phrase "every child matters" in 
its internal linking carries a humanist quality to it, In contrast "no child left behind" has 
a rather more forced quality to it that shows up its sloganeering—the phrase is adapted 
from military imagery of leaving no man behind on the battlefield (though there is also 
perhaps a hint of Hansel and Gretel about it). In at least two respects, these slogans 
have a suturing effect in that (1) they hide what they are about and (2) they become 
mantras—they dissolve into the public body. However, importantly, slogans are more 
vulnerable than statistics even when (or perhaps particularly when) they are married to 
them. This is due to the iterability of language mentioned earlier—for a slogan to be a 
slogan it has to be repeated. It will draw on words that have a rich history. Consider the 
fact that both slogans include the word "child". Much of the recent discourse in British 
schooling had abandoned this word due to its progressive connotations and replaced it 
with "student". Policy makers and politicians were presumably unaware of this word's 
origins: "A student, let us remember, is originally a lover (Latin, studere—to love)" 
(Standish, 2005, p. 60). What we are bearing witness to here is the aforementioned 
"iterability" of language. 
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I am going to tell a story to reinforce what is perhaps at stake here. I recently gave a 
lecture to teacher trainees on "behaviour for learning". Prior to this lecture I was asked 
to refer to the "Every Child Matters" agenda, as Ofsted inspectors would check that the 
students had been repeatedly introduced to it. I did not feel too happy about this and 
grudgingly referred to it in passing. The "phrase" elicited a groan from an audience 
who are still quite new to sloganeering. Suddenly I found myself defending the notion 
that every child matters with a discussion of the fact that when many of the students 
come across a certain kind of "child" and that individual will bear little resemblance to 
the sorts of human being (civil, non-violent, articulate) that they will previously have 
encountered (many of the students are privately schooled Cambridge graduates), 
resisting the temptation to write that child off will require considerable mental and 
emotional strength. Putting things this way introduces the term "every child matters" 
into a context that is neither technical nor humanist (in any sentimental sense). 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this chapter I maintained that Derrida's philosophy provides a 
limited challenge to the forces of performativity. During the course of the discussion I 
have tried to show that language cannot be constrained by context or the power of 
numbers. Statistics need words (words that is that are not numbers) to humanise them. 
Though, as we have seen, this often takes the rather inhuman form of the "slogan", 
slogans like all uses of language will contain elements that are iterable, their past and 
future contexts belong to them. The suturing effects of the marriage of statistics and 
slogans will not prevent language from bleeding. This chapter celebrates such bleeding 
not in the name of humanism, but rather in the name of the "inhuman" other that may 
arrive at any time. Words show up in unexpected places all the time. When they show 
up they do so in unpredictable ways. To follow them where they can go might help to 
decongest the passages of education. In the next chapter we will look at the ways in 
which Derrida (and Austin's) ideas find their way into a discussion of social difference 
and "otherness" conceived of in terms of race and gender. 
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Chapter 4 
It's a Kind of Magic: Performativity and 
Social Difference 
Introduction 
In the last chapter we looked at Derrida's philosophy of language and how his work on 
"differance", "iterability" and the "arrivant" pave the way for thinking differently 
about what an education might involve. In certain respects, this chapter provides a coda 
of sorts to its predecessor. I make this point because the discussion of social difference 
and otherness provided by the feminist philosopher and Queer Theorist Judith Butler 
(which is the central focus of this chapter) is deeply influenced by Derrida's work on 
language. As noted in the last chapter, Derrida argues that Austin fails to treat and 
account for the force of the locutionary aspect of language that accompanies the form 
of the words themselves: 
Austin has not taken account of what—in the structure of locution (thus 
before any illocutory or perlocutory determination)—already entails 
that system of predicates I call graphematic in general and 
consequently blurs (brouille) all the oppositions which follow, 
oppositions whose pertinence, purity, and rigor Austin has successfully 
failed to establish. (Derrida, 1988, p. 14) 
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Derrida's point is that language is itself performative and exercises force in its own 
right. Austin's mistake is to move away from the "wordness" (the "graphematic" 
aspects) of language to concentrate on forces that work on language and are thought to 
be somehow exterior to it. This brings us to Judith Butler. In this citation from Butler, 
she acknowledges her debt to Derrida: 
I originally took my clue on how to read the performativity of gender 
from Jacques Derrida's reading of Kafka's "Before the Law". There the 
one who waits for the law, sits before the door of the law, attributes a 
certain force to the law for which one waits. The anticipation of an 
authoritative disclosure of meaning is the means by which that 
authority is attributed and installed: the anticipation conjures its object. 
I wondered whether we do not labor under a similar expectation 
concerning gender, that it operates as an interior essence that might be 
disclosed, an expectation that ends up producing the very phenomenon 
that it anticipates. In the first instance, then, the performativity of 
gender revolves around this metalepsis, the way in which the 
anticipation of a gendered essence produces that which it posits as 
outside itself. Secondly, performativity is not a singular act, but a 
repetition and a ritual, which achieves its effects through its 
naturalisation in the context of a body, understood, in part, as a 
culturally sustained temporal duration. (Butler, 1999, p. xiv—xv)I9 
I want to highlight several features of Butler's understanding of performativity. Firstly, 
she clearly establishes a connection between foundationalist approaches to knowledge 
and legality, therefore emphasising the problematic aspects of a tradition that makes 
truth claims coterminous with fixity. "Knowledge" as regards gender is shown to be 
the effect of a performance that she calls "conjuration", emphasising the magical 
aspects of a process that performs its own essence, which is then made external and 
originary. Finally, Butler argues that performativity is "not a singular act but a 
repetition and a ritual"; that performativity reinforces the conjuration through repeated 
19 This quotation derives from a new introduction that is featured in a more recent Preface to Gender 
Trouble. The first edition of Gender Trouble was published in 1990. 
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performances. Just as Austin's performative is inextricably linked with institutional 
practices, so is Butler's performativity. However, Austin does not question the 
foundationalist principles that are being repeated and reinforced in the rituals that make 
up his total speech situations. For Butler, it is the constative that it is continuously 
being performed. It will be useful at this point to consider what is at stake in Butler's 
findings as regards questions of ethics. 
Butler sees the "invocation" of performativity as very much an ethical matter. For 
Butler, language performs us; various discourses designate who and what we are. This 
understanding of performativity has an ethical dimension because it works against 
essentialistic or biologistic performative discourses. Of course the biologisation of 
difference is no neutral phenomenon. The inscription of biological determinants into 
language, will invariably favour the dominant group—usually the white western male. 
Consequently, history is characterised by various discourses of superiority and 
inferiority, often hidden by a sugar coating of positive connotations—black people are 
good at music and sport, but are they fit for political office? Women are pretty and 
delicate, but do they have the stomach for business? 
Bourdieu and Magical Symbolic Power 
What Butler describes here is very like what Bourdieu calls the performative magic of 
all acts of institution. Before developing this parallel it will be helpful to give some 
indication of Bourdieu's more general theories of practice. Bourdieu's approach to 
sociology represents an attempt to bypass oppositions that were (and to a large extent 
still are) dominant in the social sciences such as the distinctions between the individual 
and society, freedom and necessity. Here focus on the individual and freedom would 
characterise "subjectivism". To think in accordance with a subjectivist model is to buy 
into the possibility that we can gain immediate access to explanations of social 
phenomena through interviewing participants in the research. In contrast, objectivists 
will discount reports of immediate experience, seeing those reports as simply 
reflections of underlying social structures that cannot be fully apprehended by subjects. 
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Though Bourdieu has a clear preference for objectivism on the grounds that it departs 
from the naiveté of subjectivism and gives weight to underlying structures, he 
recognises at the same time that the social scientist is also a participant in social life 
who is inclined to draw upon everyday words and concepts in analysing the social 
world. The problem with objectivism is that it does not account for the actual actions of 
participants, but simply sees them as cogs in a machine, without acknowledging its 
own complicity in social life. This is what leads Bourdieu to his discussion of 
"habitus". Habitus refers to sets of dispositions individuals acquire that incline them to 
behave in certain ways. Such dispositions are "inculcated, structured, durable, 
generative and transposable" (Thompson, 1991, p. 12). They are often "inculcated" in 
early childhood (think of table manners and utterances such as "Sit up straight"). These 
dispositions invariably reflect the social conditions (relating to class, ethnicity and 
gender) in which they were acquired. Dispositions are durable in that they reside in the 
body and are usually carried through life—we cannot easily modify them. Alongside 
this durability, dispositions are generative in the sense that they generate practices and 
ways of seeing that concur with conditions of existence that produce the habitus. 
When individuals act in accordance with the habitus, they invariably do so in different 
settings, what Bourdieu calls "fields". Consequently, we can say that the habitus is 
transposable in that particular dispositions are worked out in specific structured 
spaces/fields. Through this process, individuals acquire (or fail to acquire) capital. 
When Bourdieu speaks of capital he does not just mean material wealth but also 
"symbolic capital" (in the form of prestige) and cultural capital (for example, 
knowledge and skills). Certain kinds of capital can be transferred across fields—
qualifications can be traded in for well-paid jobs. But Bourdieu argues that each field is 
always a site of potential struggle. Either the status quo is maintained or it is 
challenged. More than this: "the very existence and persistence of the game or field 
presupposes a total and unconditional 'investment', a practical and unquestioning 
belief in the game and its stakes." (p. 15) 
It should be noted that though all transactions are in one sense economic, they are not 
economic in the narrow sense. One can gain cultural capital but not necessarily convert 
it into material profit, although one may convert it, in a different way, into, say, 
prestige. So, for example, at a time when I would regularly visit friends in France, I 
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noted a shift in their behaviour toward me once I had left teaching and started work in 
the Education Faculty at Cambridge. It is hard to capture exactly what this was like—I 
am not saying that my friends became deferential exactly, but they certainly expressed 
a much greater interest in my professional life than they had done before. The fact that 
I was on a part-time temporary contract and earning considerably less than the average 
schoolteacher did not really seem to affect this. This example partly indicates a cultural 
difference—the kind of prestige bestowed on me in France was not matched by friends 
in England (sometimes there seems to be something very French about Bourdieu's 
outlook). 
For Bourdieu, human action is always "economic" though economic in the "material" 
sense. There is no such thing as disinterested activity. This is not a form of "game 
theory" as conscious action rarely comes into the picture: the habitus already accounts 
for the ways in which we are predisposed to follow certain paths. In adapting his theory 
to take on board linguistic issues Bourdieu points to a linguistic habitus and a linguistic 
market. The "linguistic habitus is a subset of the dispositions which comprise the 
habitus: it is that sub-set of dispositions acquired in the course of learning to speak in 
different contexts (the family, the peer group, the school, etc.)" (Thompson, 1991, p. 
17). The linguistic habitus forms part of the bodily hexis. Bourdieu speaks of 
"articulatory style", a term which captures how ways of moving the tongue become 
synonymous with gender and class identities. "Distinction" as well as relying on this 
bodily style is reproduced due to the fact that different speakers posses different 
amounts and types of linguistic capital that define their positions in the social space. It 
would seem that for Bourdieu, language (and the invisible symbolic power it generates) 
comes to act as an agent for stabilising the habitus. Words and the bodily hexis through 
which they are produced help to ensure that individuals are not forcibly coerced into 
conforming to societal norms. Physical force is transmogrified into symbolic form and 
relies, therefore, on the shared belief (even amongst those persecuted by it) in its 
naturalness. To see the products of symbolic force as "natural" is to misrecognise what 
is going on. Individuals have to recognise its legitimacy. In this respect, they are not 
entirely passive. But for Bourdieu this seems to be where hope lies. As the linguistic 
habitus is generative, it may not generate obedience. 
129 
Bourdieu and Austin 
It is worth considering Bourdieu's general approach to the philosophy of language and, 
more specifically, his interest in Austin. Bourdieu finds Austin's work on the 
performative utterance extremely interesting and revealing. He sees it as a starting 
point from a step away from idealisation within linguistic theory, what he calls "the 
models of correct usage and turns its back on the socio-cultural/historical conditions 
through which linguistic practices become dominant and legitimate. 
Bourdieu is particularly critical of Saussurian linguistics which posits an abstract 
supposedly neutral system of signs cast in contradistinction to language in use and 
Chomsky's theory of linguistic competence. Like Habermas, whose views are 
discussed in Chapter 3, Bourdieu maintains that "actual" speakers possess a practical 
competence that enables them to produce correct utterances within the appropriate 
circumstances. Chomsky's notion of competence is not up to characterising the kinds 
of competence possessed by actual speakers. Austin on the other hand, begins to delve 
into this territory and Bourdieu treats him more sympathetically. 
Bourdieu is particularly taken with Austin's example of performative utterances that 
are institutionally bound speech acts such as "I do" when said at a wedding. He seizes 
on the infelicity that occurs if an unqualified individual makes an utterance in 
circumstances that demand credentials. For Bourdieu, these examples show that there 
must always be an institution and institutional appropriateness that allow for such acts 
to be effective. As Thompson notes, "Bourdieu is using the term "institution" in a way 
that is very broad and very active" (Thompson, J.B., 1991, p. 8). 
It is in any case institutional power that a speaker relies on to carry out a particular act. 
Not everybody is allowed to christen ships and marry people. For christening and 
marrying to happen, an institution must be in place. Though Bourdieu is impressed by 
Austin, he does not think that Austin and his followers (whose "achievements we 
described in Chapter 2) took full advantage of their discoveries. To put it bluntly, their 
approach was not, according to Bourdieu, sufficiently "sociological" (no surprise 
there!). Felicity conditions are "primarily social conditions" (p. 9). However, this fact 
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is elided (as Bourdieu sees it) by Austin and his followers in whose work this focus 
slips away from sociological factors to issues of a linguistic and logical nature. 
Because Austin does not address such factors directly his followers miss an 
opportunity as they end up focusing on the words themselves: 
As soon as one treats language as an autonomous object . . . one is 
condemned to looking within words for the power of words, that is, 
looking for where it is not to be found. In fact, the illocutionary force of 
expressions cannot be found in the very words, in which that force is 
indicated, or better, represented—in both senses of the term. (Bourdieu, 
1991, p. 107) 
For Bourdieu, Austin does not highlight the importance of the force of institutional 
context, the force that enacts itself on language. The latter does not treat these 
phenomena as social facts in the way he might. Authority, as Bourdieu sees it, 
"usually" comes from the social institution, not the words themselves. 
As noted earlier, Bourdieu's critique of Chomsky chimes quite nicely with Habermas's 
views on that thinker. Both Bourdieu and Habermas emphasise the pragmatic 
dimension of language, which goes unrecognised in Chomsky's work. However, the 
kinds of contextual factors that Austin gestures toward and Bourdieu grasps with both 
hands are not treated by Habermas. Rather, Habermas "thinks that he has found in 
discourse itself—in the specifically linguistic substance of speech, as it were, the key to 
the efficacy of speech" (p. 109). This is, in some ways, fair criticism. Habermas 
maintains that when we speak we raise certain validity claims pertaining to truth, 
rightness and truthfulness. He does seem to think that noisefree communication is 
possible. In some ways Bourdieu's response to Habermas is reminiscent of Lyotard's. 
Bourdieu points to the ways in which Habermas's model fails to account for the 
structuring apparatus of the habitus.2°  
Though Bourdieu emphasises the force of extra-linguistic factors, he nevertheless, in 
slightly contradictory mode, gives a nod to the force of the words themselves. This is 
20 For Lyotard, the habitus can be characterised by performativity, whereas Bourdieu pictures it in 
relation to a more general understanding of gender and class difference. 
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perhaps the second dimension of magical performative power. That is not to say that 
there is a clear break between the force of such words and the institutional power that 
they reflect, nor does it take away the fact (as Bourdieu sees it) that the force of speech 
acts must depend on the institutional status of the speaker and the constraints that are 
imposed on their actions. Anyway, at this point it might be helpful to have a look at 
those words which take on magical performative power. Here, this power manifests 
itself through binary pairs established through naming: 
The act of institution is an act of social magic that can create difference 
ex nihilo, or else (as is more often the case) by exploiting as it were 
pre-existing differences, like the biological differences between the 
sexes or, as in the case of the institution of an heir on the basis of 
primogeniture, the difference in age. In this sense, as with religion 
according to Durkheim, it is a "well-founded delusion", a symbolic 
imposition but cum fundamento in re. The distinctions that are most 
efficacious socially are those which give the appearance of being based 
on objective differences. . . (pp. 119-120) 
We will come back to what Bourdieu means by "giving the appearance of being based 
on objective differences". For now, I simply want to float the question: at what point 
do they look like they give this appearance? Anyway, Bourdieu discusses the 
manifestation of performative magic by giving examples such as the competitive 
examination whereby the difference between the first person to pass and the last person 
to fail can completely alter the course of an individual's life21: "The former will 
graduate from an elite institution like the Ecole Polytechnique and enjoy all the 
associated advantages and perks while the latter will become a nobody" (ibid.). This of 
course highlights the arbitrariness of magical performative power. 
For Bourdieu, it would seem that this kind of magic is a determining force. He gives 
the example of an insult that becomes "a kind of curse (sacer also signifies cursed), 
which attempts to imprison its victim in an accusation which also depicts his destiny" 
(p.121). This determining force is, Bourdieu thinks, even truer of "an investiture or an 
21  This is a very French example. The pass mark in many French examinations is determined by a 
quota. 
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act of naming" (ibid.). Here I take him to mean the named distinction between, say, 
man and woman) whereby the person "named" feels obliged to comply with his or her 
allocated status. This naming that generates a social destiny by "consecration or 
stigma" is "fatal—by which I mean mortal—because they enclose those whom they 
characterize within the limits that are assigned to them and that they are made to 
recognize" (p. 121). Nevertheless, Bourdieu indicates that there are sometimes 
"accidents" whereby individuals shake off the spell: "There are exceptions: the 
unworthy heir, the priest who abandons his calling, the nobleman who demeans 
himself and the bourgeois who turns common". With that in mind Bourdieu notes that 
with all these examples "the sacred boundary remains clear" (ibid.). What he means by 
this is that the process of naming generates an economy of exchange whereby one can 
only negate the terms in which one is positioned by moving to the other side of the 
"boundary". "Accidents" are caught up, Bourdieu claims, in an economy of exchange: 
we are positioned, or position ourselves (which is also to be positioned) on one side of 
the fence or the other. 
So, to summarise Bourdieu's position, it would seem that language, generally speaking, 
gains its force from extra-linguistic factors. The first dimension of symbolic language 
is that it acts as an aid that mysteriously pushes those factors into the background. The 
second dimension is represented by acts of naming that serve to naturalise dispositions 
within the habitus. Naming divides the world into hierarchical categories, and if people 
slip between these categories, this is some kind of accident: It is interesting that 
Bourdieu distinguishes here between the insult and the act of "naming". It would seem 
that on occasions the two coincide (to say on occasions, is also to note the sorts of 
"difference" or "distinction" that tend to get swallowed up in Bourdieu's writing). 
Superficially, Bourdieu's magical symbolic power looks very similar to Butler's 
recognition of those acts of conjuration that, through repetition and reiteration, enforce 
social norms. Butler recognises that Bourdieu's theory of habitus acknowledges the 
grip that dominant norms have on people. Indeed, Butler argues that practices that 
reiterate social norms are largely unreflexive and habitual. Also, they both try to steer 
clear of the structural interpellation that is argued for by thinkers such as Althusser. 
Both Butler and Bourdieu are committed to social and political intervention and to 
social transformation. For Bourdieu, political intervention is only possible due to the 
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generative nature of the habitus and its relative autonomy in regard to the various fields 
in which social action takes place. However, as discussed above, agency seems to be a 
kind of happy "accident". 
Will words do us in? 
Butler takes Bourdieu to task on several counts. Firstly, she notes that he conflates the 
power with of words with the power of social institutions—the magical effect for 
Bourdieu is the impression that words accomplish things, but in actual fact the force of 
words depends on institutions and speakers with positions of power within those 
institutions. The magic "only works when the words are spoken on the right occasion 
in the right manner by one who is authorised to speak them" (Lovell, 2003, p. 3). The 
problem for Butler is that Bourdieu maintains a distinction between the merely verbal 
and the social and argues that Bourdieu is simply recasting the Marxist model between 
base and superstructure (ibid.). Institutional norms provide the solid base for 
authorative speech acts, but this would seem to be at the expense of human agency. It 
is hard to see how the habitus and social field are differentiated: "the rules or norms, 
explicit or tacit, that form that field and its grammar of action, are themselves 
reproduced at the level of habitus and hence implicated in the habitus from the start" 
(Butler, 1997, p. 117). 
The problem with Bourdieu's account, as Butler sees it, is the "partial" role that he 
ascribes to language and the distinctions between norms, words and bodies. As 
discussed above, Bourdieu acknowledges the ways in which the habitus becomes 
"embodied". Norms come to reside in the body, but it would seem that this is divorced 
from linguistic concerns. Butler argues that speech acts are not "merely linguistic" and 
that Bourdieu "fails to grasp how what is bodily in speech resists and confounds the 
very norms by which it is regulated" (Butler, 1997, p. 142). What does this mean? I 
take it that Butler is following Derrida in his claim that "there is nothing beyond the 
text" (which I discussed in the previous chapter). What bodies are and how we come to 
know them and indeed what norms are, and how we come to know them is always 
mediated through language. It is always textual. The dissonance that may be developed 
between the words we speak and our bodily experience of them is textual. In the 
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introductory chapter I alluded to the queasiness I experienced on being inducted into 
the realm of educational language. This queasiness derives from earlier linguistic 
experiences, and a dissonance between present and previous linguistic encounters. 
Therefore, when I found myself, as one does, using that language (remember, this 
thesis is against sneering), it had a bodily effect. 
It might be argued that the (Derridian) power of conjuration in Butler and Bourdieu's 
magical symbolic power work in opposite directions and reflect differing 
understandings of the role of context. The power of conjuration in Derrida and Butler 
involves language's concealment of its own linguisticity. For Bourdieu it is rather the 
reverse: words conceal norms. Bourdieu argues that Austin and his followers, including 
Habermas, focus too much on the words themselves. However, as we saw in the last 
chapter (and Butler's thinking is very much in line with this view), for Derrida, Austin 
puts too much weight on context understood in extra-linguistic terms. The same might 
be said of Haben-nas. Though his "validity claims" are clearly linguistic they are in a 
sense waiting for words—they are abstract pragmatic categories. For Derrida, context 
is not something that sits behind words but operates through them. Moreover, the 
reiteration of words means that they find themselves in unexpected places, doing 
unexpected things. If we do not acknowledge the graphematic quality of all 
communication, we can only be blind to this and trapped in Bourdieu's mutually 
sustaining habitus/field. What can arrive in the most ordinary exchanges will of course 
apply to the politics of gender race and class. While language can oppress us, it cannot 
exact absolute power. 
In contrast to such discourses, the very possibility for change is inscribed in the 
performativity of language. In ways that are both negative and positive, language 
performs us as subjects; in its performative capacity, language can "do us in" (destroy 
us) just as it can "do" (that is, create). 
This brings us back to Derrida's treatment of the question of iterability, which plays 
such an important part in Butler's analysis. Drawing on Derrida, she shows how the 
iterability of language means that the same words or forms of discourse can find 
themselves in all manner of contexts in which they may do damage or act creatively. 
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Consider, for example, the reappropriation of the words "nigger"22 and "queer". It is 
important that the wordness or graphematic quality of language is recognised. There is 
a decided danger in viewing language as doing rather than stating, thereby 
dissolving/deferring the linguistic aspect of language. Through the examples he gives, 
Austin clearly understands the legal character of the illocutionary utterance in which 
words stand in for actions. It is the fixity of the law as it applies to language that Butler 
finds most dangerous: 
Those who seek to fix with certainty the links between certain speech 
acts and their injurious effects will surely lament the open temporality 
of the speech act. That no speech act has to perform injury as its effect 
means that no simple elaboration of speech acts will provide a standard 
by which the injuries of speech might be effectively adjudicated. Such 
a loosening between act and injury, however, opens up the possibility 
for a counter-speech, a kind of talking back that would be foreclosed by 
the tightening of that link. Thus the gap that separates the speech act 
from its future effects has its auspicious implications: it begins a theory 
of linguistic agency that provides an alternative to the relentless search 
for remedy. (Butler, 1997, p. 15) 
When talking about legal remedy, Butler is referring to the adoption of speech act 
theory by the legal profession and how this comes to be applied to cases involving race 
and pornography. Mackinnon argues that pornography should be regarded as 
performative and that it has an illocutionary force; the backdrop to this scenario is of 
course the constitutional debate over what counts as freedom of speech (Butler, 1997, 
p. 22). From the legal perspective offered by Mackinnon, the illocutionary force of 
pornography makes it a kind of doing as opposed to a kind of speaking: the element of 
speech is usurped by the force of doing. Butler argues that what this fails to take into 
account is the performative function of the law as it prescribes and gives constative 
value to definitional control over pornography. Effectively, the very force that is being 
criticised by Mackinnon is itself being enacted by the law. Butler is not arguing that 
22 It has become customary (particularly within black American popular culture) for black people to 
refer to themselves and to each other as "niggers". Such instances reflect a kind of talking back as 
regards the language of oppression. 
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pornography is not performative, but she is deeply sceptical of the discursive force that 
is being applied to the illocutionary utterance. Her argument takes its most vivid form 
when she writes about those members of the armed forces who declare their 
homosexuality. In these cases, the declaration of homosexuality is treated as a 
homosexual act. Discursive adherence to the illocutionary utterance has clearly led to 
the adoption of some very strange positions. 
An education in difference 
Perhaps the goal of education should be the obliteration of difference—schooling could 
partake in the ungendering and deracialising of society. I recall a paper given several 
years ago discussing the role of education in creating an ungendered society. The 
speaker was working on the assumption that "gender" is a kind of social construction 
that is in no way "essentially" linked to a person's sex. We might therefore work 
towards the creation of a society that dispensed with the disabling construction of 
gender (which tends to favour men) and ultimately succeed in that goal. What made the 
subsequent discussion so interesting was that nobody disagreed with the notion that 
gender was unrelated to biology. However, by the same token, none of the participants 
believed that the ungendering of society was feasible. At one stage somebody 
introduced the question of colour—what would such a society look like? Of course, we 
may dress baby girls in blue and boys in pink, thereby reversing the common western 
trend, yet we have not ungendered society: the norm still both haunts and allows for the 
reversal. At one point, a participant suggested that in trying to imagine a gendered 
society everything appeared white, yet quickly realised that white had connotations 
with virginity which, for example, could be observed in the traditional bridal dress. 
Ultimately, the group concluded that an ungendered society was not simply an 
impractical goal, but was in fact "unimaginable". However, that is not to say that 
anybody felt that the fact that such a society was unimaginable meant that gender 
norms should be left unquestioned. 
To try to ungender and to deracialise society is effectively to try to stand outside 
language, and this is impossible. It also suggests a lack of attentiveness to the 
sensitivities of the situation. What is perhaps badly needed, however, is some kind of 
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negotiation with the ways in which language performs us and recognition of the wider 
consequences this has for schooling. If, for example, we see racism as in some ways 
inscribed in the language, and if we recognise that we cannot stand outside it but are 
inevitably implicated in performances that reinforce gender or racial stereotypes, this 
can engender a more modest form of critique than the kind of cleansing discussed 
above. 
We are, however, still left with the question of how schools should handle these issues. 
To illustrate the relevance of Butler's account of performativity to educational matters, 
it may be helpful to consider an educational scene that illustrates what is at stake. Let 
us imagine a situation—in fact, not too far removed from my own experience—where 
an in-service education session on the subject of racism is being given to a group of 
teachers. The scene takes place is a poorer part of a run-down town, somewhere in the 
north of England. 
A speaker has been brought in, as a result of a legal obligation, to give a presentation 
on dealing with racism. He begins by explaining some fairly recent changes in the law 
that have resulted from a report on the Steven Lawrence case. This is followed by a 
series of definitions that prescribe what ethnicity, race, racism and racist behaviour 
mean. The manner of delivery involves the speaker questioning the audience as to what 
they think racism is, followed by the right answer; the answer that is defined by law. 
Both questions and answers appear in a PowerPoint presentation; the latter magically 
appear to create the effect of a moment of illumination. Once the staff has been fully 
briefed on various definitions the speaker moves on to the various things teachers 
should "do" about racism. This involves two notable forms of behaviour on their part. 
Firstly, the teachers discover that it is a legal requirement that they officially record 
every instance of racism if it conforms to the legal definition of that term. Secondly, 
they are encouraged not to punish the perpetrator of the offence—not to punish them 
for what they have said—but to discuss the issue with them. 
As Butler and Derrida argue, the ethical dimension of performativity is tied up with 
iterability; we are not controlled or constructed by language in any absolute sense. 
Therefore, the legal context ascribed to racist behaviour in above scene will not limit 
the possible contexts within which the discussion can take place. Consequently, it is 
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possible to imagine a very different approach to racial issues that acknowledged the 
difficult and undecidable aspects of racism. Rather than making the assumption that 
certain behaviour must always and all times be offensive in accordance to a given 
model, we might ask questions about how offensive behaviour works. Perhaps most 
significantly, we might introduce activities that demonstrate the performativity of race. 
There is of course, the famous example of the "blue eyes, brown eyes" experiment 
during which the teacher discriminated against her students (who were all white) on the 
grounds of eye colour. This not only allowed the students to experience the direct 
effects of prejudice but also demonstrated the foundationless performativity of race. 
Discourses of otherness in schooling 
Now, we might say that Butler's discussion of the performativity of gender reveals the 
otherness internal to our words in the sense that femininity or blackness comes to 
represent whatever masculinity or blackness is not. Here, let me rehearse (and 
embellish) some of he points made in the previous chapter. We might say that whatever 
whiteness "is" is dependant on blackness. Blackness is "internal" to whiteness. This 
represents one dimension of difference and what Den-ida refers to as the madness of 
language—all words are hunted/haunted by other words internal to their very 
possibility of meaning anything. The other dimension of differance can only be 
accounted for if we move beyond a synchronic picture of language to a diachronic 
picture of language in use. As Den-ida notes, for words to mean anything at all they 
have to be repeatable and repeated, iterable and reiterated; they have to be used and 
used over time. 
We have already seen how the iterability within language makes words other to 
themselves. Indeed we have also considered the ways in which language produces the 
effects of metaphysical presence that serves to mask the otherness internal to language. 
Part of this linguistic operation involves the production of conceptual difference—
concepts take on the appearance of separate, different entities that exist in the ether (in 
the abstract). Of course, as both Derrida and Butler show, not only does this effect of 
difference establish identities; it also establishes a hierarchy of identity reflective of 
power relations within society/language. However, the disorder/otherness internal to 
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language that accompanies its iterability, in undermining the effects of presence, allows 
for the emergence of the arrivant.23 Words are not under our direct control and can 
take us somewhere else. 
We can see an example of this in Edward Said's use of the term "Orientalism". The 
Orientalist believes that he is studying the "Orient" in some sort of objective fashion 
that treats it as though it were an "inert fact of nature". In contrast to the Orientalist, 
Said begins with the assumption that the Orient is "not merely there just as the 
Occident is not just there either" (Said, 1986, p. 4). He argues that: 
Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of 
Europe, a collective notion identifying "us" as against all "those" non-
Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in 
European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in 
and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in 
comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures. There is in 
addition the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, themselves 
reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness. (p. 7) 
Said shows how the Western distinction between Orient and Occident represents the 
construction of differences at a distance. He shows how the Orientalist, believing that 
he is engaged in a descriptive activity, contributes to the performance of difference. 
What the Orientalist fails to see is that the differences produced by differance are 
differences internal to the creation of the discourse of the West—what the Orient "is" 
is what the Occident is not. The very production of a narrative of Westernness or 
Occidentalism requires the performative conjuration of the Orient. We can see this 
trend in the binaristic thinking that characterises Enlightenment humanism. 
Enlightenment humanism conjures a realm of inhuman unenlightened culture as though 
such a thing were simply there. However, the very notion of the "human" is necessarily 
divided and "other" to itself. 
23 This is a French word that is used in English, and it refers to someone who has newly 
arrived, probably unexpectedly, perhaps with a suggestion of ghostly presence. 
140 
Let us consider what has happened to the word "Orientalism" itself: its iterability. It is 
clearly inaccurate to say that Said's way of thinking about Orientalism simply reflects 
the polysemy of language: it is not the case when Said uses the term that it reflects 
some other meaning in relation to some other context or set of objects. Rather, the 
reiteration of "Orientalism" reflects how Orientalism's understanding of itself as a 
descriptive discipline shows it to be other to itself. We should also note that this 
understanding of Orientalism, which shows itself as other to itself, is not something 
that has simply been invented. Rather (it was waiting in the wings to "arrive" and show 
itself in this way as one of the future meanings of the term). The kind of deconstruction 
pertinent to the speech/writing distinction also applies to the supposed difference 
between the Occident and the Orient. The deconstruction of the Occident/Orient binary 
allows for the arrival of a new understanding of Orientalism. It should be noted that 
Said does not "deconstruct" the opposition—this is not something that the reader or 
writer is in control of. It is something they bear witness to. 
Orientalism within the Curriculum 
In British schooling, the Orientalist approach to other cultures finds it crudest 
manifestation in the treatment of culture in terms of food, dress, customs etc. However, 
it takes a more complex form in relatively recent attempts to "accommodate" writing in 
English from other cultures into the curriculum. In some respects, we might see this as 
a form of progress, representative, as it is, of an attempt to accommodate difference 
and handle a cultural realm that was previously excluded. However, the limitations of 
such a well-intentioned "inclusive approach" can be noted in the National Curriculum 
for English in the distinction between courses of study based on an "English Literary 
Heritage" and on "Texts from different cultures and Traditions": 
English Literary Heritage 
2 Pupils should be taught 
a. how and why texts have been influential and significant [for 
example, the influence of Greek myths, the Authorised version of 
the Bible, The Arthurian legends] 
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b. the characteristics of texts that are considered to be of high quality 
c. the appeal and importance of these texts over time. 
Texts from different cultures and traditions 
3 Pupils should be taught: 
a. to understand the values and assumptions in the texts 
b. the significance of the subject matter and the language 
c. the distinctive qualities of literature from different traditions 
d. how familiar themes are explored in different cultural contexts [for 
example, how childhood is portrayed, references to oral or folk 
traditions] 
e. to make connections and comparisons between texts from different 
cultures. (National Curriculum for English, 2003) 
One can easily see how the Orientalist conception of other cultures makes itself known 
in this document. Works from the English Literary Heritage must be "influential", 
"significant" and "high quality". None of these factors play any part in the criteria for 
teaching texts from different cultures and traditions, and their absence speaks volumes. 
The word "qualities" does appear but it is used in a "descriptive" rather than 
"evaluative" context. It is made clear to the reader that two different forms of study 
apply to texts from the English literary Heritage and texts from different cultures and 
traditions. As regards the former, the approach to such texts would resemble traditional 
forms of literary criticism, whilst the latter seems to combine anthropology with 
linguistics: "pupils should be taught the significance of the subject matter and the 
language". The English literary Heritage is influenced by "myths" and "legends" which 
find their meagre infantilised equivalent in "oral" or "folk" traditions—the reference to 
the "portrayal of childhood" is telling. 
What is perhaps most significant about this distinction between an English Literary 
Heritage and texts from other cultures and traditions is that it assumes some kind of 
absolute distinction between these two categories. This assumption fails to 
acknowledge the fact that so much writing in English from cultures beyond the 
geographical borders of Britain is a direct response to the English Literary Heritage and 
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the Orientalist discourse that so often runs through it. If the conventions of the English 
language are reconfigured in these writings, then the assumption that this is merely a 
local expression of dialect to be analysed is both naïve and insulting. Instead we might 
see such texts as a means of writing back to a language/culture imposed through 
colonisation, giving words and structure a new resonance that does not simply repeat or 
reiterate the colonising power of older structures. 
The final insult to writing from other cultures manifests itself in the placing of the 
Poems From Other Cultures section within the GCSE exam.24 The English GCSE is 
currently split into language and literature. It is no coincidence that the marks 
generated from this section contribute to the English language section of the paper. 
Conclusion 
We began this chapter by considering the ways in which language can exact a 
"magical" performative force that comes to shape our understanding of difference. 
Though there are clear similarities between Butler's account of performativity and 
Bourdieu's magical symbolic power, Butler accounts for language's inherent flexibility 
and the creative dimension of our words. This dimension opens up rich possibilities for 
the teaching of difference in the classroom. 
In the last part of the chapter, we considered curricular issues pertaining to difference 
and otherness. It is important to reiterate the point that many teachers and 
educationalists will see the inclusion of texts from other cultures and traditions within 
the curriculum as a progressive move. Equally, a progressive enthusiasm accompanies 
the various pedagogical strategies designed to accommodate difference. To see the 
injustice implicated in the binary distinction between a literary heritage and texts from 
other cultures, we must embrace the "mad" or perverse workings of language, its 
difference to itself, its iterability. Of course, we would have no means of 
talking/writing about anything at all if it were not for the effects of presence--to 
imagine a language without such effects is to imagine linguistic chaos. To imagine 
24 Students in England and Wales take their GCSE exams (General Certificate of Secondary 
Education) at the age of 16. 
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linguistic chaos is to think from the perspective of linguistic "order", itself an effect of 
language. 
As I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, Butler's discussion of performativity 
represents a coda of sorts to Chapter 3 and Derrida's reading of Austin. This reading 
focuses on the locutionary aspect of the utterance. The next chapter will take a different 
tack. There we will consider Cavell's treatment of the utterance's perlocutionary aspect 
and consider its "ethical" implications for education. 
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Chapter 5 
Passionate Utterance and Moral 
Education 
Introduction 
At various points during the last few chapters I have treated the tone of different parts 
of the thesis as something worthy of thematisation. What I have tried bring out when 
discussing the formal make-up of the thesis, is the way in which different voices open 
up or foreclose on various ways of seeing the world. I have therefore thematised 
"voice". This is not meant as a nod and a wink to postmodern cleverness. Rather, I aim 
to show how different visions of language bring into focus different values and 
different senses of what "ethics" might involve. Therefore, allusions to Lyotard's 
depiction of the Cashinahua tribe, Williams's drowning wife, the arrivant that waits at 
the door, the iterability that forbids closure (even closure of the most liberal kind), 
show the ways of speaking (or should I say "writing") the ethical that take us beyond 
the narrow linguistic perameters of managerial speak and the discourse of 
performativity. In Chapter 1, I argued that the ordinary language analytic philosophy 
that follows in the wake of Austin misses the importance of voice texture and tone of 
his prose. Those philosophers take his work too "seriously" (perhaps logocentrically) 
as nothing more than an argument to be built on or refuted. In this chapter, I look at 
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Cavell's close reading of Austin in Philosophy The Day After Tomorrow. I try to show 
how Cavell's discussion of "passionate utterance" exposes problems with both the 
language of performativity and the epistemic treatment of moral issues found in the 
work of Michael Hand (a leading figure in analytic philosophy of education). I argue 
that Cavell captures something of the expressive nature of speech that is missing in 
both the performative apparatus of schooling and the analytic treatment of moral 
issues. 
Crisis 
In the chapter "Performative and Passionate Utterance", which appears in Philosophy 
The Day After Tomorrow, Stanley Cavell makes a claim for what he describes as the 
expressive or passional aspects of speech. This claim ("plea" might be a more 
appropriate term) is, in part, a response to what Cavell regards as a missed opportunity 
or failing in Austin's theory of the perfon-native utterance, an opportunity that, Cavell 
argues, philosophers seem unwilling to take up. To get a grip on what is at stake here, 
it will be helpful to follow Cavell along the path that leads to his identification of this 
missed opportunity. This path begins with a crisis. 
The crisis, which for Cavell marks Austin's How to Do Things with Words, derives 
from the latter's "failure" to make a clear distinction between the constative and 
performative utterances. I have already discussed this at length in Chapter 1. However, 
the reader might appreciate the restatement of these ideas given that Chapter 1 might 
seem like a long time ago. Also, the emphasis here is slightly different. Anyway, the 
crisis identified by Cavell can be found in Austin's initial recognition that there are 
utterances that are not nonsense and cannot be thought of in terms of truth and falsity. 
Such utterances include "I christen this ship the . . .", "I now declare you man and 
wife" and "I promise". Austin calls such sentences performative utterances and notes 
that to utter such sentences is 
not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be 
doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it. None of the utterances 
cited is either true or false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue it. 
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It needs argument no more than "damn" is not true or false: it may be 
that the utterance "serves to inform you"—but that is quite 
different... When I say, before the registrar or altar, etc., "I do", I am 
not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it (Austin, 1976, p. 6). 
By focusing on the kind of utterance that "does" something, Austin brings attention to 
an area of language that had been previously ignored by philosophers. When stating 
that performative utterances do not describe anything, he is clearly trying to show the 
limitations of the descriptive theory of language. Implied in the notion of the 
description or statement, is the implication of a distance between language and world, 
between words and actions, whereas the example of "I do" (said at a wedding) allows 
no such division—to speak is to act, to indulge. In making this point Austin introduces 
the binary distinction between performatives and constatives. Constative utterances 
state things and can be considered in terms of truth and falsity. Having made this 
distinction, Austin focuses on the performative utterance and is obliged to consider the 
"constraints or conditions that they operate under which ensure that they communicate 
or do their work as perfectly as they do, as perfectly as the most unobjectionable true-
or-false statements do theirs (Cavell, 2005, p. 158). As we saw in Chapter 1, Austin 
calls such constraints felicity conditions and identifies six of them: 
(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a 
certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of 
certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further, 
(A2) The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be 
appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. 
(B1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly 
and 
(B2) completely. 
(F1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons 
having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain 
consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person 
participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those 
thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct 
themselves, and further 
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(F2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently (Austin, 1976, 
pp. 14-15). 
Following his account of the different kinds of infelicity, Austin makes a hesitant 
entrance into an area, which marks a dramatic about turn in his thinking on the 
distinction between the constative and the performative. Here is Austin: 
Lastly, we may ask—and here I must let some of my cats on the 
table—does the notion of infelicity apply to utterances, which are 
statements? So far we have produced the infelicity as characteristic of 
the performative utterance, which was "defined" (if we can call it so 
much), mainly by contrast with the supposedly familiar "statement" (p. 
20). 
What Austin recognises is that to state something is to do something and, by the same 
token, truth conditions also apply to performative utterances. It is Austin's inability to 
separate the constative from the performative utterance in a clear fashion that marked 
the critical reception to Austin's findings. This "failure" was treated as a "flaw" or 
"aporia" in Austin's project. Cavell is to some extent being playful when he maintains 
that he does not so much "wish to deny these descriptions as to insist that this critical 
juncture also represents a signal victory for Austin, for what it shows is that 
performatives bear the same ineluctable connection with, assessment by, fact, with and 
by what is the case that statements do" (Cavell, 2005, p. 168). This "failure" is at the 
expense of a far more dramatic "victory" as it exposes the messiness of the relationship 
in which different kinds of utterance fail to sit comfortably within "constative" and 
"performative" categories. 
Having enacted this "revolution" on philosophy, which recognises the performative 
aspect of statements, Austin "reluctantly" gives up on the binary distinction between 
constatives and performatives, and moves on to a ternary distinction that analyses the 
performative utterance in more detail. Here, the performative utterance is considered in 
terms of the locutionary aspect (the form of the words), the illocutionary force (what is 
done with words) and the perlocutionary effect (what is done by words). Those who 
take Austin's inability to separate the constative from the performative utterance as a 
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failure may simply see this as a new philosophical direction or beginning bred out of 
frustration. In contrast, as we have already noted, Cavell sees this inability to make a 
clear distinction as a "victory" of sorts. For Cavell, the "failure" as such, derives from 
Austin's elaboration of this ternary distinction, an elaboration that brings about what 
Cavell (cautiously) refers to as the catastrophe in the latter's theorising. 
Catastrophe 
Austin argues that every performative utterance must necessarily be a locution and 
possess illocutionary force. Illocutionary verbs represent the explicit form of the 
performative utterance. "I christen this . . ." and "I now declare . . ." are illocutions. 
The illocutionary force of such verbs derives from what is done "in" saying something. 
Illocutions and their illocutionary force are given a considerable amount of attention by 
Austin—at one point he even counts illocutionary verbs. However, in contrast, Austin 
is hesitant when it comes to dealing with the perlocutionary effect of the utterance. For 
Cavell this hesitancy takes on catastrophic dimensions when Austin claims that: 
"Clearly any, or almost any, perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off, in 
sufficiently special circumstances, by the issuing, with or without calculation, of any 
utterance whatsoever . . . (Austin, 1976, p. 110). In light of Austin's typical rigour, 
Cavell wonders why the former should make such a bold and unsupported claim. To 
begin with, considering the importance of felicity conditions in establishing the 
happiness of a performative utterance it would seem extremely peculiar to conclude 
that there are no happy or unhappy effects of an utterance. By the same token, can an 
individual really be held responsible for "any" effect, which their utterance brings off? 
Here is Cavell considering the possible effects of saying "it would be scrumptious to 
hear you sing": 
There is no end to the things that happen to people. If you begin to cry 
upon hearing my words, I might think I had bumped against a sore 
point, that perhaps I had not heard that something had happened to your 
voice. But for someone to say that I did it, that the tears were (the effect 
of) what I did by saying what I did, seems not merely unfair in this case 
(as Austin describes accusations that would set aside excuses in 
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physical [literall cases of doing something untoward); paranoia has 
shown its hand (Cavell, 2005, p. 179). 
Although, any effect may follow on from my utterance, it is important to note, that I 
will not necessarily be responsible for that effect. For Cavell, the marginal importance 
or external nature that Austin allocates to the perlocutionary effect clashes with the 
importance of responsibility, which marks the latter's treatment of moral issues. This is 
particularly noticeable when we consider Austin's account of promising in which "the 
use of metaphysical or other false profundities to avoid one's ordinary commitments . . 
. is noted early in How To Do Things With Words as the ulterior philosophical vice or 
temptation that the theory of performative utterances is most explicitly interested to 
combat" (p. 176). Let us unpack this is a bit. Cavell's point is that Austin's claim 
(when discussing promising) that my word is my bond reflects a moral commitment 
that seems to be lacking from his approach to perlocutions. Surely, coming to know 
what the probable effects of what I say will be is part of my moral development. To say 
that anything might happen, as the result of my speaking, is to renege on my 
responsibility for what I say. This explains why Cavell draws an analogy between 
Austin's distaste for perlocutions and Stevenson's infamous emotivist claim that "Any 
statement about any matter of fact that any speaker considers likely to alter attitudes 
may be adduced as a reason for or against an ethical judgement" (Cavell, 2005, p. 174). 
The implications of this analogy are that, despite having brought the importance of 
moral issues to the philosophy of language to light, Austin has relapsed into a caginess 
that resembles the distaste for moral issues found in the work of the emotivists. 
Despite his concern with Austin's argument surrounding perlocutions, Cavell is not 
content to let a much loved teacher simply stew in his own contradictions, but attempts 
to find explanations for Austin's dismissive attitude. The more subtle explanation, in 
typical Cavellian fashion, is not stated explicitly. The reference to Stevenson suggests 
that despite the revolutionary aspects of his treatment of the performative utterance, 
Austin is unable to escape the dominance of Ayer and Stevenson's thought and open 
himself up to the messiness of the effects of performativity. With this in mind, we can 
see that there is a conventional aspect to the illocutionary/performative utterance that 
provides a safety net for Austin's argument. 
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One of the reasons which Cavell cites for Austin's relative uninterest in perlocutions 
derives from the latter's adherence to convention. When we make a performative 
utterance, there is no denying that we have "done" something. We can then adhere to a 
set of conventions (felicity conditions) to decide whether or not the utterance is happy. 
In the case of perlocutions, the matter is much more complicated. We may make a list 
of perlocutionary verbs—frighten, anger, frustrate etc. However, whereas we can speak 
of illocutionary/performative utterances and know that we have identified something, 
does it actually make sense to speak of perlocutionary utterances at all? Cavell takes 
pains to point out that, whereas we can say "I christen you" or "I marry you", and will 
have done something, we cannot say "I frighten you" or "I interest you" and 
necessarily have said anything at all; these sentences do not appear in English in this 
form (p. 171). 
Cavell focuses on the fact (which Austin also mentions) that "performative" or 
"illocutionary" utterances take the form of the first person singular present indicative 
active. Perlocutions do not fit in with this schema, because for the sentence "I frighten 
you" to be happy, I would have to be exercising some kind of magical power over 
you.25 The fact that perlocutionary "utterances" do not exist/make sense in English (in 
this form) is what seems to mark the end of the matter for Austin (he does not have a 
sufficiently exact structure to work with), and this, for Cavell is the catastrophe in his 
theorising. In contrast Cavell argues that this lack of a structure, rather than closing 
everything down, opens up a new field of enquiry that moves beyond formal 
constraints and presents an approach to speech that engages with the other.26 This is 
because, whether or not my words (which may appear in all manner of forms), succeed 
in frightening you depends not just on the words I use to try and bring this effect off, 
but also (and this is crucial) on how "you" respond to them. This explains why 
although the sentence "I frighten you" makes no sense, the utterance "I frightened you, 
didn't I" with its disclaimer works perfectly well. Consequently, taking seriously the 
importance of the perlocutionary effects of language is to acknowledge the 
individual/expressive uses of speech in which people establish relationships with one 
25 Cavell indicates that Austin's suspicions regarding perlocutions partly stem from the latter's distaste 
for political rhetoric, which partakes in the insincerity against which his philosophy rails. 
26 This "other" is used quite innocently here—as simply a partner in the conversation. Although 
Cavell's recognition of the other in speech may lead to parallels with the work of writers such as 
Levinas, there is no space to engage with such issues here (for a discussion, see Standish, 2007). 
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another. Here, the conventional aspects of speech (which have not gone away—the 
utterances I use to frighten or alarm will not be randomly chosen) but are dissimulated 
through its unpredictable, unconventional aspect. We cannot simply depend on a rule 
(as with illocutions) as individual characteristics come into play, pertaining to both the 
speaker and receiver of the utterance. Cavell notes that "Not everyone is capable of 
frightening, or seducing, or alarming other people. The skill or talent to perform these 
acts is not equally distributed amongst the species" (p. 173). 
We might say that Cavell is interested in the perlocutionary aspects of language 
precisely because they are unconventional. He shows that thinking about language in 
these terms make room for imagination and virtuosity, that consequently, there is no 
"one size fits all" (ibid.) criterion at work here: In the next section we will consider 
how Cavell's treatment of the perlocutionary effects of language leads to his usage of 
the term "passionate utterance". 
What is a "passionate utterance"? 
We have seen that by entering into the realm of the perlocutionary effects of language, 
there is no "conventional form" that can be identified. Consequently, we may expect to 
find that whatever a passionate utterance is, it cannot be "defined" in the same way as a 
performative. It is therefore unsurprising that Cavell will not, at any point, try to 
"define" the passionate or expressive utterance—to do so would miss the point. This, 
however, does not close down the discussion of passionate utterance. For example, we 
are told that passionate utterances do not exhaust the field of the perlocutionary (p. 
177). 
What might this mean? The significance of this claim becomes clearer when we 
consider Cavell's example of a judge who utters the words "you were wrong" to a 
defendant. Such an utterance cannot be considered "passionate" or expressive because 
illocutionary force dominates—it can amount to a sentence. Of course, such an 
utterance will have perlocutionary effects, but we are dealing with a different kind of 
perlocutionary field. Cavell argues that what the judge is doing does not amount to an 
"ordinary exchange". The word ordinary "exchange" is clearly heavily loaded here. 
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That Cavell wishes to occlude the judge's verdict from the field of "exchanges" is very 
telling. A study of the passionate utterance (and perlocutions generally) involves the 
recognition of the individual, which becomes distorted (perhaps sidelined) in the case 
of illocutionary force. I say distorted rather than negated in compliance with Cavell's 
point that illocutions do not silence the other. Rather they signal the end of the matter; 
the convicted criminal may protest against the verdict, but this is hardly an exchange, 
as we may "ordinarily" understand that term. Passionate utterances, as such, require 
"exchange not mediation or arbitration" (ibid.). Consequently, let us say that "You 
were wrong" could exemplify a passionate utterance, but only under different 
circumstances. Cavell provides examples of passionate utterances. Here are three of his 
examples: 
a) "I'm bored." 
b) "You know he took what you said as a promise." (Roughly a 
rebuke from Margaret Schlegel to Mr. Wilcox in Howard's End. I 
cite this to invoke and further contextualize the examples of moral 
encounter in my Claim of Reason (pp. 265-267).) 
c) "They say I (or perhaps I; or: I would not wish to) anger, mortify, 
charm, affront, encourage, disappoint, embarrass, confuse, alarm, 
offend, deter, hinder, seduce, intimidate, humiliate, harass, incite, 
etc. you." 
We might note that all these examples partake in a form of exchange in which the 
speaker is responding to the words/behaviour of another person or persons—is in the 
midst of a linguistic exchange. We might also note that what these utterances mean (or 
do?) precisely is of course neither determined by the structure of the utterance, nor by 
simply what is said in the utterance. Cavell chooses "I'm bored" because it is one of 
Ayer's examples that the latter uses to argue for "the primacy of expression over 
emotion" (p. 178). Ayer claims that such expressions do not necessarily involve 
assertions at all (which serves to back up his claim that they are not the stuff of serious 
philosophical business). Cavell, doesn't deny that expressions do not necessarily 
involve assertions, but makes the point that: "If not to 'involve assertions' or words in 
your expression means to keep silent, this may come from being silenced, from not 
wanting to say something" (p. 179). Here, Cavell is making philosophy work with the 
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situations in which words are uttered (a very Austinian move, and quite deliberately 
so). Expressions, which are not necessarily verbalised, are (sometimes) not verbalised 
due to the force of convention and this force can stultify speech. Such a reigning in of 
speech is clearly a moral issue—Cavell is trying to show how the silencing that 
accompanies such force can exert a hostile and sometimes degrading form of power 
when it silences those who are victims of it. 
The example "I'm bored" and the various ways in which this "expression" might be 
silenced has an obvious bearing on what happens in classrooms. We will say more 
about this later, but undoubtedly, a certain illocutionary force will invariably 
accompany utterances made by teachers. As we shall see, how a teacher deals with this, 
says much about the kinds of exchange that are necessary in the development of a 
moral education. 
As with "I'm bored", Cavell's second example—"You know he took what you said as 
a promise"—is interesting for several reasons. First, like "I'm bored", it represents a 
"challenge" to another speaker and it is the kind of utterance that may be both difficult 
to say and hear. As mentioned earlier, promising plays an important role in the 
association Austin makes between the performative aspect of language and his vision 
of morality as free from metaphysical get-out clauses. Indeed, promising has a certain 
special status as a performative utterance in the sense that its unhappiness cannot 
derive from the speaker lacking the appropriate authority or other kinds of infelicity of 
a similar nature. If you make a promise then you have made a promise, no matter what. 
However, things are only as clear cut as this if promising takes the conventional form 
of the utterance "I promise", yet there are all sorts of ways of doing something that 
may or may not amount to promising that do not take on board this form. On such very 
ordinary occasions we cannot rely on a formula to account for what has been "done". 
Instead what is required is a form of difficult exchange embodied in utterances such as 
"You know he took what you said as a promise". Indeed, all Cavell's examples of 
passionate utterance represent a form of negotiation with another speaker that involves 
saying something difficult that amounts to a challenge. We might also note, as Cavell 
does, that in all the examples, the issue of truth raises its head. Is it true that whoever is 
bored "is" bored—probably, but then "I'm bored" is often the reflex response of 
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teenagers when asked almost anything. Is it true that the character in the second 
example made a promise? 
To elaborate on this issue of truth we should note that Cavell's second example of 
passionate utterance—"You know he took what you said as a promise", first appeared 
in The Claim of Reason The fact that Cavell signals this up displays a rather 
roundabout and oblique form of footnoting, Shortly before displaying the quotation 
from Howard's End in The Claim of Reason Cavell writes: 
The moral significance of how an action is described, the problem in 
saying what it is which is under scrutiny, suggests that the 
epistemological "foundation" so often sought for morality, the 
"knowledge" which is to "base" our moral conduct and judgement, is a 
knowledge of persons, an epistemology which explains and assesses 
our claims to know what anyone is doing, and the basis on which one 
describes one's own action (Cavell, 1979, p. 265). 
Now, we might say, that here, Cavell is performing the very Austinian task of bringing 
philosophy's obsession with truth down to size. Epistemological concerns (narrowly 
conceived) qualify as only one aspect of a moral judgement. Cavell demonstrates what 
he means by looking at "strictly" epistemological contexts. The example he uses refers 
to the question of whether or not it is a goldfinch that has fallen from the tree. He 
mentions how, for example, simply noting that the bird has a red head means that the 
argument that it is a goldfinch is insufficiently supported. If, during this encounter, I 
say: "But that's not enough" there is no room for you to say: "For me it is enough". 
However, in moral cases "What is enough" is "itself part of the content of the 
argument". Consequently, "what is enough" "must be determined by me". Also, what I 
cannot do, if I wish to "maintain my position as morally competent, is to deny the 
relevance of your doubts" (p. 267). 
Basically, Cavell is extending the scope of epistemology to include the specifics of the 
individual/other (as an individual) rather than treating these figures as external 
concerns. We might say that the account of passionate utterance helps to justify and 
reinforce this idea. The question of whether or not a promise was truly made depends 
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on where the participants of the conversation stand vis-a-vis what counts as a promise. 
When we consider an example such as "you may feel that I harassed (etc.) you", in a 
sense this may be true—"you" may feel it to be the case, but you may not. The very 
asking of this question and its response represents a form of discourse in which people 
work out where they stand in relation to one another—truth is involved, but it is only 
one aspect of a moral judgement.27 
Although we can see how truth still has its role (though minor) to play in 
considerations of the passionate/expressive aspects of speech, we should perhaps 
consider what has happened to performance in Cavell's account. Has Austin's theory 
been debunked? We might approach this question by considering Cavell's most 
explicit application of Austinian methods to deal with the "missed opportunity" that 
marks How To Do Things with Words. I am referring here, to the moment in which 
Cavell constructs his own set of felicity conditions for perlocutions (Cavell, 2005, pp. 
180-182). When presenting his new set of conditions, Cavell also includes Austin's 
conditions relating to success of the "performative" utterance, so as to demonstrate 
how they deconstruct under the duress of the expressive/passionate/ utterance. This 
involves showing how an adherence to convention is undermined if one highlights the 
avoidance of conformity necessary for a happy perlocution: 
Austin's Illocutionary Condition 1: There must exist an accepted 
conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect . . . to 
include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain 
circumstances. 
Analogous Perlocutionary Condition 1: There is no accepted 
conventional procedure and effect. The speaker is on his or her own to 
create the desired effect (p. 180). 
On first inspection, this looks like a simple overturning/negation of convention in 
favour of the expressive aspects of speech; the perlocutionary conditions appear to be 
defying convention, rather than submitting to it. However, as Mulhall explains, there is 
27 Also note that "I harassed you" requires "disclaiming functions" due to the difficulties mentioned 
earlier regarding the fist person pronoun, which again demonstrates the importance of exchange over 
convention when it comes to perlocutionary verbs. 
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a decided danger in treating the passionate utterance as simply the negation of the 
performative utterance. He argues that when Cavell recognises that "my idea of 
passionate utterance turns out to be a concern with performance after all", he 
wishes his idea of passion internally to modify Austin's idea of the 
performative, to subject it to internal transformation. His goal is not to 
counterbalance the idea of order with that of disorder, but to suggest 
that Austin's idea of the dimension of law in which speech necessarily 
participates must be one that makes room for—makes possible—the 
ways in which speech allows us to improvise our way through the 
disorders of desire (Mulhall, 2006, p. 5). 
Cavell is not trying to show that we can escape the conventions of speech (the law). 
For a start, the deconstructive dimension of his new set of felicity conditions requires 
the old conditions, which may be destabilised, but are not negated. What does this 
amount to? Well, if we go back to the example of passionate utterance: "He took what 
you said as a promise", illocutionary force is still in play—these words may produce 
perlocutionary effects. However, the conventional form of the utterance cannot 
determine what has been done in speaking. By the same token, the force of what it 
means to make a promise has not been lost, but modified in accordance with the 
recognition that promising need not take a conventional form, yet the force of 
promising is still there in the appeal of the speaker. Consequently, Cavell is not casting 
the performative utterance aside, but simply introducing the disorders of desire to go 
beyond what Austin can bring himself to say. 
This sense of going beyond is marked by Cavell's last condition for perlocutions, in 
which he registers "a final asymmetry"28 with Austin's conditions, and adds one of his 
own: 
Perloc 7: You may contest my invitation to exchange, at any or all of 
the points marked by the list of conditions for the successful 
28 Cavell notes that for Illocutionary Conditions 2a and b (3 and 4 in Cavell's numbering system) there 
are no analogous perlocutionary acts. 
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perlocutionary act, for example, deny that I have that standing with 
you, or question my consciousness of my passion, or dismiss the 
demand for the kind of response I seek, or ask to postpone it, or worse. 
I may or may not have further means of response. (We may understand 
such exchanges as instances of, or attempts at, moral education) 
(Cavell, 2005, p. 183). 
Here, Cavell is obviously, in one sense, "extending" Austin's contribution by 
refiguring the total speech act situation so that it is resistant to closure (in the case of 
passionate utterance at any rate). As noted in Cavell's aforementioned approach to 
moral issues in The Claim of Reason, the possibility for "exchange" is part of the 
content of the utterance. Issues pertaining to truth or epistemological "reasons" make 
up only one facet of the situation, and the same can be said for performance. 
Otherwise, we negate the possibility for "improvisation in the disorders of desire". 
Moral education, as such, necessarily involves the constant possibility of exchange and 
cannot be impoverished by an "absolute" (following Mulhall) appeal to convention, 
which one might assume, would result in the "moralism" that accompanies 
"instruction" and inhibit "instances of, or attempts at, moral education". 
A Passionate Response to Hand 
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, Cavell's philosophy throws up issues 
concerning expression that are both relevant to analytic approaches to ethics and what 
is ethically coded through the language of performativity. The urge to write this 
chapter derives, in part, from listening to Michael Hand's paper "Should we teach 
homosexuality as a controversial issue?" at the Gregynog Philosophy of Education 
Conference in 2006.29 Hand begins his paper by arguing that there are two options 
open to educators when they "tackle" moral questions in the classroom: 
One is to provide pupils with substantive moral guidance, to teach 
moral questions with a view to promoting particular answers to those 
questions. The other is to teach moral questions as controversial issues, 
29 This paper has since been published in Theory and Research in Education, and it is to the published 
version that reference is now made. 
158 
to make a deliberate attempt not to steer pupils towards particular 
answers but rather to be as even-handed as possible in the presentation 
of conflicting views (Hand, 2007, p. 69). 
Hand calls these directive and non-directive approaches to teaching moral questions. 
The question his paper asks is whether or not homosexuality is an issue that demands 
the promotion of particular answers to questions (the directive approach) or whether it 
is sufficiently "controversial" as to merit the presentation of different views on the 
matter (the non-directive approach). It should be noted that Hand makes it very clear 
that when he is talking about homosexuality, he is referring to homosexual acts. 
The first part of Hand's paper looks at the different theories that deal with the criterion 
for establishing controversiality. Ultimately, he discards most of these approaches and 
settles on Robert Dearden's "epistemic criterion". Here is Dearden: 
a matter is controversial if contrary views can be held on it without 
those views being contrary to reason. By "reason" here is not meant 
something timeless and unhistorical but the body of public knowledge, 
criteria of truth, critical standards and verification procedures which at 
any given time has been so far developed (Dearden, in Hand, 2007, p. 
71). 
By adopting Dearden's approach, Hand attempts to discover rational arguments for 
treating homosexuality as a controversial issue. He considers a number of moral 
objections to homosexuality and shows (in my view, quite legitimately) that the various 
positions under scrutiny present arguments that are "contrary to reason". Hand 
eventually concludes that homosexuality should not be taught as a controversial issue. 
Following the reading of this paper at the conference, I recall having had feelings of 
acute frustration at my inability to articulate successfully my problems with what Hand 
was trying to do. Some writers may wish to take Hand to task for his choice of 
Dearden's model of controversiality (Hand presents enough conflicting models of 
controversiality to make this seem plausible), whilst others may find inconsistencies in 
his argument. However, neither of these argumentative routes touches on what seems 
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to me to be problematic about the paper. At the time, I knew that my frustration did not 
derive from the quality of the argument exactly, but rather from the mode of 
argumentation employed and the specific limitations imposed by it. The devil was, 
therefore, not so much in the details of the argument as in its adherence to a particular 
kind of discourse. Consequently, this paper's aim is not to provide a critique of Hand 
that attempts to refute his arguments, but to find a language (which houses a mode of 
thinking) that brings critical attention to the kind of moral philosophising on education 
instanced by "Should we teach homosexuality as a controversial issue?". It will, I hope, 
become clear that Stanley Cavell's treatment of the role of passion in speech takes us 
some way down this road. Cavell wishes to raise "the question of philosophy's 
tendency, notable in my experience particularly within the tradition of analytical 
philosophy, to discount the role of passion in human life, as if that discounting might 
be a step toward a welcome reduction of it" (Cavell, 2005 p. 156). What I want to 
consider, following Cavell, is whether or not the role of passion and the expressive 
aspects of speech have a role to play in moral education and whether or not a certain 
kind of rationalistic thinking occludes something important. 
Without wanting to let too many cats out of the bag, we might note that homosexuality 
is certainly a passionate issue in schools (and society at large), if not a controversial 
one. It is too early in the paper to elaborate on this point—the groundwork for that has 
not yet been provided. Perhaps philosophers are right to occlude passion from their 
thinking. It may, however, be interesting to let a couple of questions hover over the 
forthcoming text. First, why think of homosexuality purely in terms of homosexual 
acts? Second, can we adequately deal with moral issues by deciding whether or not 
they are controversial? In the last part of this chapter these questions will be 
reintroduced, but this follows a discussion of Stanley Cavell's treatment of 
performative and passionate utterances. 
The reader may find the inclusion of Hand's paper in this article rather strange given 
the discussion of Cavell's passionate utterance presented above. For a start, both 
Cavell's (and of course Austin's) treatment of moral issues takes place against the 
backdrop of the emotivist theory of language that considers moral questions as separate 
from epistemological truth questions. In this sense, Hand, by introducing Dearden's 
epistemic criterion when approaching homosexuality, takes a completely opposite 
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approach—evaluating moral judgements in terms of epistemological factors is 
apparently his "only" method. Of course, the similarity between both approaches (and 
this is important) is that epistemological factors are the governing concern. 
I want to briefly restate the point that in employing, what I take to be, Cavellian tactics, 
the intention is not to contradict Hand, or attempt to refute his argument, but rather to 
consider the implications, which derive from his particular approach and the limitations 
that it imposes. Invoking Cavell's treatment of the passionate utterance, I will attempt 
to show that in a complicated (unconventional?) way, Hand's paper partakes in a form 
of moralism (Hand's paper is not moralistic in a conventional sense), which Cavell is 
trying to counter. 
Let us begin by considering the philosophical limitations of what Hand sets out to do. 
As I said at the beginning of the article, it is not that I disagree with Hand's findings (as 
they are developed within his chosen perameters), but it is rather his "epistemological" 
approach, which engenders some consternation. Before introducing the question of 
passion, I should point out that I am not suggesting that epistemological factors 
(including the kind that Hand deals with) should be excluded from the 
picture, but rather that Hand's interest in "truth" is itself rather limited. It is perhaps 
telling that, when discussing homosexuality, Hand refers to homosexual "acts" as 
though such things merely represented brute empirically observable facts30. His reason 
for adopting this particular approach perhaps represents the kind of skittishness toward 
language that Austin displays toward perlocutions—both areas are rather messy. But, 
to what extent does it make sense to talk of homosexual acts as though they were 
somehow free of linguistic considerations? Are we to think of copulation between 
homosexuals (or heterosexuals) as simply instances of particular kinds of animal 
rutting? To think in this way is to ignore the realm of significance that situates different 
kinds of sexual act and, following Judith Butler, the various "performances" that 
constitute gender. To ignore this (and here we have a truth claim) is to ignore the most 
30 It should be noted that Hand provides a justification for treating homosexuality in terms of acts. 
However, this simply involves distinguishing them from "preferences, inclinations or orientations" 
which people cannot be held responsible for (Hand, 2007, p. 85). It is interesting for the purposes of 
this chapter that Hand should distinguish "acts" from the preferences, inclinations and orientations 
implicit to them. 
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important dimension of what homosexuality "is" and here controversiality enters the 
picture—what "sexuality" "is" is controversial. 
Even if we take the suggestion that sexuality is bound up in complex linguistic issues, 
and in doing so introduce the history of homophobic discourse, genetic arguments etc., 
into the classroom this will still miss something about what a moral education involves. 
In a sense it is also to advocate the overly cerebral pedagogy that is implied by Hand's 
argument. This quality is apparent when Hand speaks of the two ways of tackling 
moral issues in the classroom—steering and not-steering. The options (only two?) open 
to us, seem to have little to do with anything that begins in or emerges from the 
classroom. Rather, they relate to a decision making process that precedes entry into the 
classroom and provides guidance for what teachers do. In a climate, currently obsessed 
with student-centred pedagogies, Hand's binary distinction governing the possibilities 
for teaching moral education, may seem slightly anachronistic to modern practitioners. 
Looked at from this (student-centred) perspective, both the directive and non-directive 
approaches belong to the same camp because the emphasis is on what the "teacher" 
"does"—either steering or not-steering. Similarly, a debate surrounding socio-linguistic 
issues may present similar formal restrictions. Although Hand's argument bypasses 
issues of language, whereas the socio-linguistic approach does not, both miss 
something important about language. 
We go some way to seeing what this missing element is by recognising that in British 
schools (and I daresay, elsewhere) issues pertaining to homosexuality are, for many 
students, the most passionate. Homosexuality constantly raises its head in the form of 
homophobic abuse and bullying. This is not necessarily directed at gay students, but 
(Alen at emotionally weak students as a means of exercising power over them. Now, 
whether or not Cavell would be willing to accept some of the comments made by 
students in this respect as passionate utterances is clearly contentious. This is because 
Cavell draws a distinction between hate speech and passionate utterance, maintaining 
that they are different forms of perlocution.3132 However, there is no denying the 
32 In "Performative and Passionate Utterance", Cavell is keen to save Austin from certain readings of 
his work that assimilate the performative to "hate speech". Some feminist writers maintain that 
linguistic instances of hate speech successfully "do" something in a manner that is analogous to the 
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expressive aspects of "hate speech". Also, from my teaching experience, I can think of 
many occasions in which students have passionately expressed their irritation with 
homophobic language. 
If we take the expressive quality of this kind of utterance seriously, we come to see that 
it is not enough to coldly recognise that moral issues are bound up with language. It is 
also important to consider the ways in which they make themselves known in 
"worldly" utterances. Antonio Negri, in discussing Wittgenstein, may help us here: 
With Wittgenstein there was an extraordinary rediscovery of a 
phenomenology of passions within language. . . With Wittgenstein, 
language becomes the condition of the mind, its very form. He 
introduced us to an analysis of language in which it is not the 
philosophical questioning that counts, but rather the linguistic form of 
the question, the intonation of the voice, all the bodily elements of 
language that are now seen to be central (Negri, 2004 pp. 173-174). 
With this conception of the world (also shared by Cavell) in which language is viewed 
as the condition of the mind (which is bodily in a different sense to the brain), 
philosophy conceived of in terms of controversiality (particularly when this is limited 
to giving reasons) cannot be the governing concern when handling moral issues. By 
focusing solely on epistemological questions, only one dimension of the moral life is 
accounted for at the expense of the performative/passionate aspects of that life. 
Whether something is controversial or not depends on assessing things in the cold light 
of reason, yet homosexuality is not a "cold" issue—in some countries it is sufficiently 
"hot" that its practice merits the death penalty. 
We can perhaps now see that a moral education needs to account for the lived, bodily, 
linguistic experiences of the moral life. What I want to suggest, is that Hand's 
argument seems to tacitly imply that teachers should stifle those "ordinary exchanges" 
that can become "instances of, or attempts at, moral education". This is so because the 
expressive qualities that may characterise the kinds of utterance that the teacher fields, 
performative utterance. Cavell makes it clear that examples of "hate speech" are perlocutions, not 
illocutions. 
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will be stymied and redirected by the downward force of the cold blade of reason. In 
wielding such an impersonal weapon, as a teacher, I ignore the expressive aspects of 
language and must therefore "deny that I claim any particular standing with you in 
order to confront you, and my utterance may therefore claim authority to speak for a 
particular institution, with its own ordinances, or for morality as such, and risk 
moralism" (Cavell, 2005, p. 182). The kind of pedagogy that we may read off Hand's 
argument entails that the responsibility to the individual as an individual and the other 
(as an individual other) is not permitted to enter the picture. Consequently, Hand's 
argument must therefore be, in one sense, moralistic because it has no place for the 
expressive in speech. Here is Cavell: 
But if what I have been aiming at is indeed some fragment of a view of 
expression, of recognizing language as everywhere revealing desire—. 
. . this is meant in service of something I want from moral theory, 
namely a systematic recognition of speech as confrontation, as 
demanding as owed, . . . each instance of which directs and risks, if not 
costs blood (p. 187). 
Earlier in this paper, I alluded to the element of risk that characterised Cavell's 
passionate utterance that involves freedom to say what it is difficult to say—to be 
confrontational when necessary—to say what one has to say. This is ultimately the 
crucial factor that Hand's argument cannot take in. Instead, he provides a bloodless 
anaemic take on morality, which abstracts and severs it from worldly exchanges. The 
epistemological account he offers fails to consider how language and exchange are at 
the heart of our moral lives. 
This discussion can be illuminated by a consideration of the distinction Cavell draws 
between the impersonal metaphysical voice of modern philosophy (Hand would only 
represent the impersonal aspect of this voice) and ordinary language philosophy. Paul 
Standish explains this as follows: 
In contrast to the impersonal metaphysical voice of modern philosophy, 
which states or questions what is the case, ordinary language 
philosophy characteristically proceeds with expressions, as we saw, of 
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the form "When we say . . ., we mean . . .". The verbal form here is first 
person, which authorises the judgement, and plural, which binds the 
speaker to the community. And this statement is made not as some kind 
of empirical generalisation; a survey of usage, for example, would be 
beside the point. It is made rather as something closer to a commitment 
or an expression of assent, depending both upon the sincerity of the 
speaker (how it seems to her) and on her affirming her alignment or 
community with others (her faith that she shares this judgement with 
them, can speak for them). In this, then, Cavell mitigates any tendency 
towards the "subliming" of rules by throwing emphasis on the location 
of rule-following practices in the hurly-burly of the form of life, the 
cohesion of which depends on agreement in judgements (Standish, 
2004, p. 94). 
As with his insistence on perlocutions, "voice" is important in Cavell's approach to 
"assent". Here, we might note a distinction between the forced consensus, which would 
derive from avoiding encounters that bring into question the legitimacy of moral 
judgements, and the "assent" that can be offered or withheld from negotiations that 
take place in "the hurly burly of the form of life". If, in the teaching of moral 
education, we are to do justice to our students, then this "commitment, or an expression 
of assent" will not lead to chaos. Rather, it will represent the difficult task of promoting 
shared entry into a common world. 
It is important to make it clear that despite the restricted vision that constitutes "Should 
we teach homosexuality as a controversial issue", Hand's arguments against those who 
find homosexuality morally questionable are rigorous and important—they may, and 
perhaps should, be infused into exchanges within the classroom. To deny 
epistemological factors any credibility is "not" the aim of this paper. Hand may claim 
that he is criticised for something that he is "not" trying to do, and in a sense this would 
be right. However, those areas that do "not" feature in Hand's paper, whether they are 
epistemological or passionate, are too important to ignore. If such considerations are 
not infused into moral debate and confrontation within the classroom, then a shiver will 
be felt that does nobody any good. 
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Performativity and Passion 
Having considered the rather bloodless portrayal of the moral life in Hand's 
philosophy, let us now turn to the language of modern pedagogy and managerialism. 
Here, I want to introduce two sections from a chapter that features in The Therapy of 
Education (Smeyers, Smith and Standish, 2007), called "Self-esteem: The Inward 
Turn". This chapter shows how the promotion of self-esteem in the classroom (which 
is often uncritically celebrated as an obvious good) can lead to certain absurdities. Such 
absurdities derive in part from the deficit culture regarding the kinds of responsibility 
teachers take for their words. The first section from the chapter that I want to draw on 
relates to the current tendency in schools to avoid "punishing" children—it will 
(supposedly) damage their self-esteem. Instead, "consequences" have come to replace 
sanctions. If children are fully aware of the "consequences" of their actions then 
responsibility has been devolved. If a child misbehaves she is not "being punished". 
Rather, she is effectively punishing herself. The example, Smeyers et al. paraphrase 
(and criticise) is taken from Canter and Canter's book Assertive Discipline (Canter and 
Canter, 1992): 
Carl is told that poking someone means that "you will choose to sit by 
yourself at the table". Carl might reasonably respond that while he was 
told that this was to be the punishment he hardly wants to sit by 
himself, and hasn't chosen to. But there is no talk of punishment, 
because of course punishment would damage pupils' self-esteem 
(Smeyers et al, 2007, p.16). 
Smeyers et al. do not simply want to castigate this kind of classroom activity for its 
manipulation: "perhaps all teaching has an element of it" (ibid.). Rather what they see 
as objectionable is the disavowal of personal responsibility. The teacher in the example 
is unwilling to say the kind of thing that risks blood (or rather reveals something other 
than bloodlessness). The kinds of exchange that Cavell refers to are stymied. This 
example resonates with the meeting described in the introductory chapter of this thesis 
between Sharon and Albert. Being a professional nowadays can lead to a curious 
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detachment from one's words. Smeyers et al. provide a rather beautiful example of this 
kind of detachment when a family visit a school that prioritises self-esteem: 
Consider Hannah, who was six years old when her parents were 
inspecting possible schools for her in their suburb of Boston, 
Massachusetts. They were initially impressed with one which 
foregrounded the building of self-esteem among its aims. As she 
showed Hannah and her parents around the school the Principal drew 
attention to the various arrangements that were meant to embody this 
philosophy: no competitive sport, plenty of Circle Time for children to 
listen respectfully as their peers talk about their feelings, an emphasis 
on praise for good behaviour rather than blame for bad. Hearing the 
phrase used so often, Hannah asked, "What's self-esteem?" "It means 
we love you Hannah", the Principal replied. "No you don't", Hannah 
burst out. "Mummy and Daddy love me, and grandma and granddad, 
but you don't even know me". (p. 11) 
That Hannah should be the one to identify the absurdity of the principal's comments is 
telling. She has yet to be dragged into the technologies of learning that may impact on 
her ability to display the kind of "voice" we see here. Of course the teacher's intentions 
are good. It is not my aim to castigate or sneer at the Principal (though cringing is 
perhaps unavoidable). However, we might wonder what have things come to when 
"love" can be treated so lightly, so mechanically. 
Conclusion 
Though I do not want to draw an exact analogy between Hand's approach to moral 
issues and the language of contemporary schooling, they both seem to have "something 
missing". The teachers who behave in ways analogous to the actors in Smeyers et al's 
examples will perhaps go home and lead rich passionate lives. The fact that 
professional life so often occludes richness and passion is something that educationists 
might "rage" against. At the very least we might learn to laugh at ourselves when we 
are at our most ridiculous. 
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Chapter 6 
Dionysos, Intensity and Rhizomes 
In the last chapter, we discussed the ways in which certain approaches to teaching and 
learning can lead to linguistic detachment and a denial of responsibility. Also, through 
the discussion of the expressive aspects of speech, we touched on the linguistic forces 
that accompany our utterances. To think in terms of the force of our words is of course 
very much part of Austin's project, through his discussion of illocutionary force and 
what is done by words. However, it is also very Nietzschean. Without approaching it 
directly, I hinted at what might be involved here in Chapters 1 and 5. Austin's style 
(and the force that accompanies that style), suggest that he is doing more than simply 
constructing an argument. The jokes about christening ships "Stalin", the endless lists 
that will never resolve things suggest that there is clearly something of the "gay 
science" going on in Austin. Indeed, Nietzsche's interest in developing a "gay science" 
is in part a response to the "Socratism" that characterises so much philosophy. 
Socratism here signifies the belief that philosophers hold that dialectic will eventually 
lead to the source of truths that concern us. For Nietzsche such truths are always 
historical. They have no metaphysical foundation. As we have seen already, Austin is 
equally suspicious of metaphysical pretensions and is also concerned, to paraphrase 
Cavell, with bringing philosophy's concern with truth down to size. 
In this chapter, we will consider the ways in which a Nietzschean approach to 
education helps to counter the "force" of performativity, by looking at that 
philosopher's distinction between Apollo and Dionysos and also by considering 
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Nietzscheans Deleuze and Guattari's three images of thought: the tree, the fascicular 
root and the rhizome. In contradistinction to the previous chapters, the discussion of 
education will be interspersed with philosophy in most of the sections. The reasons for 
this will hopefully become clear. 
Apollo and Dionysos 
In Education in an Age of Nihilism, Blake, Smith, Smeyers and Standish adopt a 
Nietzschean critique of contemporary educational values and in so doing argue that the 
technological understanding of being which characterises contemporary education 
simply treats questions pertaining to value in terms of the opposition between success 
and failure. 
This kind of nihilism manifests itself in the artificialities comprised in skills-based 
approaches to teaching and learning. Blake et al. show the unnaturalness that 
accompanies talk of things such as "emotional skills" and demonstrate how this mode 
of thought inhibits the development of "intense learning experiences". Here, the figure 
of Dionysos, the Greek God of sensual abandon and intense experience, enters the 
picture. Blake et al. discuss the distinction between Dionysos and Apollo, the sun God 
of order and reason. Following Nietzsche, they are neither advocating the abandonment 
of reason in "a free-for-all" pedagogy nor maintaining that the current vogue 
surrounding the development of cognitive skills represents a triumph of the Apollonian 
spirit. Rather: 
There is no suggestion here that anything goes. It is dissimulation that 
harbours difference within identity, passion within reason, chance even 
within structured composition. It suggests a way for our thought and 
action, and so possibilities for our teaching and learning. (Blake et al, 
2000, p. 114) 
The dissimulation of Apollo and Dionysos is what is required. The obsession with 
cognitive skills and structured learning represents an impoverished mechanical version 
of reason, oblivious to the spirit of the dance. Knowledge is not something that can be 
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isolated from the ways of gaining it. Moreover, as Deleuze shows in his reading of the 
role "forces" play in Nietzsche, "We will never find the sense of something . . . if we 
do not know the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes 
possession of the or is expressed in it. A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an 
apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force" 
(Deleuze, 2005, p. 3). Consequently, we cannot simply speak of different ways of 
learning the same thing, but must consider how that thing becomes this or that in 
accordance with the way in which it is apprehended. Lessons that manipulate and aim 
to foster "skills" do not leave their object untouched. With• characteristic humour, 
Blake et al. capture what is, generally speaking, at stake here: 
But beware the numerous false dancers here . . . enthusiastic facilitators 
and earnest enablers, transferrers of skills and critical thinkers, 
motivators and school improvers, progressives in various guises, 
beware find-the-learning-style-that-suits-you-best, the onanism of 
learning-to-learn. . . Beware: as-a- teacher-you-must-plan-your-lessons, 
you must state clearly the aims of the lesson, specify the learning 
outcomes, list the resources you will use, describe the method you will 
use, you must keep the class moving so that the children's attention 
doesn't wander, you must not stray from your plan, and so, with this 
careful planning, and with the inspection that ensures you are fully 
accountable, what is taught and what is learned become channelled to 
predetermined ends. These are highly realistic counterfeits of 
education. (p. 117) 
Here, Blake et al. show how the nihilistic forces of modern pedagogy generate a form 
of intensity that presents a hollowed out, debased version of the Dionysian. There is 
intensity all right, but it is of a counterfeit kind, a disturbing, if impotent libidinal drive. 
I take the repetition of the term "beware" to be a humorous take on Nietzsche's 
theatrical style. However, the notion of fear is an important one in the current 
environment of schooling and is a complex issue. As Blake et al. note in an earlier part 
of their book, thinking in terms of the classroom "skills" can act as a shield against the 
kind of close connection with•students that may engender a greater chance of rejection. 
Of course, this is a very different kind of fear from what is reproduced by and within 
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the system. This other kind of fear is perpetuated by skills or technique-oriented 
thinking. The flipside of the confidence generated by my array of skills is the fear that 
if I use them and things don't work out, then I am clearly some sort of failure. The 
children who do not respond in the correct way can appear monstrous. Indeed, the 
nihilistic distinction between success and failure produces and reproduces a closed 
economy of fear. When things do work out, this may build confidence, but what if 
something goes wrong tomorrow? To experience the alleviation of fear is to continue 
to partake in the culture of fear. The performative apparatus is the very thing that 
produced the fear in the first place. 
I want to make an analogy between the solutions and smoking. Smokers sometimes 
believe that they need cigarettes to alleviate stress. Of course, it is their addiction to 
cigarettes that makes them stressed when they lack access to the evil weed; there is 
scientific evidence to suggest that smoking increases stress levels. Public broadcasts in 
the 1980s used to feature a stooped Dickensian cartoon figure called Nicotine who, fag 
in hand, would attempt to lure teenagers into adopting a smoking habit. But just as they 
are about to spark up, Superman appears, makes a speech and drags Nicotine away. 
The teaching and learning gurus would perhaps like to think of themselves as 
Supermen leading teachers down the right track: the sanctimonious way in which many 
such figures reveal their magic tricks can certainly sound like a Superman speech. 
However, what if they, like Nicotine, are addicted to their wares and are simply 
providing teachers with a quick fix? In so doing, they cultivate the culture of fear. 
This perpetuation of a closed economy of fear explains why we should "beware" the 
various attractions presented by Blake et al. To be wary of enthusiastic facilitators etc 
is not to escape fear, but to submit our selves to an "open" economy of fear. To enrich 
this discussion let us now consider the three images of thought discussed by Deleuze 
and Guattari in their extraordinary book A Thousand Plateaus. 
Tree-Like Thought 
Describing tree-like thought is fairly straightforward. Here we have (1) the image of 
roots, often invisible to the naked eye—think of God or Hegel's conception of spirit, 
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and (2) the firm insular trunk from which branches spread. A tree (as image) is a self-
enclosed entity, an arborescent phallogocentric "structure". Deleuze and Guattari 
maintain that the law of the tree-like structure always follows the logic of the one that 
becomes two. Here we might think of Genesis, and the creation of Eve from Adam's 
rib. In this sense "the tree is already the image of the world, or the root the image of the 
world-tree" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 5). The law of the "One that becomes two" 
is effectively also the law of reflection. The book is projected as the reflection of the 
world. There is therefore a matching of thought and world in representation. Within 
this model, thought is not conceived as an active element in the world. 
To understand what this means in relation to education, we have only to look at the 
Humboldtian conception of the university. Following Fichte and Schleiermacher, Von 
Humboldt argued that the goal for higher education was the "spiritual and moral 
training of the nation, which could be achieved by "deriving everything from an 
original principle, by "relating everything to an ideal" (justice), and by "unifying this 
principle and this ideal in a single idea"—the state. As a consequence: "The end 
product would be a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society—each mind an 
analogously organised mini-State morally unified in the supermind of the State" 
(Massumi in Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. xii). 
With the breakdown of grand narratives, the unifying ideal espoused by Von Humboldt 
is replaced by another unifying principle—that of performativity as diagnosed by 
Lyotard. As we saw in Chapter 2, Lyotard argues that the grand narratives of 
modernity have been replaced by the logic of effectiveness. We have already seen how 
this works in regard to schooling. To guarantee success, the family tree of the school is 
organised in accordance with a structure of line managers who attempt to ensure that 
teachers are delivering lessons in the correct ways. Earlier we noted that in the 
Humboldtian vision of higher education the individual subject becomes equated and 
inextricably linked to the root manifested in the figure of the State. Similarly (though 
this is a more impoverished vision) the individual subject in the contemporary 
comprehensive school is one with their target grade. The emphasis on teaching the 
"individual" comes to mean little more than maximising a student's "potential", or 
"output". It should be noted that, in the case of performativity, although the root of 
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Enlightenment reason has been broken, an equally powerful arborescent structure has 
grown out of the remains. 
The Fascicular Root 
Having considered the tree-like structure of the contemporary school, in which the 
relative autonomy once enjoyed by teachers has been replaced by the trunk of extreme 
accountability (a structure reinforced in each individual lesson), let us turn to Deleuze 
and Guattari's second image of thought, the fascicular root: 
The radicle system, or fascicular root, is the second figure of the book, 
to which our modernity plays willing allegiance. This time, the 
principal root has aborted, or its tip has been destroyed; an immediate, 
indefinite multiplicity of secondary roots grafts onto it and undergoes a 
flourishing development. This time, natural reality is what aborts the 
principal root, but the root's unity subsists as past, as yet to come, as 
possible. We must ask if reflexive, spiritual reality does not compensate 
for this state of things by demanding an even more comprehensive 
secret unity, or a more extensive totality. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 
pp. 5-6) 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to fascicular thought (or the fascicular book) as "modern". I 
think they are referring to poems like T.S.Eliot's The Waste Land. The structure of The 
Wasteland appears to resemble a multiplicity. Different voices appear and disappear. 
Different languages ancient and modern are thrown together. The book presents an 
image of a degraded, splintered, "multiple" world" in which the root of classical 
fullness and beauty has been aborted—its tip has been destroyed: "What are the roots 
that clutch, what branches grow/ Out of this stony rubbish?" (Eliot, 1922). 
Consequently, The Wasteland, by longing for a moment at which the fragments of 
civilisation can be shored against their ruins, demonstrates the cyclical unity in which 
"fullness" can be regained when the future is reconciled with the past and the root is 
restored. This then represents a form of "unworldliness", a turning away from the 
world to a spiritual, higher or "secret unity" that cannot be found in the world, but may 
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be discovered by elite artistic intellects: "The world has lost its pivot: the subject 
cannot even dichotomise, but accedes to a higher unity, of ambivalence or 
overdetermination, in an always supplementary dimension to that of its object" (p. 6). 
Deleuze and Guattari point out that despite projecting an image of multiplicity, the 
fascicular system does not really break with dualism, that: "unity is constantly thwarted 
in the object, while a new type of unity triumphs in the subject" (ibid.). This is due to 
the fact that the subject/writer/intellectual becomes one with the spiritual realm and 
therefore gains some sort of control over the world, by structuring and representing that 
world as chaotic. This is why Deleuze and Guattari argue that this attempt to represent 
the world, in which root–cosmos has been replaced by radicle chaosmos actually leads 
to an even higher sense of unity than is the case with tree-like thought. 
A Fascicular Education 
Fascicular thought portrays a world which is multiple and chaotic. What might a 
fascicular education look like? We will consider what is at stake here through a 
discussion of a fictional educational scenario taken from Donna Tartt's novel The 
Secret History. 
The Secret History 
The narrator of The Secret History, having dropped out of medical school, goes to a 
small, prestigious American college to study English literature. In the early part of his 
first semester he attempts to gain credits for his degree by joining the tiny Classics 
department (at this point there are only five students) and finally gets accepted. The 
department is set aside from the rest of the university both geographically and in terms 
of how it functions. Over the course of the novel we come to understand that the 
Classics department only exists on the whim of its sole lecturer. The College 
tolerates/ignores the Classics department and its unusual practices due to the fact that 
Julian, a rich aesthete, makes donations to the college, and "refuses" to accept a salary. 
The aforementioned "unusual practices" include a process of selection that is almost as 
much based on personality as academic merit—four of the five students (Henry, 
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Charles, Camilla and Francis) are depicted as extremely clever, whereas Bunny adopts 
a persona that Julian finds "agreeable". The methods of assessment are also shown to 
be eccentric in comparison with other departments in the College. 
This small academic community which the narrator joins define themselves in 
opposition to what they perceive to be a degraded, debauched, uncivilised student 
community, obsessed with drugs and parties. They generate an insular society redolent 
of Evelyn Waugh novels—they do not read newspapers, or watch television. Instead 
they decamp to Francis's family's country estate where they row on the lake, read in 
the library and drink wine. At a fairly early stage in the novel, Julian gives a seminar 
on the Dionysiac ritual. Without including the narrator (who is new to the group), the 
other characters attempt to recreate the Dionysiac ritual at the country estate—they 
dress like Ancient Greeks, consume potions etc. However Bunny keeps ruining their 
attempts by farting or making jokes. He is subsequently excluded from these secret 
proceedings. 
The characters finally "succeed" in enacting the ritual, but in the process they 
"accidentally" kill a local farmer. Bunny finds out about this and, without doing so 
explicitly, blackmails them. Eventually they let the narrator in on what has been going 
on, and together they plot Bunny's murder before pushing him over the edge of a cliff. 
The final section of the novel is marked by the remorse the characters feel for what 
they've done. They are unable to transcend the morality of an age from which they 
have attempted to flee. Julian works out what has happened, and without giving the 
characters up to the police, leaves the university. 
Julian's lesson 
The description of the lesson on the Dionysiac ritual begins tellingly with the narrator's 
apology for failing to accurately replicate Julian's virtuoso performance: "He was a 
marvellous talker, a magical talker" (Tartt, 1993, p.38). Indeed the narrator berates 
himself for the fact that he cannot imitate the speech of a "superior" one. Julian begins 
with solipsism and the "burden of the self"—we are made miserable by our individual 
souls and desire to escape them. He rejects "love" as an antidote to this situation 
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because "one loses oneself for the sake of the other" and maintains that one can only 
truly lose oneself in "the joy of battle" (p. 39). Julian then jokes that with all their 
knowledge of battle tactics gleaned from his seminars, the students should be able to 
take Hampden town. He adds: "And how many years has it been since the gods have 
intervened in human wars? I expect Apollo and Athena Nike would come down to 
fight at your side, "invited or uninvited", as the oracle at Delphi said to the Spartans. 
Imagine what heroes you'd be." 
Following this darkly humorous aside (we are told that some of the students seem to be 
taking the prospect of invading the town quite seriously), Julian moves onto the subject 
of beauty. He suggests that the most violent moments in Greek tragedies are also the 
most beautiful, that therefore: "Beauty is rarely soft or conciliatory. Quite the contrary. 
Genuine beauty is always quite alarming." This segues into an account of the 
"Dionysiac ritual" in which "The revellers were apparently hurled back into a non-
rational, pre-intellectual state, where the personality was replaced by something 
completely different—and by "different" I mean something to all appearances not 
mortal. Inhuman" (p. 42). Julian then queries whether or not the people present are so 
very different to the Greeks and Romans as they are also "obsessed with duty, piety, 
loyalty, sacrifice? All those things which are to modern tastes so chilling" (p. 43). The 
narrator humorously notes that looking round the table at the expressions of his 
classmates: "to modern tastes they were somewhat chilling". Anyway, Julian goes on 
to suggest that by adopting such values, intelligent and cultivated people will ignore 
the existence of the irrational. The Dionysiac ritual therefore acts as a therapeutic 
pressure release. Otherwise "those powerful old forces will mass and strengthen until 
they are violent enough to break free, more violent for the delay, often strong enough 
to sweep the will away entirely." Referring to these destructive passions Julian 
concludes: 
How glorious to release them in a single burst! To sing, to scream, to 
dance barefoot in the woods in the dead of night, with no more 
awareness of mortality than an animal! These are powerful mysteries. 
The bellowing of bulls. Springs of honey bubbling from the ground. If 
we are strong enough in our souls we can rip away the veil and look 
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that naked, terrible beauty right in the face: let God consume us devour 
us, unstring our bones. Then spit us out reborn. (p. 45) 
Is there not something "terribly" attractive about Julian's lesson? The clear crescendo 
that builds up from the jokes about invading Hampden to the rapturous finale in which 
he envisions a freedom to sing and dance and bathe in all manner of sensuous 
pleasures, divorced from the mundanities of the self and its tawdry existence. 
Shouldn't teaching be like this? Julian's students are clearly transfixed: "We were all 
leaning forward, motionless. My mouth had fallen open; I was aware of every breath I 
took". Indeed, Tartt's narrator is so moved by this experience (and I imagine that many 
readers, including myself are similarly moved by this passage) that we hear: 
That night I wrote in my journal: "Trees are schizophrenic now and 
beginning to lose control, enraged with the shock of their fiery new 
colors. Someone—was it van Gogh?—said that orange is the color of 
insanity. Beauty is terror. We want to be devoured by it, to hide 
ourselves in that fire which refines us. (Ibid) 
However, inevitably, the more troubling elements of this scene must be brought to the 
foreground. This can partly be observed in the clear elitist aspects of the discourse on 
view. The jokes about taking Hampden have a sinister resonance—there is a clear 
fascistic desire to make the plebiscite minions kneel before the superior race of 
classicists with their higher values of "duty, piety, loyalty and sacrifice". This elitism 
obviously also echoes in the claim that the Dionysian experience is for "intelligent 
people", who in their pursuit of reason violently repress urges, which are of no real 
significance to "lesser beings". Although Julian appears to be championing affirmative 
delight and rapture this is all done in the service of negation. The self, which we 
despise in our solipsistic haze, must be overcome, must be negated if we are to become 
open to Dionysian pleasures. Consequently, we must destroy to build, and it is this that 
accounts for the violence, which for Julian is integral to terrible beauty. When Yeats 
writes that "A terrible beauty is born" (Yeats, 1965, p. 205), his sensitivity toward the 
oxymoronic force of revolutionary republican violence in Ireland is not diluted, as it 
(oxymoronic force) seems to be for Julian. 
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For Julian, the self is not lost but is present as negation. Trees are not schizophrenic in 
Julian's vision—the affirmative power, which might allow this to happen, is always 
being recouped by negative forces. That affirmative power had already been grounded 
in the very negation of the self, found in Julian's interpretation of the Dionysiac ritual. 
Despite the appearance of a multiplicity, and a loosening and escape from tree-like 
structures of reason and self-hood, the entire experience so it is presented here, 
ultimately resides at the root of "pure being". Indeed, we might say that during the 
encounter, Julian represents himself as being at one with pure Being. This grounding, 
which marks a return to a lost spiritual unity, epitomises the fascicular approach 
Deleuze and Guattari condemn as a false or deluded approach to multiplicity. Unity 
may have been aborted in the object but is returned to in the subject. 
We might say that the disastrous and tragic events that follow on from Julian's lesson 
are tied up with the form of negation that haunts Julian's description of the Dionysiac 
ritual. Ultimately the characters are unable to escape the pressures of the moral 
universe that exerts its force on them. Their attempts at enacting Dionysiac rituals (it as 
if they were following a handbook), demonstrate how their denial of society is not an 
escape at all—tree-like thinking is not so easily avoided. 
Rhizomes 
Having considered the implications of tree-like and fascicular thought, let us now 
consider the rhizome. For the purposes of clarity, the following descriptions of 
rhizomatic thought will be compared to tree-like thought. Whereas trees grow in 
accordance with an arborescent "structure", rhizomes do not behave in this way; they 
grow round the edges and between gaps and are always on the outside. Grass is a 
rhizome—here we might note the peculiar resistance to destruction displayed by grass. 
It may be obliterated in one place but simply grows up again elsewhere. 
When looking at tree-like and fascicular thinking, we noted that, in the case of the 
former, subject and object are in a sense united—this is obviously the case when we 
consider the Humboldtian conception of higher education in which individuals become 
mini-states. In the case of the fascicular thought, the root is aborted and the 
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object/world is projected as multiple, yet unity is restored in the subject, who in their 
higher state of being, gains interpretative control over the chaos. In contrast, the very 
dichotomy between subject and object is displaced by the figure of the rhizome. Again 
we might think here of grass, or the ant colony, which Deleuze and Guattari describe as 
an animal rhizome. We tend not to think of grass in terms of its individual blades; by 
the same token, ants are not generally thought about in this way. Also, having no 
original starting point or end point, the rhizome lacks an established, fixed or stable 
identity—it is always in the process of "becoming". Think of the forest rather than the 
tree, which goes where it can go and cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. 
Rhizomes are multiplicities. We cannot even speak coherently about "a rhizome"- we 
must simply refer to "some" of a rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 9) as we 
might speak of a patch of grass, which is already multiple. Rhizomes are therefore 
"always in the middle". 
There is a decided danger of thinking of the tree and rhizome in terms of a binary 
opposition. The aforementioned images of tree and forest neatly exemplify how 
Deleuze and Guattari's images problematise binary distinctions between separate 
entities. It might seem that whether we think in terms of the tree or the forest comes 
down to a simple question of perspective. However, there is more to the distinction 
than this. Deleuze and Guattari often use the terms "inside" and "outside". This is not a 
metaphysical distinction, but one that emerges from tree-like thinking, which, in 
developing an internal structure, posits an outside and generates a metaphysics; binary 
distinctions are, in effect, the products of arborescent thought. Consequently, in 
defining an outside, tree-like thought creates boundaries and establishes limits; by 
constructing a sense of internal unity, tree-like thought must negate that which it is not. 
In contrast, as it is always on the outside (of tree-like thought), the rhizome is 
necessarily coterminous with affirmation, spreading everywhere, refusing to establish 
limits and boundaries, flying in the face of pre-established identities. For rhizomes, 
there is no beyond. 
Trees and rhizomes differ in the sense that they provide different kinds of image. The 
image of the tree is a metaphor that belongs to metaphysics. In contrast, Deleuze and 
Guattari's "rhizome" is a metonym that resonates with the intensities of the world. That 
is not to say that Deleuze and Guattari are nature mystics—guerrilla armies and the 
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Internet are rhizomatic. We might simply say that a rhizome's movements cannot be 
pinned down and controlled by discursive power structures. 
Let us consider, for a moment, a short section of the film Jaws. Whilst looking for the 
shark, the scientist Hooper (a man who is at home on the sea) is perplexed by the fact 
that the police chief Brody lives on an island when he is scared of the water. Brody 
replies: "It's only an island if you look at it from the sea". For Brody, the experience of 
island life reveals a landlocked internalising and arborescent perspective. He embodies 
this perspective as the figure of the "law". In contrast Hooper, who spends his life 
working with sharks in the midst of the flat multiplicity (characterised by intensities) 
that is the sea, cannot contemplate the distinction between island and sea. Hooper 
thinks outside the brackets of Brody's legalistic imagination. 
Deleuze and Guattari often use linguistics as a model for demonstrating the distinction 
between rhizomes and trees. Put simply, tree-like approaches to linguistics champion 
models of grammatical correctness, which conjure the figure of an ideal speaker or 
listener. In contrast rhizomatic thinking on language turns away from such "power 
markers" and approaches language in a different way: 
A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic 
chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts 
sciences and social struggles. A semiotic chain is like a tuber 
agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic, but also 
perceptive, mimetic, gestural and cognitive: there is no language in 
itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng of dialects, 
patois, slangs and specialised languages. There is no ideal speaker-
listener, any more than there is a homogenous linguistic community. 
(Deleuze nd Guattari, 1987, p. 7) 
There are several important things to note here. A rhizome, characterised by the line as 
opposed to the point, establishes connections between linguistic zones, which are kept 
separate by tree-like thought. By the same token, rhizomatic thinking brings certain 
aspects of language "the perceptive, mimetic, gestural and cognitive", which are 
ignored by traditional linguistic models, to the forefront. We are therefore encouraged 
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to think of language in terms of intensities as well as "meaning". The linguistic 
universals formulated in traditional grammar are replaced by an understanding of 
language, which celebrates its multiplicity of "dialects, patois, slangs and specialised 
languages". Perhaps more than this, we might say that the "standard" forms of 
language enact a kind of tree-like violence against the forest of languages. Multiple 
languages are "forced" outside to continue their rhizomatic behaviours around the roots 
of the dominant "standard language". This is why Deleuze and Guattari argue that 
conventional linguistic models do not represent "a method for the people" whereas, "a 
method of the rhizome type, on the contrary, can analyse language only by decentring 
it onto other dimensions and other registers. A language is "never closed in on itself, 
except as a function of impotence" (p. 8) 
A Rhizomatic Education 
I am well aware that so far this account of rhizomatic thinking might appear rather 
abstract. Hopefully, by making these ideas work in an educational context, the force of 
Deleuze and Guattari's work on the rhizome will come through. Let us consider two 
scenes from schooling. They are both Classics lessons, and if we think about them in a 
tree-like way, it might be said that they are both teaching the same thing, namely, the 
use of hyperbole in classical texts. The first scene depicts a lesson that coheres to the 
model of good teaching I alluded to earlier when discussing the tree-like structure of 
the contemporary school. 
Scene 1 
A Classics teacher enters the room and writes his outcomes on the board which read: 
Outcomes: All students will be able to understand "hyperbole" in 
Classical texts and attempt some examples of their own. Some of the 
students will be able to produce excellent examples of hyperbole. 
Having put his objectives on the board, he gives a PowerPoint presentation, which 
both explains what hyperbole means and provides some easily palatable examples. The 
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class are then required to provide their own examples of hyperbole. The teacher then 
informs the class that he is going to read a section from a simplified version of The 
Iliad. He informs the class that he will improvise some sections and involve the 
students in the improvisation. When they come across examples of hyperbole, they must 
record them to demonstrate understanding of the concept. The class become engaged 
in drama activities and perform their examples at the end of the lesson. The teacher 
conducts a plenary session in which the class provide feedback on what they have 
learnt. 
The description of the lesson in Scene 1 demonstrates what many teachers would 
consider to be the strengths of modem pedagogy. The teacher has provided 
"scaffolding" for the students learning, by providing a step-by-step introduction of the 
subject matter. The students are made to demonstrate their involvement in the lesson 
by constructing their own examples of hyperbole and recording instances from the text. 
The plenary session provides a means for "monitoring" learning. Auditory, visual and 
kinaesthetic learners needs are accommodated. 
The next scene I want to look at possesses none of the "qualities" described above. 
Scene 2 
A mature and highly experienced Classics teacher is teaching Year 7 students a 
simplified version of The Iliad. His lesson follows a structure, which he tends to employ 
for the majority of his lessons. This involves the reading of the story (he has written his 
own version), embellished by moments in which the teacher veers off into other stories 
and areas pertaining to related myths. The class will, on occasions be asked to 
participate. They will often have to perform a written task at the end of the lesson. His 
knowledge of the subject is vast and detailed. Eventually he describes the first battle 
between the Greeks and Trojans. He addresses the class: "How many Trojans did the 
great Agamemnon slay?" The first student puts her hand up: "Twelve?" "More" 
replies the teacher. A second student offers a number: "one hundred?" and receives a 
louder "More!" for his trouble. This goes on for a while, the intensity grows, but the 
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teacher refuses to offer a final number. He stops at three hundred and moves on with a 
cursory "it was too many to count". 
The current performative approach to pedagogy would find this teacher's approach to 
be far too teacher led and insufficiently "student centred". Could the teacher 
empirically demonstrate that all the children were listening, that they were actively 
involved? Certainly not. Were the students doing something that could be observed and 
measured? No! The lesson certainly did not cater for kinaesthetic learners, as the whole 
class remained rooted to their seats. One might well assume that this lesson, had it been 
observed by an inspector, would have received nothing better than the grade 
"satisfactory" if that. 
Despite (In spite of) the fact that the lesson described in scene 2 failed to conform to 
the criteria, which make up a good lesson (in accordance with the current orthodoxy), I 
imagine that few observers would deny that something special had taken place. This 
"special" quality derives from what we might call an intensity, which displaces the 
question/answer dialectic. The teacher is asking a question which cannot be answered 
and resolved by any happy unity or resolution. Indeed, the whole point of the question 
is that it cannot be satisfactorily answered except by hyperbole. In a sense language 
here ceases to signify (in straightforward terms) and words become "asignifying 
particles"—"meaning" as such becomes a secondary concern—the counting is 
"pointless". However, we should also note that this does not mean that nothing has 
been taught—the students "learn" rather than "learn about" hyperbole; they are caught 
up in hyperbolic intensity. In Scene 1, the abstraction of the concept from its examples 
leads to a mechanical approach to hyperbole that breaks up the flow of its rhetorical 
force. The powerful aspects of Scene 2 derive from a situation during which, there are 
no roots to cling to. Intensity is generated by the fact that the class is somehow "in the 
middle" in two senses; the scene both takes place in the middle of the lesson, but also, 
due to the lack of a structuring apparatus it is "in the middle" in a more abstract or 
teleological sense. Might we not call this an instance of rhizomatic teaching? 
It is clear that teaching and learning should and could not always be like scene 2 and is 
not my intention to enact a dramatic reversal by castigating the teacher in Scene 1 
simply because their approach reflects the very embodiment of performativity. The 
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teacher in Scene 2 does not prepare the students at all for what they are about to 
witness. By the same token he does not provide them with an explanation of what he is 
doing. Some students may have a sense of what he is doing but lack the ability to 
explain/represent it. Others may be utterly confused. They would almost certainly be 
suspicious about whether or not one man could kill all those people—surely it would 
be possible to count them. Whether the students have some inkling of what is going on, 
or are utterly confused is in a sense immaterial. Their imaginations have been 
stimulated because they cannot feel mastery over what they have just witnessed. They 
are involved in a "becoming". This kind of experience is occluded from contemporary 
pedagogy, yet surely students should have the opportunity to know what it is like to be 
"all at sea". 
Is an Intense Education Elitist? 
When I gave a paper on trees and rhizomes at the Gregynog Philosophy of Education 
Conference, one of the delegates suggested that the notion of a rhizomatic education 
had an elitist aspect to it. This was probably not helped by the fact that my educational 
examples dealt with classics lessons. One might argue that it is all very well to imagine 
an education which involves an intense experience unencumbered by a structuring 
apparatus, when the students are already reasonably well balanced, able to control their 
behaviour and sufficiently intelligent to deal with the disorientating aspects of learning 
that does not proceed in accordance with measured stages, but what about children who 
may be less equipped to handle this kind of thing? A flippant response to this issue 
would be to simply acknowledge the fact that if it only has implications for bright 
willing students then at least "they" might benefit from an intense education. Of 
course, the problem that then arises relates to who exactly will feel sufficiently 
confident to teach in this way given the closed economy of fear that serves to disable 
so many teachers. As mentioned in Chapter 1, I recall the resistance put up by former 
colleagues when they were asked to teach A-level English. The colleagues in question 
were new to the profession—they were all extremely hard-working teachers who spent 
most of their evenings planning lessons and creating resources. It was not the extra 
workload that frightened them, but the perception that they would have to teach more 
difficult material and this would involve the kinds of interaction with students that 
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could not easily be incorporated into fast-paced tasks. Thinking that this would be well 
received they asked if they could take on more difficult classes. 
Regardless of whether or not a rhizomatic/intense education may be provided to more 
able students, it would seem remiss to ignore the possibility that an intense education 
might be available to all. I want to begin by providing what is perhaps a particularly 
extreme example of the ways in which contemporary approaches to teaching and 
learning with their focus on structure and scaffolding can lead to some very strange 
practices. Let us consider this scene. 
Scene 3 
A man came from the local education authority to provide training to members of staff 
at a secondary school. One part of this training day was devoted to providing ideas for 
teaching GCSE (14-16) poetry to students in lower sets (lower sets are often composed 
of academically weak students and/or students whose behaviour is deemed to be 
detrimental to other's learning). As is quite typical of these occasions, the advisor 
began by reminding the teachers of the importance of catering for different learning 
styles—kinaesthetic, auditory and visual. He then demonstrated how one might 
accommodate the needs of different learners when studying the poem "Vultures" from 
the Poems from Other Cultures section of the GCSE. One of the figures presented in 
the poem is the commandant at Auschwitz. The commandant is presented in the poem 
as a loving family man and the poem clearly wishes to address the moral complexity of 
his situation. In the first task (designed to accommodate kinaesthetic learners) the 
teachers were asked to leave their seats and imagine a line between two poles (chairs) 
representing absolute good and absolute evil. The line incorporated a numerical 
system in which 1 represented absolute goodness and 10 absolute evil. The teachers 
were then asked to grade the commandant at Auschwitz to determine his position on 
the scale. 
The perceived strengths of performing this task are that it will make the poem's moral 
dilemma clear to students who will otherwise not be able to understand it. The fact that 
they have to place themselves on a line will help students focus on the task and 
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hopefully remember it. Now of course, it is easy to criticise this presentation of 
morality as overly simplistic and reductive, but might we not see it as a platform for 
developing a more sophisticated moral understanding. It is hard to see how this would 
work. To make this task convincing the teacher will have to present the notions of 
absolute good and evil as somehow representative of real states. The same thing goes 
for the numerical scale that bridges them. To build on this picture would be to dismiss 
it entirely and this would surely be more confusing for the students. If we leave things 
to stand this would imply that we our content with the idea that our students visualise 
and understand moral judgements in accordance with this model. What is perhaps most 
interesting about scene 3 is that it nicely indicates what Deleuze says about Nietzsche's 
understanding of knowledge and force. 
The force that appropriates the figure of the commandant and places him on a scale 
between absolute good and absolute evil derives from the fear that things will not be 
understood and this failure of understanding will be particularly dramatic for 
kinaesthetic learners. Of course, if we take Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche as it is 
presented above seriously, then we might simply say that the good and evil scale is 
simply one way of understanding the moral dilemma that the figure of the commandant 
confronts us with. However, Nietzsche treatment of forces is not neutral and 
relativistic. Nietzsche notes that certain objects have affinities with different forces: 
"Up to now we have presented things as if different forces struggled over and took 
successive possession of an almost inert object. But the object itself is expression of a 
force. This is why there is more or less affinity between the object and the force that 
takes possession of it." (Deleuze, 2005, p. 13) We might therefore argue that 
understanding the moral status of the commandant once caught in the grip of an 
inadequate force serves to create a picture of understanding which attempts to gain 
clarity from something that is obviously not clear and easy to handle. 
The scene above is perhaps absurd but its absurdities are certainly not uncommon. 
However, it will not silence objections to the elitist objections to an intense form of 
teaching and learning that accompany a more moderate take on contemporary 
pedagogy. Let us take seriously for a few moments, the possibility that the 
performative pedagogy with its targets, fast-paced tasks, learning objectives and the 
mass of behavioural and assessment strategies actually represents an approach to 
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learning that provides a form, however impoverished, of justice for children who seem 
either unable to behave in ways deemed socially acceptable or have difficulty with 
academic work (often the two things go together). Children who don't behave well 
often find it hard to concentrate—learning objectives will provide a focus that keeps 
their minds on what they're doing, short, energetic, fast-paced tasks will serve the same 
function—the children do not have time to become distracted and are constantly 
stimulated. As a result, they do not try to fight one another. Even if we think that all the 
talk of learning styles is a lot of nonsense, it might make a good deal of sense to get 
children who have, to use a common English expression, ants in their pants, to move 
around the classroom rather than insisting that they suffer the purgatory of being told to 
remain rooted to their seats. As regards the academically challenged students, 
scaffolding, in which knowledge is built on from very simple beginnings will give 
them confidence and enable them to progress. Surely if such students are thrown into 
the midst of things then they will simply not understand what is going on and are 
therefore more likely to misbehave out of fear, resentment and frustration. 
If we take seriously the issues presented above, then we come to see that "intensity" 
seems to feature quite prominently. It is undeniable that the students described above 
bring a great deal of intensity into the classroom with them. Often students who find 
school difficult will have suffered almost unimaginable forms of abuse and neglect in 
their home lives. The anger and resentment this produces is not a form of intensity to 
be lightly dismissed. One might argue, and many do, that a heavily structured 
classroom environment that is open to differentiated needs will provide the structure 
and care that is lacking. In effect the classroom becomes (or so it might seem) a benign 
space that neutralises negative intensities. It might also be argued that such a space 
need not be so antiseptic as to work to the detriment of a form of intense learning 
experience even if this is a "counterfeit of education". Perhaps the fast-paced lessons 
provide such an experience even if it is an impoverished controlled version of that 
experience. The contemporary classroom might therefore be seen as the space that 
neutralises negative intensities and suffuses students with positive energy that is 
prevented from going awry by the structuring apparatus that has been put in place. 
Of course, the picture presented above is not couched in the feverish discourse of the 
teaching and learning guru. Rather, it represents a more measured approach to aspects 
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of modern teaching and learning that simply face up to practical realities. Although, I 
have some sympathy with this position (I have taught children who were extremely 
challenging), there is something wholly depressing about it. Children whose terrible 
circumstances have made them say no to life are then represented with the systematic 
reinforcement of a "no" to their every move. There is no real engagement with the 
children here, but rather an attempt to "manage" them. For Nietzsche, affirming life is 
not an easy task as it involves saying "yes" to both what is pleasurable and painful in 
life. 
Perhaps it will be useful here to bring in another image—Nietzsche's image of the 
dicethrow. Nietzsche presents the dicethrow as taking place on two distinct tables, the 
earth and the sky. The earth where the dice are thrown, and the sky where the dice fall 
back. To know how to play the game properly means to affirm chance— a bad player 
counts on several throws of the dice, on a great number of throws. In this way he 
makes use of causality and probability to produce a combination that he sees as 
desirable. He posits this combination as an end to be obtained, hidden by causality. 
Such players are "Timid, ashamed, awkward, like a tiger whose leap has failed. But 
what of that you dicethrowers! You who have not learned to play and mock as a man 
ought to play and mock" (Deleuze, 2005, p. 14). 
Playing and mocking, affirming chance, what might these things mean in the context of 
teaching and learning? To provide a dinky formula would somehow defy the point, it 
would not be in the spirit of the game. However, to tell a story might be more 
appropriate. 
Scene 4 
Before I joined the teaching profession, I went to observe lessons in a local school. I 
arrived late to the lesson I want to describe, as I had to walk across half the school 
following an earlier observation. On entering the room the room, I felt as though I had 
encountered a world of chaos. There was a tremendous amount of noise, the teacher 
was talking, half the class were talking, several students were grabbing the teacher 
around the waist—there seemed to be movement wherever you looked. The board was 
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covered in writing, but unlike the other lessons I observed, there were no learning 
objectives. It was hard to avoid the thought that I might have been sent here to see an 
example of "bad practice". However, it quickly became apparent that the students were 
working, just not all at the same time and in the same way. Those who were hugging 
the teacher were waiting for help, which he provided as soon as he's finished talking to 
another group. Sometimes the teacher was discussing the lesson with students, at other 
points he was engaging in banter with the "naughty kids" yet this was both 
linguistically creative and funny. If it looked like it might go too far, the teacher simply 
turned his attention elsewhere. Not everyone in the class was doing the same thing, 
"differentiation" was in place, yet the students were evidently not sitting in rigidly 
designed attainment groups—if they needed help they knew who could help them and 
this was not always the teacher. The lesson was clearly not organised according to a 
three-part structure—everything just seemed to flow and move along at different 
speeds. 
What is so interesting about this lesson, it neither looks like an old-fashioned teacher-
led lesson, nor the kind of "modern" lesson described above, yet it clearly takes things 
from both models. The teacher could ask lengthy questions or give detailed responses 
to questions, but did not require silence to do this. People were moving around the 
room but not in a rigidly controlled manner. The lesson clearly built on previous work, 
but not in a way that could be characterised by a discrete series of lessons that formed a 
scheme of work. The lesson ebbed and flowed. It took on board plurality yet it was one 
shimmering entity. Students were not always "on task" yet they returned to their work 
after they'd asked the teacher or their peers for help. Of course, the teacher could not 
be sure that this was going on—I could only be sure because I was not teaching—yet 
this did not frighten him—he had thrown the dice and they came back to him because 
he believed they would. 
Conclusion 
I am not for one moment suggesting that rhizomatic or intense pedagogies must 
resemble the lesson described above. Intensity takes different forms—it doesn't have to 
be loud. For teachers to simply use this as some kind of template would also miss the 
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point. What I have tried to show is that the current pedagogical norms stifle teachers, 
and students alike. Such stifling can pertain to knowledge, to behaviour and to the flow 
from one sphere of life into another. I am also not arguing that teachers should simply 
let things happen—some structures will invariably be put in place, yet those structures 
can be flexible positions from which teachers have the confidence to throw the dice 
and affirm chance. 
Having been a teacher, I anticipate certain problems my former peers might have with 
some of the arguments presented above. Perhaps we might say that the tree-like 
structures in place in the school and lesson are the only thing preventing the students 
from going berserk. Might we not say that, in certain areas, many students lead 
rhizomatic existences, with no parental discipline, often living in two or more houses, 
spending half the night on the street destroying everything that comes into their path. 
Surely we owe these students a sense of order, a tree to cling to when they are not 
forced to burrow around outside. 
Although I have some sympathy for this position, I feel that it assumes and often 
generates a deficit model, failing to see that sometimes the tree-like structures are the 
very things that cause the students to rebel and wreak havoc. Again, I anticipate a 
certain objection. Classrooms are not the rigid, silent places they once were. In the 
name of auditory learning, children are regularly encouraged to discuss their ideas with 
one another. For the benefit of kinaesthetic learners, students often get to move around 
and discover things in the classroom. However, the cold theorising that accompanies 
"learning styles" and "outcomes" based approaches, serves to strangle intensities, 
diluting the force and range of experience that might characterise a fulfilling and 
stimulating form of education. Do we really want our students to be afraid of the 
water? 
The fear that accompanies a rhizomatic/intense pedagogy derives from the fact that it 
would not proceed in accordance with a stage by stage process that links back to some 
originary point—the end would not predetermined—we have the fear of the void. 
Because a structuring apparatus is lacking we have the fear of confusion—how will 
children cope if their knowledge has not been "scaffolded"? The lack of a 
predetermined structure may produce confusion if the teacher does not subdivide the 
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lesson into neat building blocks, yet in the name of intensity this confusion is affirmed. 
If students have difficulties these are dealt with in the moment and become part of the 
rhizome. The teacher would neither be facilitating learning nor imparting knowledge, 
but would be part of a process in which, following Blake et al., knowledge is not a 
coherent separate object, but is drawn and shaped by the intense classroom 
experience—there is no divide between Apollonian reason and Dionysiac intensity. 
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Conclusion 
During the course of this thesis, we have looked at various ways in which ideas 
concerning performatives and performativity might have something to say to 
education. In this concluding chapter, I want to do attend to some comparisons and 
contrasts. This will perhaps serve the ends of clarity and allow the indication of one or 
two preferences. I use the word "preferences" here slightly guardedly. In a sense 
preferences have already been expressed (for Lyotard's agonistics over Habermas's 
consensus, Butler's "magic" over Bourdieu's, Cavell's passion over narrow analytic 
accounts of the moral life). To speak of preferences is to do one's best to steer clear of 
the Socratism that Nietzsche railed against. Moreover, I am not for one minute 
suggesting that philosophers such as Habermas, Bourdieu and Hand have nothing 
interesting to say to education. Indeed, I hope I have not given the opposite impression 
during the course of the thesis. The attempt to do philosophy of education presented 
here bears some relation to what Cavell describes in this fragment, which appears in 
Philosophy The Day After Tomorrow, a book that is dedicated to "praise": 
As for Chapter 8, on Wittgenstein, its mode is characteristic of the way 
I am moved to philosophize, or wish to be moved to philosophize, 
namely non-polemically or non-argumentatively. This does not mean 
that I agree with everything that I find calls for a response, but rather it 
means that criticism in my writing often tends either to invoke the idea 
Kant established for "critique," namely articulating the conditions 
which allow a coherent utterance to be made, or a purposeful action to 
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enter the world, or else to provide an explication or elaboration of a 
text—sometimes of the merest fragment, sometimes one of my own—
that accounts for, at its best increases, which is to say appreciates, my 
interest in it. Elaborates it philosophically, I would say. What is that to 
say? (Cavell, 2005, p. 4) 
What is that to say? Cavell's avoidance of polemic is what we might call an inclusive 
(though hardly acritical) approach to philosophising, which appeals to be heard and 
responds to appeals to be heard. This is also the aim of this thesis. 
Towards the end of "Performative and Passionate Utterance" Cavell makes it clear 
what he "wants" from philosophy, namely that "we shall not stop at what we should or 
ought to say, nor at what we may say and do say, but take in what we must and dare 
not say, or have it at heart to say, or are too confused or too tame or wild or terrorized 
to say or to think to say" (p. 185). Here Cavell appears to be saying that an 
acknowledgement of passion and the perlocutionary effect of the utterance are as 
relevant to a moral way of philosophising as to moral encounters in general. This is 
because these factors relate to an openness in which ideas will not be silenced. It is as 
though Cavell were suggesting that a certain illocutionary force surrounded particular 
approaches to philosophy, inhibiting them. He does not say as much, but following his 
recognition that his treatment of the passionate utterance might be thought by some to 
occupy the realm of psychoanalysis (an area typically of much interest to philosophers 
classed as "continental thinkers") he appears to be alluding to the schism between 
analytic and continental philosophy: 
It is little help in this work, to my mind, to take reassurance from the 
supposed fact (on certain readings of Austin and the later Wittgenstein) 
that language is public, that it is shared. This prompts us to avoid 
seeking sociably to provide help and example sufficient to make it 
public, to see it shared, the first step toward which might be, as in 
Wittgenstein, and in Freud, to recognise when it has become private. 
(ibid.) 
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In various ways many of the philosophers presented in this thesis clearly share Cavell's 
desire to see philosophy in broad terms. After all, Austin might seem to be a strange 
choice of ally (or opponent) for the likes of Derrida and Butler. Yet clearly they have 
engaged with a tradition outside the realms of their familiar remit and seen something 
powerful in it. The extent to which the engagement is reciprocated is the questionable. 
Of course, this thesis tends to favour what is generally referred to as Continental 
philosophy, but at the same time analytic philosophers such as Strawson, Grice and 
Searle are included here—their voices are part of the discourse of the thesis. I am not 
trying to trump their ideas as if we were at an imaginary philosophy themed private 
gentlemen's club (that philosophy can sometimes seem like such a club says something 
about the state of the discipline). Rather, I have tried to bring out (make public?) the 
aporias and gaps in that philosophy. I believe (to use Habermas's phrase to apply to 
him and others) that they have taken a "wrong turn". I have tried to show how this 
"wrong turn" is largely the result of a failure to take on board the rhetorical aspects of 
our being in the world and the possibilities these aspects engender. 
In this spirit, in the forthcoming pages I will consider the relative merits of the various 
philosophies that have thus far been championed (to a greater or lesser extent). This 
will not result in the elimination of various ideas until my pawn becomes a queen. 
Rather there are some uncomfortable aspects to some of the philosophies presented so 
far that I want to return to or bring out. 
Compare and Contrast 
Let us begin with Butler and Cavell. Having considered Butler's and Cavell's 
philosophies, we see that in rather different ways their attempts to extend (or depart 
from) Austin's theory of the performative utterance represent resistances to moralism. 
By recognising the iterability of language, Butler draws attention to the 
creative/destructive aspects of language, which is to say that words may "do" just as 
they may "do us in". Cavell, with his discussion of perlocutions, demonstrates how the 
unconventional aspects of language make room for the expressive aspects of moral 
exchange—to ignore such aspects can only lead to moralism. Of course, in different 
ways, they also reframe epistemological questions in regard to moral theory. For 
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Butler, "truth" and knowledge claims are coterminous with performative discourses, 
whereas Cavell recognises the limited relevance of epistemological concerns in regard 
to moral issues. Both writers have important things to say about moral education in its 
most general sense, and, as I hope to show, about moral education in the context of 
schooling (not that these areas should be regarded as distinctive realms). 
To develop what has already been said, it might be helpful at this point to provide an 
example (taken from the hurly-burly of life) that demonstrates the complex aspects of 
the moral universe (conceived of in linguistic terms) that Butler and Cavell are, in 
different ways, trying to capture and expose. It should be noted that the example we are 
about to consider is rather typical of recent approaches to "racist" language within the 
British media. Two tears ago, a contestant on the reality television show "Big Brother" 
(a Channel 4 programme on British television) was removed from the programme 
following her use of the term "nigger" to a black housemate. It should be noted that the 
woman in question meant no harm when using this word—it was a term that she and 
her friends commonly used due to its frequent appearance in the black American music 
that they listened to. Although the programme-makers were obviously aware of the 
context, it was felt that the term's inappropriateness should lead to her being removed. 
Subsequently the woman was hounded by reporters and vilified in the press. 
It is tempting to applaud Channel 4's handling of this matter—especially in view of its 
contrast with British television's rather murky (if distant) past as regards racist 
programming. Indeed, from a legalistic standpoint on racism one might say that the 
woman was simply wrong to have used the word at all. However, this seems overly 
dramatic given the context. Indeed one can hardly avoid thinking about context here—
what if a black contestant had used the word? However, simply to invoke context also 
seems to miss the point: the woman who was on the receiving end of the word was 
clearly shaken by it, although not horrified—she knew that nobody was trying to insult 
or abuse her. Might we, following Butler, say that her shock may derive from the fact 
that the word "nigger" carries its old horrific contexts with it, in spite of her modest 
reaction derived from the "dilution" of the term due to its appearances in contemporary 
culture? We might also say that the expulsion from the show of the woman who had 
used the term represented something of a disaster for moral education. Had she 
remained then the kind of passionate exchange celebrated by Cavell may have been on 
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show for millions of viewers to engage with. Instead, speech was stultified. The 
difficult things that needed saying were left unsaid. 
So far I have presented Butler's and Cavell's ideas as distinct and possibly 
complementary—as though these writers simply looked at language and morality from 
different perspectives, as though together they completed the circle. However, though 
both Cavell and Butler have important things to say about the moral life, it is important 
to note that a certain dissonance comes into play when their arguments are drawn 
together. For both writers, Austin's project is diminished by his fixation with 
illocutions. For Butler this is at the expense of locutions, for Cavell, perlocutions. 
However, it might be argued that Cavell's project begins one stage too late—by 
focusing on what is done "by" words, Cavell forgets about the words themselves. 
When Butler recognises how unstable locutions are, this impacts on the illocutionary 
force and perlocutionary effects of language. In her account of performativity, Butler 
presents language as a disorderly machine, but a machine nonetheless. The expressive 
voice that Cavell introduces has no real place in this schema. Does this entail that 
Cavell's project is misguided, that he is guilty of privileging the voice and indulging in 
phonocentrism? 
To take this view would be a radical misrepresentation of Cavell's argument. Like 
Austin, Cavell believes that we "indulge" in language—we are what we say. To see 
things in this light is not phonocentric—phonocentrism implies some kind of 
separation between thoughts/ideas and language. This separation does not feature in 
Cavell's philosophical writing. Rather, he makes room for individual expression 
recognising that whilst we speak language, it speaks us. Cavell's account of passionate 
utterance can therefore incorporate iterability into the picture as that which is 
coterminous with expression. We might say that Butler's performativity requires 
sustenance from Cavell's passion 
Whereas Butler's argument regarding performativity has an important historical 
dimension, her foray into language still represents the cold form of theorising of which 
Cavell is suspicious. Moreover, Butler's overly "theoretical" account represents a 
world-view that has attracted a popular following, a movement if you like. In contrast, 
Cavell's philosophy is rather resistant to "theorizing", if "theorizing" means standing 
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back from the world and therefore not engaging with lived bodily experience—it is 
there that the moral life resides. This is not a disavowal of political responsibility, but a 
more cautious and ultimately more searching approach to ethical and political matters. 
My preference for Cavell's moral philosophy will hopefully become clear when we 
consider the role that Butler and Cavell's thinking might play within the setting of 
formal schooling. To illustrate the significance of their ideas it is helpful to consider an 
educational scene that shows what is at stake. The reader may remember this scene 
from Chapter 4. In British schooling, there is a legal requirement to provide training on 
racism. I shall describe a session on the subject of racism given at a high school: 
A speaker was brought in to give a presentation on racism. He began by providing by a 
series of definitions that prescribe what ethnicity, race, racism and racist behaviour 
mean. The manner of delivery involved the speaker questioning the audience as to what 
they thought racism was, followed by the right answer; the answer that was defined by 
law. Both question and answer appeared in a PowerPoint presentation; the latter 
magically appeared to create the effect of a moment of illumination. Once the teachers 
had been fully briefed on various definitions the talk moved on to the various things 
they should "do" about racism. This involved two notable forms of behaviour on their 
part. Firstly, they discovered that it was a legal requirement that they officially record 
every instance of racism if it conformed to the legal definition of that term. Secondly, 
they were encouraged not to punish the perpetrator of the offence (the speaker's 
words) but to discuss the issue with them. 
Considered from a Cavellian perspective, it is apparent that the speaker makes an 
unquestioning appeal to convention and works with a supposedly purely 
epistemological understanding of moral issues As noted above, moral education (in the 
most general sense of the teiiii) requires the constant possibility of exchange. Yet the 
legalistic discourse of this speaker stands above the kinds of ordinary exchange that 
could take place in the classroom. It fails to account for the ways in which views on 
racism are passionately held by students and puts an enforced consensus in place, 
whereby students are not permitted to find out where they stand—to give or withhold 
assent. If we are to do justice to our students, then recognising the importance of 
"commitment, or an expression of assent" does not celebrate chaos (a fear which is 
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surely endemic to the speaker's discourse). Rather, it will represent the difficult task of 
promoting shared entry into a common world. 
There is more to say about this scene regarding Cavell's thoughts on passionate 
utterance, and we shall come back to this shortly. In the meantime let us consider again 
(as we did in Chapter 4) how Butler's understanding of performativity problematises 
the speaker's approach. 
As Butler argues, the ethical dimension of performativity is bound up with iterability, 
whereby we are not controlled or constructed by language in any absolute sense. 
Trying to provide a legal context to shore up the meaning of racist behaviour should 
not and will not limit the contexts within which the discussion can take place. In 
recognising the iterability of language we move toward a very different approach to 
racial issues. Here, rather than making the assumption that certain behaviour must 
always and all times be offensive, teachers might ask questions about how offensive 
behaviour works. As noted in Chapter 4, they might conduct experiments long the lines 
of "blue eyes, brown eyes". 
This is all well and good, but talking about what the teacher might do here seems to 
encourage a rather formulaic approach to how teachers go about their work in the 
classroom. Although it is clearly important that moral education takes on board the 
historical and linguistic aspects of racism, there is a sense in which Butler's approach 
to performativity may become too conventional when incorporated into educational 
settings (this has already happened in Gender Studies). It is possible, if slightly far-
fetched, to imagine a training day in which Butler's performativity might be presented 
(and over-simplified) in a PowerPoint presentation so as to "illuminate" racial issues. 
The "blue eyes, brown eyes" film might be shown to teachers to illustrate how Butler's 
ideas might be incorporated into the classroom. Though this would certainly be an 
improvement on the kind of "training" offered by the speaker, "training" is perhaps not 
what is called for. 
During my time working in a high school, I recall supervising a trainee teacher on her 
first teaching practice who decided to attempt the "blue eyes, brown eyes" experiment 
with my class. Despite taking the courageous decision to engage in this activity, the 
198 
student became nervous, and decided to give the game away by explaining what she 
was about to do before conducting the experiment33. Of course, this made the whole 
thing rather pointless, yet the student's choice shows something interesting. Her 
insecurities were perhaps justified—she would have had to put herself on the line and 
possibly face all manner of rebuff To conduct that experiment properly involves entry 
into dark and difficult territory recognising (to paraphrase parts of Cavell's 7th 
condition for perlocutions) that at any point the students might contest your invitation 
to exchange or deny that they had any standing with you. What is so interesting about 
the "blue eyes, brown eyes" experiment is that it is not something that one can be 
"trained" to carry out. What I mean is that it requires a level of experience, practical 
judgement and confidence that cannot be simply passed on in formulaic terms. It 
cannot be planned for if planning amounts to containment. It cannot be delivered in a 
Power Point presentation. 
Part of what is so disturbing about the speaker on racism's presentation is the 
"magical" illuminating quality that PowerPoint seems to give his words. This type of 
approach can formally inhibit the kinds of exchange that Cavell champions by 
smoothing over the difficult aspects of communication and silencing the voices that 
demand to be heard. There is therefore perhaps something potentially sinister about 
teaching/training through PowerPoint—the lure of this technology is that it gives the 
teacher/trainer something to hide behind, the sort of mask that Austin expresses such 
disdain for. Of course, Austin's mistake is to associate political screening or 
manipulation with the entire perlocutionary realm, as well perhaps as being sometimes 
stuck, so it would seem, with the present indicative active. 
By taking on perlocutions Cavell enters where Austin fears to tread—into the realm of 
the disorderly, blood(i)ed life of language. In choosing this path, he presents a 
treatment of language that veers away from the kinds of thinking that might be 
illuminated on a screen and the bleak form of power that this represents. Indeed, if 
there are pedagogical lessons to be learnt from Cavell's treatment of expression, they 
relate to an attitude towards teaching and learning that is radically at odds with the 
form of "effectiveness" that PowerPoint provides and symbolically endorses. Iterability 
33 I want to note that I am not suggesting that this experiment is wholly unproblematic. There are 
clearly some strong ethical objections to conducting it. It might be seen as cruel and/or patronising. 
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may play its part here. In "Democratic Participation and the Body Politic", Standish 
argues that difficult forms of exchange are important in the development of a moral 
education. Through such exchange, children will come to recognise that they cannot 
"fall back on any secure sense of identity. . . Against the ready-made possibilities of 
identity that are offered to them—indeed, against the idea of a stable identity itself—
they must come to accept its deferral, to recognise that an identity must be more 
carefully, and more painfully worked out" (Standish 2005b, p. 384). Here iterability 
enters the picture—our lack of absolute control over identity (which is subject to the 
dynamic forces within language) will unnerve us. The ways in which we learn to deal 
with this will enrich our moral lives. 
By arguing for the superiority (and inclusiveness) of Cavell's vision, I am not 
dismissing the importance of alerting children to the performative aspect of race. 
However, this must necessarily involve a recognition of and indulgence in the 
expressive engagement that has characterised and may continue to characterise the 
struggle for racial equality. 
Butler's treatment of performativity and Cavell's passionate utterance bring attention 
to the linguistic complexities of the moral life. As we saw in Chapter 5, such 
complexities are often elided within the philosophy of education in favour of 
epistemological considerations concerning, for example, whether certain issues may be 
thought of as controversial. Such theorising invariably stands at a distance from the 
lived linguistic life of the classroom. If we are to respond to the "worldly" issues of 
performance and passion, then we must give up PowerPoint thinking and give way to 
philosophical force. 
Derrida and Cavell 
As I have expressed a preference here for Cavell's philosophy over Butler's, the reader 
might expect that sentiment to extend to a preference for Cavell to Derrida. After all, 
Derrida's account of iterability provides the bedrock for Butler's discussion. However, 
things are not, I think, so straightforward. Derrida's philosophy differs from Butler's in 
important ways. For a start, it deals with more general issues to do with language per 
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se. Moreover, there is no sense in which Derrida is trying to develop a "social theory". 
A resistance to theorising characterises the work of Lyotard, Derrida, Cavell and 
Deleuze. In this sense, if a preference is to be put forward it is for the work of these 
four philosophers. Reservations about Lyotard will be discussed later in the chapter. 
In the meantime, it is worth noting a strange relationship between Cavell and Derrida's 
philosophy. Cavell's decision to treat the literariness of philosophical writing resonates 
strongly with Derrida's consideration of the irony that emanates from the work of 
philosophers who adopt literary methods to castigate or belittle writing. In the case of 
Austin, Cavell notes the former's "somewhat manic tone reporting his discovery of a 
type of utterance that neither is nonsense or true or false" (Cavell, p.160). Referring to 
Ayer's Language Truth and Logic, Cavell writes: "(it appeared in 1936); in my edition 
from ten years later, a new Introduction by Ayer excuses the young man's passion in 
the writing of the text but reaffirms the belief 'that the point of view it expresses is 
substantially correct'.)" (p. 162) 
Though there are some parallels, the "expressive" tone in Cavell's writing speaks of a 
"personal" engagement with philosophy that Derrida would arguably have little time 
for. To note this "personal" quality is not, as discussed above, to accuse Cavell of 
phonocentrism. It might however point to a something of the order of "authenticity" 
that Cavell's philosophy gestures toward. There seems to be a lot of talk of the "self', 
of what "I" do, in Cavell that would, I think, seem strange to Derrida, a Levinasian at 
heart. Then again, I am probably being unfair to Cavell. It might be helpful at this point 
to draw a limited analogy between Cavell's and Charles Taylor's approaches to ethics. 
In arguing against the cold dispassionate role of autonomy that characterises certain 
analytic readings of the moral life, Taylor shows how a sense of self gained through 
recognising what I am responsible for is both dependent on exchanges with other 
people and the horizon of significance (socio-cultural norms) that provide their 
background. In a sense, we might see Cavell's development of Austin's argument (in 
the direction of exchange) as a contribution within the philosophy of language that 
leads to similar conclusions. However things are not quite as straightforward as this. 
Consider these remarks by Taylor on authenticity: 
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Briefly, we can say that [on the one hand] authenticity (A) involves (i) 
creation and construction as well as discovery, (ii) originality, and 
frequently (iii) opposition to the rules of society and even potentially to 
what we recognize as morality. But it is also true, as we saw, that [on 
the other hand] it (B) requires (i) openness to horizons of significance . 
. . and (ii) a self-definition in dialogue. That these demands may be in 
tension has to be allowed. But what must be wrong is a simple 
privileging of one over the other, of [the active dimension] (A), say, at 
the expense of [the passive dimension] (B), or vice versa. (Taylor, 
1991, p. 24) 
A crucial difference here between Cavell and Taylor (besides the fact that Cavell has 
nothing directly to say about authenticity) is that, for the latter, the creative aspects of 
our moral encounters are associated with individual creativity, whereas "self-
definition" in dialogue is represented as a containing/conventional aspect of moral 
encounters. In contrast, for Cavell, the creative individualised aspects of the moral life 
require exchange. Just as Taylor dilutes the individualistic aspects of rational autonomy 
and authenticity (conceived in a Sartrean sense) by emphasising the importance of our 
relationship to both others and the world, he still retains an opposition between the 
individual actor and her social environment. In contrast, for Cavell the individual 
aspects of speech are dissimulated through its unpredictable unconventional aspect. 
Austin's recognition that the self constitutes itself linguistically and publicly is still part 
of Cavell's plan, but, as Mulhall (Mulhall, 2006) notes, it has been subject to a sea 
change by embracing perlocutions. The "self' presented by Cavell here is perhaps not 
too far removed from Derrida's notion of self as an effect of language. 
I have no more to say about the tensions (or lack of) between Derrida and Cavell's 
philosophy. They both have, I believe, extremely interesting things to say to education. 
We shall leave Cavell now (he has played his last scene in this thesis) though Derrida 
will make a further cameo appearance. Let us now consider some other tensions 
(though tensions might not be the right word). 
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Lyotard 
As I argued in Chapter 2, Lyotard's performativity represented a powerful prognosis of 
what would happen to education (and society more generally). However his ways of 
thinking through and beyond this state of affairs tend to privilege dissonance or 
negation. In 'Pointlessness and the University of Beauty' (an essay that has been cited 
several times already), Bearn offers a way of thinking that moves beyond negative 
terms and discursive boundaries. Beam's response to Lyotard is very much in keeping 
with the Nietzschean spirit of the previous chapter. Indeed, the influence of Deleuze 
and Nietzsche is readily acknowledged by Bearn. 
For Bearn, the "issue" (I would hesitate to say the "problem") with Lyotard's thought 
is that it approaches the other side of representation from this side. This is very 
Deleuzian, and Bearn quotes Deleuze who argues that representation represents 
"groundlessness as a completely undifferentiated abyss, a universal lack of difference, 
an indifferent blank nothingness". (Deleuze quoted in Bearn, 2000, p. 242). Therefore, 
if we look at things from this side of representation and if something comes out of this, 
it will be "incomprehensible: as terrifying as dread or as wonderful as grace" (ibid.). 
Whereas Lyotard's discussion of the other side of representation represents a doubled 
negation, a no followed by a no, Beam supplements this with an account of full-
fledged affirmation. Interestingly, he develops this position in relation to another short 
(marginal?) section of Kant's Critique of Judgement on "free beauties". 
Free beauties include "the foliage on wallpaper" and "music not set to words" (Kant, 
1987, sect. 16). Though we might approach these things in negative terms (in 
accordance with the sublime), Bearn argues that there is another affirmative way not by 
subtracting negations but by increasing them. He returns to Lyotard's two steps 
backward from representation and chronological time. He argues that non-
representationality, pointlessness, escaping the chronological now, and loss of the self 
"come in two flavours: negative and positive". 
Bearn gives us a flavour of what this means when thinking about the non-
representational patterns on wallpaper. If we look at these patterns from this side and 
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see them in negative terms we will be agitated and experience a serious negative 
pleasure. However, if we open ourselves and caress the patterns, forms will slip and 
slide away. Repetition can allow us to see differences in things that we thought were 
identical. Bearn mentions taking the same drive or rereading a book. On each occasion, 
repetition releases swarms of differences. What seemed identical is not identical. The 
point here seems to be that when we go slow and "caress" our surroundings, our world 
is changed radically—there was something always waiting to be experienced that our 
representational practices would not let in. Affirmation for Bearn is about letting 
ourselves travel with this intense sensuous experience of the world. Thinking should 
not move to either the technical rhythms of march-time or the bounce of syncopation 
(which is its reworked opposite) but dance to Messiadn's disparate rhythms (p. 251). 
Before considering what all this means for education, let us entertain some rational 
"objections" to Bearn's "argument". It seems difficult to fathom what Bearn is talking 
about when he writes about caressing the patterns in the wallpaper. Where on earth is 
this going to get us? We might stare at the wallpaper for a bit, our eyes will go funny 
and we'll see some new shapes. So what, we might say? The whole business of 
caressing wallpaper with our eyes sounds perverse, even a bit kinky. What is more, 
why does Bearn compare this activity with going for a drive or reading a book? We 
might accept that rereading a book might introduce new things and that the "same" 
drive will never be the same drive, but these are quite different sorts of thing. In the 
case of reading a book, one is surely engaged in an activity that involves 
understanding. This cannot be the case when one stares at wallpaper. By the same 
token, why does Bearn dismiss syncopation due to its dependence on regular metre yet 
imagine that a more radical departure is not still a departure that gains its significance 
from those same coordinates of the starting point? What on earth is Bearn talking about 
when he criticises Lyotard for looking at the other side of representation from this 
side? How does he know that the other side is a swarm of differences? 
One can look at things this way and raise quite legitimate criticisms. However, to think 
like this is not to approach Bearn on his own terms. Indeed treating what he has to say 
as a conventional argument will miss the point—it will create the very kind of dialectic 
that Bearn (following Nietzsche) wishes to overcome. To accept Bearn we must open 
ourselves to a way of thinking that is "aesthetic" not rational-dialectical. So, for 
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example, caressing clearly has sensual/sexual connotations, but it is exactly this mode 
of experiencing the world that is occluded from rational thought. This is not to say that 
Bearn is opposed to rational thought per se. It is simply that rational thought must be 
dispersed amongst the other forms of experience. 
When he talks of caressing and moving to different rhythms, Beam cannot be 
advocating a form of education that lacks a rational dimension. The activities that must 
become beautiful must generally involve a rational component. Beam's antipathy 
towards "rational thinking" is working against the ascetic distance from the object that 
rational thought (untempered by intensity) is typically inclined to seek. Truth is 
therefore not the only or indeed not the primary concern: "nobody really cares about 
truth, just truth" (Bearn, 2000, p. 253). Here I take the emphasis to be on the words 
"cares" and "just". Bearn is only disregarding truth in its caged generic sense. By the 
same token the point that nobody cares about truth is that nobody is engaged in a 
bodily way with "truth", as a concern with truth (and truth alone) can, as we have 
learned to believe, only be cerebral. More than this, rational thought (or thought 
concerned with truth) must still retain the model of a coherent self that thinks, whilst 
Beam's Dionysian approach dissimulates the self through intense particles. Getting lost 
in the wallpaper seems like a mundane activity, but that it seems this way is partly 
Beam's point. How much of our lives are spent following the repeating patterns along 
the pavement? Or the richness and movement of the lines of wallpaper? The 
ordinariness of this experience makes us shy away and seek something more 
substantial, in fact something in more reified terms: we must go to the art gallery 
(where the followers of Lyotard reside). Caressing wallpaper is therefore not a 
metaphor for other kinds of less mundane activities. It is rather part of the metonymic 
experience of intensity in which one is carried along by the flows of the world—in 
which activities meet one another in multiple ways and sometimes depart together. 
Though syncopation and dispersed rhythms both depart from regular measures, there is 
a sense in which syncopation is like a theoretical response. It is caught in a dialectic. 
Caressing the wallpaper is not. 
Beam's thought sometimes works in oppositional terms, but this is not in opposition to 
the kind of "litigation" that characterises rational argument. Rather it is in opposition to 
absence. Lyotard's negative move was to subtract—desires, purposes and the self For 
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Beam, to be freed from the constraints of goal-directed thinking requires no 
subtraction, but must be thought of in terms of what happens in the middle, where we 
get lost in a swarm of different thoughts, ideas, feelings, worries, enjoyments. Goals 
(the point of things) do not exactly disappear, but their determining quality is hijacked 
by the multiplicity of experience: there are an indeterminate number of goals/points. 
Moreover, there is a general goal that defies teleological boundaries—the goal of 
becoming intense. This represents an affirmative overcoming of chronological time. 
The University of Beauty and the Beautiful School 
Performativity is blind to the "swarm of intense differences" because it, like any genre 
of discourse, can only "regiment" intensity and "tie it in a knot". The goal as 
mentioned earlier of Bearn's vision is to release intensity. This release should 
characterise "The University of Beauty". In keeping with the affirmative thrust of 
Bearn's argument, this will not simply involve a departure from certain activities that 
are often associated with the culture of effectiveness such as various forms of 
vocational training. It is not the training that is the problem but the genre of discourse 
that has tied it in a knot and made our understanding of training anaemic and technical 
(p. 254). All sorts of activities, whether they take place in the humanities or sciences or 
indeed whether or not they involve training for a vocation, can be diffused through 
intense particles. What matters is that the fires of the imagination are ignited and burn 
"with a fire that does not consume" (p. 247). Moreover, the university should be an 
intensity machine breaking through disciplinary boundaries. This approach should be 
playful, as this will help us break free of received representational frameworks for 
thinking. 
It is interesting to note that Beam's vision of the university can easily "cross over" to 
thinking about the school. This is partly due to both the affirmation characterised by 
overcoming the academic/vocational hierarchy and the recognition of ordinary 
experience. Indeed, perhaps the school with its less pretentious ambitions might be a 
more obvious candidate than the university for becoming intense and beautiful. 
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Affirmation and Arrivants 
We have seen how Lyotard and Bearn (whose position is very Nietzschean/Deleuzian) 
move in different directions: one toward negation, the other affirmation. However, 
philosophies of absence need not be pessimistic. Indeed, at various points in this thesis, 
we have considered the more positive philosophy of absence supplied by Derrida. One 
way of discussing a commonality, which is also a difference, between Derridian and 
Deleuzian philosophies, might be to see them as two kinds of metonymic philosophy. 
During my time as a schoolteacher I frequently had to teach the difference between 
metaphor and metonymy. Metaphors, I explained, must replace other ways of putting 
things. Similes (a kind of metaphor) involve using the words "like" and "as"—"like a 
bear", "she was as cold as ice". Hence, to do this I would give examples: "the sun" 
might be replaced with the "eye of heaven". This is based on the idea of there being 
some kind of resemblance between the metaphor and the thing it stands for. Metonyms, 
by contrast, were best explained by giving examples of what metonyms are: the crown 
stands for the king. In these cases a part of the thing in question is taken to stand for the 
whole. 
Why does this matter? It matters to me because I want to introduce the idea that some 
kinds of philosophy—in fact, some ways of thinking more generally—are metonymic. 
Let's approach this by asking, first, how some kinds of philosophy (and thinking) may 
depend on metaphor. This applies to philosophies that depend upon some kind of a gap 
between, for example, the actual and the ideal, perhaps between language and logic.. . 
Where there is such a gap, one element in the binary is privileged. A clear case of this 
is in Plato's theory of the Forms (the ideal forms that for Plato are the most real things 
and that contrast with the changing objects of our experience). Obviously this is crucial 
for what we think of as Western forms of thought. This makes us believe that the 
actualities of our experience are somehow second-rate: they are inferior to the ultimate 
reality, the realm of the Forms. A version of this way of thinking is inherited by 
Christianity. We can see here its connection with a certain kind of metaphysics: 
metaphor connects with metaphyics! 
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This may seem remote from life in the 21st century, but it is not. Think for a moment of 
an ordinary department store. We are presented with a kind of ideal world where all 
items are in perfect condition and everything is arranged beautifully. When we go to 
the store and purchase something, we feel we are brought closer to this ideal world—
almost perhaps as if this were like a religious experience. Just think for a moment of 
the compulsion that people feel to go shopping—as if they were spiritually drawn. On 
the negative side, this can make us feel that our actual lives—our homes, our clothes, 
out kitchens—are second-rate, not how things should be. In fact, a similar process is at 
work through television. Advertisements work on us in this way, constantly presenting 
the world that we should aspire to live in. So also do series such as Friends, which 
glamorise a way of life, making us feel that this is really how people should be. All this 
is relevant to ordinary everyday unhappiness. Phillip Larkin's poem 'Essential Beauty' 
catches something of this. 
In frames as large as room that face all ways 
And block the ends of streets with giant loaves 
Screen graves with custard, cover slums with praise 
Of motor-oil and cuts of salmon, shine 
Perpetually these sharply-pictured groves 
Of how life should be. High above the gutter 
A silver knife sinks into golden butter (Larkin, 1962) 
We can also relate these images of an idealised world to the way the classroom has 
become. Instead of the dynamic and sometimes heated space that this used to be, it is 
now characterised more by the cool air of a climate-control system. The atmosphere 
has become antiseptic through an overreliance on ICT. Everywhere you look there are 
laminated cards with lists of learning objectives. Teachers will be smartly dressed and 
smiling, as if they were young executives efficiently managing the business at hand. 
Activities will be "well targeted". Lesson plans, and the discourse of the teacher during 
the lesson, must remain "on message". 
Derrida takes issue with the whole structure of thought that lies behind this. For him, it 
is not the case that there are truths to the world that are already there but waiting to find 
words. Rather, language generates a metaphysics through its own workings, through 
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the repetition of words in connection with other words. Meaning is only possible 
through interdependence, and there is no final stability. This is metonymic because 
meaning is generated through contiguity (where one thing touches another) and not 
through representation (where one thing stands for or replaces something else). A 
crown touches the head of a king or queen, and part of what you see when you see a 
king is the crown on that person's head. Metaphor is, in a sense, the enemy: Derrida's 
philosophy is metonymic due to its resistance to logocentrism, which is, in a sense, 
necessarily "metaphorical": 
[M]etaphoric mediation has insinuated itself into the relationship and 
has simulated immediacy; the writing of truth in the soul, opposed by 
Phaedrus (278a) to bad writing (writing in the "literal" [propre] and 
ordinary sense, "sensible" writing, "in space"), the book of Nature and 
God's writing, especially in the Middle Ages: all that functions as 
metaphor in these discourses confirms the privilege of the logos and 
founds the "literal" meaning then given to writing: a sign signifying a 
signifier itself signifying an eternal verity, eternally thought and spoken 
in the proximity of a present logos. The paradox to which attention 
must be paid is this: natural and universal writing, intelligible and 
nontemporal writing, is thus named by metaphor. (Derrida, 1997, p.15) 
Metaphor always implies the notion that there is some kind of origin that the metaphor 
stands in for or represents. Logocentric thought with its world-word hierarchy is in this 
sense always metaphorical. Because Derrida exposes the absence of an origin(al) 
metaphysics through his discussion of "the mark", he shows language to be 
fundamentally metonymic. For Derrida, words do not refer to something that is "there". 
They come to "mean" due to their relationship with other words and through being 
repeated. As there is no binary code for deciphering metonyms, they come to stand for 
the concealed truth about language. It is, if you like, the metonymic quality of language 
that allows for the education of the arrivant. 
There is, however, another kind of philosophy that is also metonymic. Derrida's ideas 
about language derive especially from a Heideggerian and Levinasian background. As 
we have seen, Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy is more Nietzschean in character. In 
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contrast to Den-ida, the metonymic aspect of Deleuze's philosophy is captured by the 
figure of the rhizome. As we saw in the last chapter, rhizomes are metonyms that 
resonate with the intensities of the world. The tree is a metaphor because it is a 
fabrication, a symbol of power that tries to control the multiplicity of things. Indeed, 
the "tree" with its roots is, by its nature, bound to metaphor. By contrast, Deleuze and 
Guattari depict the universe as a flat realm across which multiple intensities meet and 
depart on lines of flight. There is no governing "identity" that can exercise full control 
of this process. 
An intensity is an experience, they say, that is allowed to move across a flat plane. But 
what then does that mean? Intensities do not happen all the time. They are a matter 
rather of what happens in the middle, when things are allowed to flow. Thus, in the 
teaching of a class one can find that there are different phases. The class starts slowly, 
the planned activity is set out, the children begin to work. But then, somewhere in the 
middle, a question is asked, a discussion takes place, something happens that breaks 
with the lines of the lesson-plan or that opens it to new possibilities. And then in the 
midst of this activity, teacher and children become absorbed in what they are doing: 
things become intense. 
The point here is to see that this is not something to be frightened of, it is not 
something that makes us unhappy. On the contrary it may be associated with some of 
the more memorable aspects of our teaching and learning, or indeed of our lives more 
generally. Why is this metonymic? The point is that thought is not confronted with a 
gap—between one thing and something else it resembles; it is not a matter of 
representation—say, of the way that the tree relates to the world. Rather there is a 
contiguity (things touch!), and thought is allowed to flow as it touches this thing, and 
another and another. It touches, it caresses. Whereas the tree generates an 
"arborescent" structure: it frustrates touch, being preoccupied with the gaze that seeks 
representation. 
It is interesting to repeat that the tree-rhizome distinction is not a straightforward 
binary opposition. This is partly because of what we saw earlier about the fact that tree 
is a metaphor and the rhizome a metonym. The rhizome does not represent but it 
continuous with those aspects of the world to which it relates. A Deleuzian approach 
210 
here requires us to think in terms of contiguity. A word touches another. It functions, as 
is well established, not so much through its correlation with the thing it represents as 
with its connections with other words. 
Ulimately Derrida's metonymic vision sees language as conjuring metaphoricity 
through the logos. When the philosopher sees this is so, she can watch for the slippage 
and shifts that reveal the abyss. She can welcome what comes out of the abyss during 
linguistic performances. In contrast and in Nietzschean fashion, Deleuze and Guattari 
travel with the intense flow, where it goes. Ultimately, I do not want to choose between 
the Derridian or Nietzschean/Deleuzian visions. I believe that they both give rise to 
rich ways of thinking about education that have only been touched on during this 
thesis. Nevertheless, we might consider Bearn's rhetorical question: "How do you 
break on through to the other side of representation?" He responds: "I take my cue 
from Deleuze and Guattari: I do not think that it can be done alone. It takes at least 
two, perhaps not two persons, but it takes two" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, pp. 243-
4). 
It seems that the way to become intense takes two and involves catching beauteous 
particles. Unfortunately it seems that politicians, university lecturers, school leaders 
and teachers are more likely to catch swine flu than beauteous intense particles if they 
simply wait around for them. One might argue that the relatively recent upheavals in 
British education may suggest contagion—national tests have been abolished for 14 
year olds and recent reviews of Primary Education have revealed considerable 
dissatisfaction with the technical target-driven edifice of contemporary education. 
Nevertheless, as we speak teachers are trying to find "in-school" ways of testing 14 
year olds and developing ways of predicting grades at a local level. This bleak situation 
shows that intensity has been tied in a knot. Just as nothing may come out of Lyotard's 
desert, beauteous particles may never break on through to the other side. 
Perhaps then, the unravelling of language that bearing witness to its iterability would 
involve may help to untie the knots in our thinking and allow intensity to break on 
through or arrive—and they we may find that the student is after all the lover. A recent 
television advert shows children on a beach throwing stones at the grey sky. When the 
stones penetrate the clouds they release sunlight. Perhaps close attention to the 
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otherness internal to representation may both release what we have not yet known and 
also set Bearn's ordinary particles of light (particles all around us already) free. Maybe 
philosophies of affirmation and absence can have a happy (if sometimes troubled) 
marriage. Repetition will then act both as a release through intensity and an experience 
of the alterity internal to our words. 
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